I don’t see any problem with a tautological definition of “selfishness”, as long as you realize what it can and can’t do (eliminate “impossible possible worlds” but not “possible possible worlds”). Of course, you should also have a word (“selfishness” is often used for this too) for utility functions that don’t count the well being of others.
“he proclaims that price controls will lead to rationing by non-price means. But this is only true if the provider of the good in question is attempting to maximize profit; if the producer is willing to take a hit in the wallet out of the goodness of his heart for his customers’ well-being, as Mises’ tautological definition of self-interest allows, a small price ceiling could conceivably have no effect.”
That prediction is based on the second definition of selfishness, and is not required by the first. It’s an empirical prediction based on a falsifiable premise of selfishness2, so I don’t see what the problem is.
If Mises has trouble keeping the two meanings in different mental buckets, then he has a problem, but I don’t think that damns Austrian economics. If Austrian economics came about purely because of confused thought, then maybe we could dismiss it offhand, but unless you’re convinced of this (I’m not), then all you’re doing is attacking the weak support.
I don’t see any problem with a tautological definition of “selfishness”, as long as you realize what it can and can’t do (eliminate “impossible possible worlds” but not “possible possible worlds”). Of course, you should also have a word (“selfishness” is often used for this too) for utility functions that don’t count the well being of others.
“he proclaims that price controls will lead to rationing by non-price means. But this is only true if the provider of the good in question is attempting to maximize profit; if the producer is willing to take a hit in the wallet out of the goodness of his heart for his customers’ well-being, as Mises’ tautological definition of self-interest allows, a small price ceiling could conceivably have no effect.”
That prediction is based on the second definition of selfishness, and is not required by the first. It’s an empirical prediction based on a falsifiable premise of selfishness2, so I don’t see what the problem is.
If Mises has trouble keeping the two meanings in different mental buckets, then he has a problem, but I don’t think that damns Austrian economics. If Austrian economics came about purely because of confused thought, then maybe we could dismiss it offhand, but unless you’re convinced of this (I’m not), then all you’re doing is attacking the weak support.