we might ask why, if consciousness is not really distinct from the physical properties, is it so easy to imagine the physical properties without imagining consciousness?
And that is a question of cognitive science, is it not?
What was poor about it? The rest of your point is consistent with that wording. What would you put there instead so as to make your point more plausible?
Good question. It really needed to be stated in more objective terms (which will make the claim less plausible to you, but more logically relevant):
It’s a fact that a scenario containing a microphysical duplicate of our world but lacking chairs is incoherent. It’s not a fact that the zombie world is incoherent. (I know, we dispute this, but I’m just explaining my view here.)
With the talk of what’s easily imaginable, I invite the reader to occupy my dialectical perspective, and thus to grasp the (putative) fact under dispute; but I certainly don’t think that anything I’m saying here forces you to take my position seriously. (I agree, for example, that the psychological facts are not sufficient justification.)
Okay, but there was some evidence you were trying to draw on that you previously phrased as “it’s easy to imagine p-zombies...”—and presumably that evidence can be concisely stated, without having to learn your full dialectic perspective. Whether or not you think it’s “not a fact that the zombie world is incoherent”, there was something you thought was relevant, and that something was related (though not equivalent!) to the ease of imagining p-zombies. What was that?
(And FWIW, I do notice you are replying to many different people here and appreciate your engagement.)
And that is a question of cognitive science, is it not?
Ha, indeed, poorly worded on my part :-)
What was poor about it? The rest of your point is consistent with that wording. What would you put there instead so as to make your point more plausible?
Good question. It really needed to be stated in more objective terms (which will make the claim less plausible to you, but more logically relevant):
It’s a fact that a scenario containing a microphysical duplicate of our world but lacking chairs is incoherent. It’s not a fact that the zombie world is incoherent. (I know, we dispute this, but I’m just explaining my view here.)
With the talk of what’s easily imaginable, I invite the reader to occupy my dialectical perspective, and thus to grasp the (putative) fact under dispute; but I certainly don’t think that anything I’m saying here forces you to take my position seriously. (I agree, for example, that the psychological facts are not sufficient justification.)
Okay, but there was some evidence you were trying to draw on that you previously phrased as “it’s easy to imagine p-zombies...”—and presumably that evidence can be concisely stated, without having to learn your full dialectic perspective. Whether or not you think it’s “not a fact that the zombie world is incoherent”, there was something you thought was relevant, and that something was related (though not equivalent!) to the ease of imagining p-zombies. What was that?
(And FWIW, I do notice you are replying to many different people here and appreciate your engagement.)