I also view philosophy as a meta-science. I think language is relational by nature (e.g. red refer to the strong correlation between our respective experiences of red) and is blind to singularity (I cannot explain by mean of language what it is like for me to see red, I can only give it a name, which you can understand only if my red is correlated to yours—my singular red cannot be expressed).
Since science is a product of language, its horizon is describing the relational framework of existing things, which are unspeakable. That’s exactly what science converge toward (Quantum physics is a relational description of measurables—with special relativity, space/time referentials are relative to an observer, etc.). Being a subject is unspeakable (my experience of existing is a succession of singularities) and is beyond the horizon of science, science can only define its contour—the relational framework.
I don’t think that we can describe the subject in the language of scientific representation, because I think that the scientific representation is always relative to a subject (therefore the subject is already in the representation, in a sense...). That is why I always insist on the subject. Not that I refuse to let philosophy do its thing, I just want to clarify what its thing exactly is, so that we are not deluded by a mythical scientific description of everything that would be totally independend of our existence (which would make of us an epiphenomenon).
1: Yes—we assume that words mean the same thing to others when we use them, and it’s actually quite tricky to know when you’ve succeeded in communicating meaning.
2: “with special relativity, space/time referentials are relative to an observer, etc.”—this is rather sad and makes me think you’re trolling. What does this have to do with language? Nothing.
3: Your belief that we can’t describe things in certain ways has you preaching, instead of trying to discover what your interlocutor actually means. “which would make of us an epiphenomenon”—so what? It sounds like you’re prepared to derail any conversation by insisting everyone remind themselves that these are PEOPLE saying and thinking these things. Or maybe, more reasonably, you think that everyone ought to have a position about why they aren’t constantly saying “I think …”, and you’ll only derail when they refuse to admit that they’re making an aesthetic choice.
I only insist that people do not conflate representation and reality. To me, stating that an object is is already a fallacy (though I accept this as a convenient way of speaking). An object appears or is conceived, but we do not know what is, and we should not talk about what we do not know. To me, uncritically assuming that their exist an objective world and trying to figure out what it is is already a fallacy. Why I think that? Because I think there is no absolute, only relations.
I also view philosophy as a meta-science. I think language is relational by nature (e.g. red refer to the strong correlation between our respective experiences of red) and is blind to singularity (I cannot explain by mean of language what it is like for me to see red, I can only give it a name, which you can understand only if my red is correlated to yours—my singular red cannot be expressed).
Since science is a product of language, its horizon is describing the relational framework of existing things, which are unspeakable. That’s exactly what science converge toward (Quantum physics is a relational description of measurables—with special relativity, space/time referentials are relative to an observer, etc.). Being a subject is unspeakable (my experience of existing is a succession of singularities) and is beyond the horizon of science, science can only define its contour—the relational framework.
I don’t think that we can describe the subject in the language of scientific representation, because I think that the scientific representation is always relative to a subject (therefore the subject is already in the representation, in a sense...). That is why I always insist on the subject. Not that I refuse to let philosophy do its thing, I just want to clarify what its thing exactly is, so that we are not deluded by a mythical scientific description of everything that would be totally independend of our existence (which would make of us an epiphenomenon).
I hope this clarify my position.
To your 3 paragraphs:
1: Yes—we assume that words mean the same thing to others when we use them, and it’s actually quite tricky to know when you’ve succeeded in communicating meaning.
2: “with special relativity, space/time referentials are relative to an observer, etc.”—this is rather sad and makes me think you’re trolling. What does this have to do with language? Nothing.
3: Your belief that we can’t describe things in certain ways has you preaching, instead of trying to discover what your interlocutor actually means. “which would make of us an epiphenomenon”—so what? It sounds like you’re prepared to derail any conversation by insisting everyone remind themselves that these are PEOPLE saying and thinking these things. Or maybe, more reasonably, you think that everyone ought to have a position about why they aren’t constantly saying “I think …”, and you’ll only derail when they refuse to admit that they’re making an aesthetic choice.
I only insist that people do not conflate representation and reality. To me, stating that an object is is already a fallacy (though I accept this as a convenient way of speaking). An object appears or is conceived, but we do not know what is, and we should not talk about what we do not know. To me, uncritically assuming that their exist an objective world and trying to figure out what it is is already a fallacy. Why I think that? Because I think there is no absolute, only relations.
Who cares?