I find the term useful. I think it is what a lot of the media has done. Since Amanda and Raffaele are in discussion and named in the theory, there must be something to it and they have equal weights of measure for concern as the third suspect, Rudy. When in fact, they are very lightweight and the (heavy) weight should be attributed to the method by which they became suspects. The term helps me to say “Oh that’s what is going on.” Like komponisto said, a whole category of error. (Not to mention all the contexts apart from this specific case, the topic at hand, indeed.)
Quite right. It’s actually amazing how little attention was paid to Rudy Guede in the media coverage of this case, particularly in the U.S. and U.K. media. (Numerous stories either omitted all mention of him altogether or else referred briefly and vaguely to “a third suspect”—without any hint about the disparity in evidence.)
I am also pointing out that is a question pertaining to applied situation with a limited scope—the decision to convict or exonerate. For all intents and purposes, relative “knowing” is permissible in a legal case, since we are dealing with human events and activities of a finite nature—a court decision is a discrete (not continuous) matter. After a certain point, probabilties have to turn into decisions.
Therefore, I offered 0 in the spirit of Goedel’s completeness theorem, yes, at the expense of consistency. Consistency will yield a perpetual motion situation. Completeness is required and can be appropriately reached through reasoning, logic, objectivity, etc. Something can only consistent OR complete. Not both.
The thing that I am trying to point out is that I believe Amanda and Raffaele were wrongly included in the class called “suspects”.
Yes indeed—our term for that here is privileging the hypothesis.
(Although I do find the point more salient when it is described explicitly rather than by reference to jargon. )
Wasn’t trying to enforce the use of jargon so much as classify the fallacy.
After all, the point is even more salient when you can relate it to a whole category of error found in many other contexts.
I find the term useful. I think it is what a lot of the media has done. Since Amanda and Raffaele are in discussion and named in the theory, there must be something to it and they have equal weights of measure for concern as the third suspect, Rudy. When in fact, they are very lightweight and the (heavy) weight should be attributed to the method by which they became suspects. The term helps me to say “Oh that’s what is going on.” Like komponisto said, a whole category of error. (Not to mention all the contexts apart from this specific case, the topic at hand, indeed.)
Quite right. It’s actually amazing how little attention was paid to Rudy Guede in the media coverage of this case, particularly in the U.S. and U.K. media. (Numerous stories either omitted all mention of him altogether or else referred briefly and vaguely to “a third suspect”—without any hint about the disparity in evidence.)
I am also pointing out that is a question pertaining to applied situation with a limited scope—the decision to convict or exonerate. For all intents and purposes, relative “knowing” is permissible in a legal case, since we are dealing with human events and activities of a finite nature—a court decision is a discrete (not continuous) matter. After a certain point, probabilties have to turn into decisions.
Therefore, I offered 0 in the spirit of Goedel’s completeness theorem, yes, at the expense of consistency. Consistency will yield a perpetual motion situation. Completeness is required and can be appropriately reached through reasoning, logic, objectivity, etc. Something can only consistent OR complete. Not both.