Ok, it depends what you mean by “information about”. My understanding is that we have no information on the nature of reality, which does not mean that we have no information from reality.
I agree that we get information from reality. And I think that we agree that our confidence that we get information from reality is far less murky than our concept of “the nature of reality”.
Kant, being a product of his times, doesn’t seem to think this way, though. Maybe, if you explained the modern information-theoretic notion of “information” to Kant, he would agree that we get information about external reality in that sense. But I don’t know. It’s hard to imagine what a thinker like Kant would do in an entirely different intellectual environment from the one in which he produced his work. I’m inclined to think that, for Kant, the noumena are something to which it is not even possible to apply the concept of “having information about”.
I suppose it’s a virtue of that interpretation that ‘information that cannot be coded in any particular scheme’ is a conceptual impossibility (assuming that’s what you meant).
Ok, it depends what you mean by “information about”. My understanding is that we have no information on the nature of reality, which does not mean that we have no information from reality.
I agree that we get information from reality. And I think that we agree that our confidence that we get information from reality is far less murky than our concept of “the nature of reality”.
Kant, being a product of his times, doesn’t seem to think this way, though. Maybe, if you explained the modern information-theoretic notion of “information” to Kant, he would agree that we get information about external reality in that sense. But I don’t know. It’s hard to imagine what a thinker like Kant would do in an entirely different intellectual environment from the one in which he produced his work. I’m inclined to think that, for Kant, the noumena are something to which it is not even possible to apply the concept of “having information about”.
Suggestion: knowledge of what a thing is in itself , is like information that is not coded in any particular scheme.
I suppose it’s a virtue of that interpretation that ‘information that cannot be coded in any particular scheme’ is a conceptual impossibility (assuming that’s what you meant).
Yes. You can make such an interpretation of the ding-an-such.
For my money, that lessens its impact.