As for intuitions trumping science, that was unclear. What I mean is that, in my view, philosophers still often take their intuitions to be more powerful evidence than the trends of science (e.g. reductionism) - and again I can point to this example.
Ah, you mean capital-S ‘Science’, as opposed to just the empirical data. One might have a view compatible with all the scientific data without buying in to the ideological picture that we can’t use non-empirical methods (viz. philosophy) when investigating non-empirical questions.
Like, whether phenomenal properties just are certain physical/functional properties, or whether the two are merely nomologically co-extensive (going together in all worlds with the same natural laws as our own). This is obviously neither mathematical nor empirical. Similarly with normative questions: what’s a reasonable credence to have given such-and-such evidence, etc.
Ah, you mean capital-S ‘Science’, as opposed to just the empirical data. One might have a view compatible with all the scientific data without buying in to the ideological picture that we can’t use non-empirical methods (viz. philosophy) when investigating non-empirical questions.
Non-empirical questions like… what? Mathematical questions?
Like, whether phenomenal properties just are certain physical/functional properties, or whether the two are merely nomologically co-extensive (going together in all worlds with the same natural laws as our own). This is obviously neither mathematical nor empirical. Similarly with normative questions: what’s a reasonable credence to have given such-and-such evidence, etc.
See: Overcoming Scientism