OSHA rules would still require that the crane operator passes the crane related training.
The term ‘signalling’ seem to have heavily drifted and mutated online to near meaninglessness.
If someone attends a truck driving course with the intention of driving trucks—or a math course with the intention of a: learning math and b: improving their thinking skills—that’s not signalling behaviour.
And conversely, if someone wants to demonstrate some innate or pre-existing quality (such as mathematical ability), they participate in a relevant contest, and this is signalling.
Now, there may well be a lot of people who start in an educated family and then sort of drift through the life conforming to parental wishes, and end up obtaining, say, a physics PhD. And then they go to economics or something similar where they do not utilize their training in much any way. One could deduce about these people that they are more innately intelligent than average, more wealthy than average, etc etc, and that they learned some thinking skills. The former two things are much more reliably signalled with an IQ test and a statement from IRS.
The term ‘signalling’ seem to have heavily drifted and mutated online to near meaninglessness.
I think it’s more that the concept entered LessWrong via Robin Hanson’s expansion of the concept into his “Homo Hypocritus” theory. For examples, see every post on Overcoming Bias with a title of the form “X is not about Y”. This theory sees all communicative acts as signalling, that is to say, undertaken with the purpose of persuading someone that one possesses some desirable characteristic. To pass a mathematics test is just as much a signal of mathematical ability as to hang out with mathematicians and adopt their jargon.
There is something that distinguishes actual performance from other signals of ability: unforgeability. By doing something that only a mathematician could do, one sends a more effective signal—that is, one more likely to be believed—that one can do mathematics.
This is a radical re-understanding of communication. On this view, not one honest thing has ever been said, not one honest thing done, by anyone, ever. “Honesty” is not a part of how brains physically work. Whether we tell a truth or tell a lie, truth-telling is never part of our purpose, but no more than a means to the end of persuading people of our qualities. It is to be selected as a means only so far as it may happen to be more effective than the alternatives in a given situation. The concept of honesty as a virtue is merely part of such signalling.
The purpose of signalling desirable qualities is to acquire status, the universal currency of social interaction. Status is what determines your access to reproduction. Those who signal status best get to reproduce most. This is what our brains have evolved to do, for as long as they been able to do this at all. Every creature bigger than an earthworm does it.
Furthermore, all acts are communicative acts, and therefore all acts are signalling. Everything we do in front of someone else is signalling. Even in solitude we are signalling to ourselves, for we can more effectively utter false signals if we believe them. Every thought that goes through your head is self-signalling, including whatever thoughts you have while reading this. It’s all signalling.
...which means that describing an act as “signalling” is basically meaningless, insofar as it fails to ascribe to that act a property that distinguishes it from other acts. It’s like describing my lunch as “material”. True, yes, but uninteresting except as a launching point to distinguish among expensive and cheap signals, forgeable and unforgeable signals, purely external signals and self-signalling, etc.
That said, in most contexts when a behavior is described as “signalling” without further qualification I generally understand the speaker to be referring more specifically to cheap signalling which is reliably treated as though it were a more expensive signal. Hanging out with mathematicians and adopting their jargon without really understanding it usually falls in this category; completing a PhD program in mathematics usually doesn’t (though I could construct contrived exceptions in both cases).
...which means that describing an act as “signalling” is basically meaningless, insofar as it fails to ascribe to that act a property that distinguishes it from other acts.
That a proposition has the form “every X is a Y” does not make it uninteresting. For example: All matter is made of atoms. All humans are descended from apes. God made everything. Every prime number is a sum of three squares. Everyone requires oxygen to live. True or false, these are all meaningful, interesting statements. “All acts are acts of signalling” is similarly so.
That said, in most contexts when a behavior is described as “signalling” without further qualification I generally understand the speaker to be referring more specifically to cheap signalling which is reliably treated as though it were a more expensive signal.
Yes, this subtext is present whenever the concept of signalling is introduced (another example of an “all X is Y” which is nevertheless a meaningful observation).
“Signalling”, in this context, means “acts undertaken primarily for the purpose of gaining status by persuading others of one’s status-worthy qualities”. As such, “All communication is signalling” is not a tautology, but an empirical claim.
acts undertaken primarily for the purpose of gaining status by persuading others of one’s status-worthy qualities
Many of those acts can be undertaken without having any such qualities, though.
I think Hanson’s ideas are far more applicable to Hanson’s own personal behaviour than to the world in general.
