I agree that Hayek doesn’t fall into the same methodological trap. Which is why hardcore Mises/Rothbard Austrians spend a little time eschewing his work on knowledge. (See especially the last handful of quotes.)
Caplan indeed has quite a back-and-forth with Hülsman and Block. Especially of note for those on this site will be this paper (pdf) advocating a Bayesian interpretation of probability, something Austrians resist vehemently.
To be fair to the Austrians, mainstream economists aren’t always keen on it either. Caplan recounted a story to us in class: Robin Hanson apparently submitted a paper to a journal about beliefs. The editor responded that using probabilities to represent people’s beliefs was “crude charlatanism.”
I agree that Hayek doesn’t fall into the same methodological trap. Which is why hardcore Mises/Rothbard Austrians spend a little time eschewing his work on knowledge. (See especially the last handful of quotes.)
Caplan indeed has quite a back-and-forth with Hülsman and Block. Especially of note for those on this site will be this paper (pdf) advocating a Bayesian interpretation of probability, something Austrians resist vehemently.
To be fair to the Austrians, mainstream economists aren’t always keen on it either. Caplan recounted a story to us in class: Robin Hanson apparently submitted a paper to a journal about beliefs. The editor responded that using probabilities to represent people’s beliefs was “crude charlatanism.”