I mean Peterson and Harris both support “good” as opposed to “moral relativism” where there is no good, there is no evil. Moral relativism is a philosophy without objective goodness e.g. Nietzsche: there is only will to power. There are many competing definitions of “good”. Peterson and Harris agree that the concept of “good” shouldn’t be thrown away entirely. Which definition of “good” we use is not important to the Peterson-Harris debate.
They both agree that religion has value.
I’m not sure whether religion has (significant, positive) value. Does that make me unreasonable?
In the context of this debate, not. I’m using “reasonable” the way legal scholars use “reasonable”: for having to avoid defining nebulous-yet-commonly-used words.
I’m a moral anti-realist; it seems to me to be a direct inescapable consequence of materialism.
I tried looking at definitions of moral relativism, and it seems more confused than moral realism vs. anti-realism. (To be sure there are even more confused stances out there, like error theory...)
Should I take it that Peterson and Harris are both moral realists and interpret their words in that light? Note that this wouldn’t be reasoning about what they’re saying, for me, it would be literally interpreting their words, because people are rarely precise, and moral realists and anti-realists often use the same words to mean different things. (In part because they’re confused and are arguing over the “true” meaning of words.)
So, if they’re moral realists, then “not throwing away the concept of good” means not throwing away moral realism; I think I understand what that means in this context.
Should I take it that Peterson and Harris are both moral realists and interpret their words in that light?
Yes. I believe neither Peterson nor Harris is a moral anti-realist.
So, if they’re moral realists, then “not throwing away the concept of good” means not throwing away moral realism; I think I understand what that means in this context.
I mean Peterson and Harris both support “good” as opposed to “moral relativism” where there is no good, there is no evil. Moral relativism is a philosophy without objective goodness e.g. Nietzsche: there is only will to power. There are many competing definitions of “good”. Peterson and Harris agree that the concept of “good” shouldn’t be thrown away entirely. Which definition of “good” we use is not important to the Peterson-Harris debate.
In the context of this debate, not. I’m using “reasonable” the way legal scholars use “reasonable”: for having to avoid defining nebulous-yet-commonly-used words.
Nietzsche’s approach.might be a form of relativism, but it’s not the only one.
Thank you. I have corrected the original comment.
I’m a moral anti-realist; it seems to me to be a direct inescapable consequence of materialism.
I tried looking at definitions of moral relativism, and it seems more confused than moral realism vs. anti-realism. (To be sure there are even more confused stances out there, like error theory...)
Should I take it that Peterson and Harris are both moral realists and interpret their words in that light? Note that this wouldn’t be reasoning about what they’re saying, for me, it would be literally interpreting their words, because people are rarely precise, and moral realists and anti-realists often use the same words to mean different things. (In part because they’re confused and are arguing over the “true” meaning of words.)
So, if they’re moral realists, then “not throwing away the concept of good” means not throwing away moral realism; I think I understand what that means in this context.
Yes. I believe neither Peterson nor Harris is a moral anti-realist.
Yes. I think you understand the debate correctly.
Harris is both a moral realist and a naturalist. He thinks moral truths can be derived by science. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Moral_Landscape