I think you’re on the right track in assessing the paper’s content. Here’s what I retained from a first reading: He considers a quantum density matrix. He decides to separate it in a way which minimizes the mutual information of the two parts, hoping that this might be the amount of conscious information present, but it always turns out to be less than a bit. Also, his method of division tends to produce parts which are static (energy eigenstates). So in dividing up the density matrix, he adds a second condition (alongside “minimize the mutual information”) so that the resulting parts will evolve over time. This increases the minimum mutual information, but not substantially.
I regard the paper as a very preliminary contribution to a new approach to quantum ontology. In effect he’s telling us how the wavefunction divides into things, if we assume that the division is made according to this balance between minimal mutual information and some dynamics in the parts. Then he can ask whether the resulting things look like objects as we know them (reasonably so) and whether they look like integrated information processors (less success there, in my opinion, even though that was the aim).
I think you’re on the right track in assessing the paper’s content. Here’s what I retained from a first reading: He considers a quantum density matrix. He decides to separate it in a way which minimizes the mutual information of the two parts, hoping that this might be the amount of conscious information present, but it always turns out to be less than a bit. Also, his method of division tends to produce parts which are static (energy eigenstates). So in dividing up the density matrix, he adds a second condition (alongside “minimize the mutual information”) so that the resulting parts will evolve over time. This increases the minimum mutual information, but not substantially.
I regard the paper as a very preliminary contribution to a new approach to quantum ontology. In effect he’s telling us how the wavefunction divides into things, if we assume that the division is made according to this balance between minimal mutual information and some dynamics in the parts. Then he can ask whether the resulting things look like objects as we know them (reasonably so) and whether they look like integrated information processors (less success there, in my opinion, even though that was the aim).