So if a simple setup you can do at home with some liquid nitrogen, a laser and a kumquat appeared to allow direct hypercomputation—could instantaneously determine whether a particular Turing machine halted—and you were able to test this against all sorts of extraordinary examples, you would never come to the conclusion that it was a hypercomputation engine, instead building ever-more-complex computable models of what it was doing?
A hotline to a computable halt-finding machine seems much more plausible than something uncomputable, yes. We have no idea how something uncomputable could possibly work. You should not give weight to the uncomputable while computable approximations exist.
figure out from that an example where it makes the wrong call
test it, find that the experiment makes the correct call
hypothesize a new computable halt-tester that makes the correct call on this example
would you have to go through before concluding the universe was not computable?
I have to confess that I don’t really see what’s so special about the bottom of the compute hierarchy that you would be so certain that’s where the universe is.
So if a simple setup you can do at home with some liquid nitrogen, a laser and a kumquat appeared to allow direct hypercomputation—could instantaneously determine whether a particular Turing machine halted—and you were able to test this against all sorts of extraordinary examples, you would never come to the conclusion that it was a hypercomputation engine, instead building ever-more-complex computable models of what it was doing?
I would never conclude that, because the proposition that I’m in a simulation and the DLotM are messing with me is about as plausible on the evidence.
A hotline to a computable halt-finding machine seems much more plausible than something uncomputable, yes. We have no idea how something uncomputable could possibly work. You should not give weight to the uncomputable while computable approximations exist.
So how many cycles of
hypothesize a computable halt-tester
figure out from that an example where it makes the wrong call
test it, find that the experiment makes the correct call
hypothesize a new computable halt-tester that makes the correct call on this example
would you have to go through before concluding the universe was not computable?
I have to confess that I don’t really see what’s so special about the bottom of the compute hierarchy that you would be so certain that’s where the universe is.