If there is none, it would mean a world where everyone suffers horribly forever is not objectively worse than one where everyone is eternally happy. But I think that’s just not compatible with what words like “good” or “worse” mean! If we imagine a world where everything is the same as in ours, except that people call things “bad” we call “good”, and “good” what we call “bad”—would that mean they believe suffering is good? Of course not. They just use different words for the same concepts we have! Believing that, other things being equal, suffering is bad seems to be like believing that bachelors are unmarried, or that even numbers are divisible by two without rest. It seems to be a conceptual truth, an objective fact about the concepts in question. Which is incompatible with ethical statements not being able to be objectively true or false, because whether someone suffers, or not, is an objective psychological fact.
To acknowledge this I don’t think we need to actually finish a complete ethical theory which translates all statements about goodness into statements about expected utility or suffering or preferences or such. Otherwise this would be like saying “If you don’t have a precise analysis of the term ‘rational’, it can be doubted there are any objective facts about what is rational or irrational”. We don’t need to know a perfect theory of rationality to know that some things are definitely rational and some others are definitely irrational, which already rules out the view that there is nothing objective about rationality. The same holds for morality.
Consider a world where everyone suffers horribly, and it’s no ones fault , and it’s impossible or to change. Is it morally wrong , even though the the elements of intentionality and obligation are absent?
But it is clearly “morally” bad? It is just not a morally wrong action. Actions are wrong insofar their expected outcomes are bad, but an outcome can be bad without being the result of anyone’s action.
(You might say that morality is only a theory of actions. Then saying that a world, or any outcome, is “morally” bad, would be a category mistake. Fine then, call “ethics” the theory both of good and bad outcomes, and of right and wrong actions. Then a world where everyone suffers is bad, ethically bad.)
If there is none, it would mean a world where everyone suffers horribly forever is not objectively worse than one where everyone is eternally happy. But I think that’s just not compatible with what words like “good” or “worse” mean! If we imagine a world where everything is the same as in ours, except that people call things “bad” we call “good”, and “good” what we call “bad”—would that mean they believe suffering is good? Of course not. They just use different words for the same concepts we have! Believing that, other things being equal, suffering is bad seems to be like believing that bachelors are unmarried, or that even numbers are divisible by two without rest. It seems to be a conceptual truth, an objective fact about the concepts in question. Which is incompatible with ethical statements not being able to be objectively true or false, because whether someone suffers, or not, is an objective psychological fact.
To acknowledge this I don’t think we need to actually finish a complete ethical theory which translates all statements about goodness into statements about expected utility or suffering or preferences or such. Otherwise this would be like saying “If you don’t have a precise analysis of the term ‘rational’, it can be doubted there are any objective facts about what is rational or irrational”. We don’t need to know a perfect theory of rationality to know that some things are definitely rational and some others are definitely irrational, which already rules out the view that there is nothing objective about rationality. The same holds for morality.
Consider a world where everyone suffers horribly, and it’s no ones fault , and it’s impossible or to change. Is it morally wrong , even though the the elements of intentionality and obligation are absent?
The terms “right” and “wrong” apply just to actions. This world is bad, without someone doing something wrong.
An imperfect world might be in various ways, such as being undesirable, but if it is not morally bad, it implies nothing about objective morality.
But it is clearly “morally” bad? It is just not a morally wrong action. Actions are wrong insofar their expected outcomes are bad, but an outcome can be bad without being the result of anyone’s action.
(You might say that morality is only a theory of actions. Then saying that a world, or any outcome, is “morally” bad, would be a category mistake. Fine then, call “ethics” the theory both of good and bad outcomes, and of right and wrong actions. Then a world where everyone suffers is bad, ethically bad.)
No, that’s the point.
Yep, but you still need to show its morally bad even if it is unintentional.