Weren’t things like the current positions on the trinity arrived by political processes, including persecution of dissenters as heretics? Why should such positions be expected to be more likely to be true, even assuming divine beings? Or do you mean you will accept their expert opinion on what the church positions are, their history and so on?
I am presuming a theology professor is more likely to have a view based on the arguments (if you can call them that) and textual evidence than a random member of the public or follower of that religion. (A priest would be a different matter as they have strong investment in the doctrine.)
Analogously, I will likely trust the opinion of the head of a Harry Potter fandom group, who has likely been involved in debates on the topic, about some point of the minutiae of Harry Potter lore (how old his parents were when they died for example). But that doesn’t entail accepting the premise ‘Harry Potter is real.’
Edit Upon more thought I think the issue may be that I was working from the premise “Theology professors are not invested emotionally in the results of a debate, but argue based on theory and textual evidence” which, while it has been my experience, may not be universal and may not be a premise you share.
I’d trust the head of a Harry Potter fandom group to get questions about the fictional character Harry Potter right, but not for questions about a hypothetical culture of real wizards, even if someone were claiming the books to have been based on such.
But (assuming for the sake of argument the books count as documentary evidence) would you say they had a higher probability of being right than: ‘someone who had read the books once’ or ‘someone who had never read the books.’ Or would you expect them all to be equally likely to be right or wrong?
Someone who has read the books, but isn’t a fan > a dedicated fan > someone who never read the books. I’d expect dedicated fans to over-count the books as evidence and to not give very different scenarios enough consideration, or fail to think of them at all.
But surely they are also more likely to have inconsistent beliefs that a person who had engaged in discussion wouldn’t? (E.g. misunderstanding a section in a way that could easily be noticed in discussion.)
Analogously very few theology professors believe in the literal creation story, for obvious reasons, and are likely to have slightly more coherent conceptions of free will/sin/miracles.
Weren’t things like the current positions on the trinity arrived by political processes, including persecution of dissenters as heretics? Why should such positions be expected to be more likely to be true, even assuming divine beings? Or do you mean you will accept their expert opinion on what the church positions are, their history and so on?
I am presuming a theology professor is more likely to have a view based on the arguments (if you can call them that) and textual evidence than a random member of the public or follower of that religion. (A priest would be a different matter as they have strong investment in the doctrine.)
Analogously, I will likely trust the opinion of the head of a Harry Potter fandom group, who has likely been involved in debates on the topic, about some point of the minutiae of Harry Potter lore (how old his parents were when they died for example). But that doesn’t entail accepting the premise ‘Harry Potter is real.’
Edit Upon more thought I think the issue may be that I was working from the premise “Theology professors are not invested emotionally in the results of a debate, but argue based on theory and textual evidence” which, while it has been my experience, may not be universal and may not be a premise you share.
I’d trust the head of a Harry Potter fandom group to get questions about the fictional character Harry Potter right, but not for questions about a hypothetical culture of real wizards, even if someone were claiming the books to have been based on such.
But (assuming for the sake of argument the books count as documentary evidence) would you say they had a higher probability of being right than: ‘someone who had read the books once’ or ‘someone who had never read the books.’ Or would you expect them all to be equally likely to be right or wrong?
Someone who has read the books, but isn’t a fan > a dedicated fan > someone who never read the books. I’d expect dedicated fans to over-count the books as evidence and to not give very different scenarios enough consideration, or fail to think of them at all.
But surely they are also more likely to have inconsistent beliefs that a person who had engaged in discussion wouldn’t? (E.g. misunderstanding a section in a way that could easily be noticed in discussion.)
Analogously very few theology professors believe in the literal creation story, for obvious reasons, and are likely to have slightly more coherent conceptions of free will/sin/miracles.