In particular, what he’s trying to do with his “Signalling theory” is not to tell us anything about human behaviour, but instead to try to imply that he is neglecting necessity for actual training, which would be consistent with him having some immense innate abilities but not trying hard.
Meanwhile out there in the real world, if you specifically want to get a job that requires you to speak Chinese, you are going to have to attend a course in Chinese, to actually learn Chinese. Unless you are actually native Chinese in which case you won’t have to attend that course. Which applies to most disciplines, with perhaps other disciplines for which the skill may not even exist monkey style imitating the rest.
Meanwhile out there in the real world, if you specifically want to get a job that requires you to speak Chinese, you are going to have to attend a course in Chinese, to actually learn Chinese. Unless you are actually native Chinese in which case you won’t have to attend that course.
Though depending on the situation I might still find that it’s useful to attend the course, so I can get certification as having gone through the course, which in the real world might be of more value than speaking Chinese without that certification.
And these sorts of certification-based (as opposed to skill-based) considerations apply to most disciplines as well.
And, of course, the fact that I’m applying for this job, which requires Chinese, is itself a choice I’m making, and we can ask why I’m making that choice, and to what extent my motives are status-seeking vs. truth-seeking vs. improvements-in-the-world-seeking vs. something else.
Conversely, if I am entirely uninterested in certification and I really am solely interested in learning Chinese for the intrinsic value of learning Chinese, I might find it’s more useful not to attend a course, but instead study Chinese on my own (e.g. via online materials and spending my afternoons playing Mahjong in Chinatown).
If you already speak Chinese, you’d just need to pass an exam, no course attached, and if you are a native speaker, you’d be correctly presumed to speak it better than someone who spent many years on a course, lived in China, etc.
Many of those acts can be undertaken without having any such qualities, though.
I agree. I’m not defending Hanson’s theory, just saying what it is. Perhaps in more starkly extreme terms than he might, but I have never seen him put any limits on the concept. This, I am suggesting, is the origin of the broad application of the concept on LessWrong.
Meanwhile out there in the real world, if you specifically want to get a job that requires you to speak Chinese, you are going to have to attend a course in Chinese, to actually learn Chinese.
Quite so. But you are thinking like an engineer—that is, you are thinking in terms of actually getting things done. This is the right way to think, but it is not the way of the Hansonian fundamentalist (an imaginary figure that appears in my head when I contemplate signalling theory, and should not be confused with Robin Hanson himself).
The Hansonian fundamentalist would respond that it’s still all signalling. The only thing that he aims at getting done is the acquisition of status for himself. All else is means. The role that the actual ability to speak Chinese plays is that of an unforgeable signal, a concept which replaces that of truth, as far as what goes on inside our heads is concerned. Tarski’s definition of truth stands, but the Litany of Tarski does not. It is replaced by, “If X is true, I desire whatever attitude to X will maximise my status; if X is false, I desire whatever attitude to X will maximise my status. Let me not become attached to anything but status.”
If the job really cannot be done without good spoken Chinese, then to keep that job, you will need that ability. But if in the particular situation you correctly judged that you could get by with English and the help of a Chinese secretary, busk your way through the training course, and pull strings to keep your job if you run into difficulties, then that would be Homo Hypocritus’ choice. Homo Hypocritus does whatever will work best to convince his boss of his worthy qualities, with what lawyers call reckless disregard for the truth. Truth is never a consideration, except as a contingent means to status.
ETA:
I think Hanson’s ideas are far more applicable to Hanson’s own personal behaviour than to the world in general.
In particular, what he’s trying to do with his “Signalling theory” is not to tell us anything about human behaviour, but instead to try to imply that he is neglecting necessity for actual training, which would be consistent with him having some immense innate abilities but not trying hard.
He does have tenure at a reputable American university, which I think is not a prize handed out cheaply. OTOH, I am reminded of a cartoon whose caption is “Mad? Of course I’m mad! But I have tenure!”
If the job really cannot be done without good spoken Chinese, then to keep that job, you will need that ability. But if in the particular situation you correctly judged that you could get by with English and the help of a Chinese secretary, busk your way through the training course, and pull strings to keep your job if you run into difficulties, then that would be Homo Hypocritus’ choice. Homo Hypocritus does whatever will work best to convince his boss of his worthy qualities, with what lawyers call reckless disregard for the truth. Truth is never a consideration, except as a contingent means to status.
