And by and large I agree with the analysis—that is, I agree that how much weight to give to that particular evidence is determined by your estimates of P(B|AC) and p(B|C).
We may yet disagree on these, but if we do it should be on the basis of models that further evidence can in principle confirm or rule out, for instance whose DNA exactly was found on the clasp—does it match the investigators’ ? They were at the crime scene. Contamination of that sort would help (in a Bayesian sense) the prosecution, not the defense.
What I take issue with is to say that something “does not count” when we have a previous commitment to take into account every bit of evidence available to us. Either we use Bayesian standards of inquiry, or judicial standards of inquiry, but we do not cherry-pick which is convenient to a given point we want to make.
Now that is analytical.
And by and large I agree with the analysis—that is, I agree that how much weight to give to that particular evidence is determined by your estimates of P(B|AC) and p(B|C).
We may yet disagree on these, but if we do it should be on the basis of models that further evidence can in principle confirm or rule out, for instance whose DNA exactly was found on the clasp—does it match the investigators’ ? They were at the crime scene. Contamination of that sort would help (in a Bayesian sense) the prosecution, not the defense.
What I take issue with is to say that something “does not count” when we have a previous commitment to take into account every bit of evidence available to us. Either we use Bayesian standards of inquiry, or judicial standards of inquiry, but we do not cherry-pick which is convenient to a given point we want to make.