At that point we aren’t really talking about signalling innate qualities, we’re talking of forgeries and pretending. Those only work at all because there are people who are not pretending.
A fly that looks like a wasp is only scary because there are wasps with venom that actually works. And those wasps have venom so potent because they actually use it to defend the hives. They don’t merely have venom to be worthy of having bright colours. Venom works directly, not through the bright colour.
One could of course forge the signals and then convince themselves that they are honestly signalling the ability to forge signals… but at the end of the day, this fly that looks like a wasp, it is just a regular fly, and it only gets an advantage from us not being fully certain that it is a regular fly. And the flies that look like wasps are not even close to displacing the other flies - there’s an upper limit on those.
He does have tenure at a reputable American university, which I think is not a prize handed out cheaply. OTOH, I am reminded of a cartoon whose caption is “Mad? Of course I’m mad! But I have tenure!”
Well, tenure is an example of status… and in his current field there may not be as many equivalents of “venom actually working” as in other fields so it looks like it is all about colours.
You can say that whether it’s signaling is determined by the motivations of the person taking the course, or the motivations of the people offering the course, or the motivations of employers hiring graduates of the course. And you can define motivation as the conscious reasons people have in their minds, or as the answer to the question of whether the person would still have taken the course if it was otherwise identical but provided no signaling benefit. And there can be multiple motivations, so you can say that something is signaling if signaling is one of the motivations, or that it’s signaling only if signaling is the only motivation.
If you make the right selections from the previous, you can argue for almost anything that it’s not signaling, or that it is for that matter.
if someone wants to demonstrate some innate or pre-existing quality (such as mathematical ability), they participate in a relevant contest and this is signalling.
If I wanted to defend competitions from accusations of signaling like you defended education, I could easily come up with lots of arguments. Like people doing them to challenge themselves, experience teamwork, test their limits and meet like-minded people. And the fact that lots of people that participate in competitions even though they know they don’t have a serious chance of coming on top, etc.
OSHA rules would still require that the crane operator passes the crane related training.
(Sure, but I meant that only truck drivers would be accepted into the crane operator training in the first place, because they would be more likely to pass it and perform well afterward.)
And conversely, if someone wants to demonstrate some innate or pre-existing quality (such as mathematical ability), they participate in a relevant contest, and this is signalling.
Given the way the term is actuallly used, I wouldn’t call that “signalling” because “signalling” normally refers to demonstrating that you have some trait by doing something other than performing the trait itself (if it’s capable of being performed). You can signal your wealth by buying expensive jewels, but you can’t signal your ability to buy expensive jewels by buying expensive jewels. And taking a math test to let people know that you’re good at math is not signalling, but going to a mathematicians’ club to let people know that you’re good at math may be signalling.
Given the way the term is actuallly used, I wouldn’t call that “signalling” because “signalling” normally refers to demonstrating that you have some trait by doing something other than performing the trait itself
This seem to be the meaning common on these boards, yes.
And taking a math test to let people know that you’re good at math is not signalling, but going to a mathematicians’ club to let people know that you’re good at math may be signalling.
Going to mathematicians club (and the like) is something that you can do if you aren’t any good at math, though. And it only works as a “signal” of being good at math because most people go to that club for other reasons (that would be dependent on being good at math).
Signalling was supposed to be about credibly conveying information to another party whenever there is a motivation for you to lie.
It seems that instead signalling is used to refer to behaviours portrayed in “Flowers for Charlie” episode of “It’s always sunny in Philadelphia”.
OSHA rules would still require that the crane operator passes the crane related training.
The term ‘signalling’ seem to have heavily drifted and mutated online to near meaninglessness.
If someone attends a truck driving course with the intention of driving trucks—or a math course with the intention of a: learning math and b: improving their thinking skills—that’s not signalling behaviour.
And conversely, if someone wants to demonstrate some innate or pre-existing quality (such as mathematical ability), they participate in a relevant contest, and this is signalling.
Now, there may well be a lot of people who start in an educated family and then sort of drift through the life conforming to parental wishes, and end up obtaining, say, a physics PhD. And then they go to economics or something similar where they do not utilize their training in much any way. One could deduce about these people that they are more innately intelligent than average, more wealthy than average, etc etc, and that they learned some thinking skills. The former two things are much more reliably signalled with an IQ test and a statement from IRS.
I think it’s more that the concept entered LessWrong via Robin Hanson’s expansion of the concept into his “Homo Hypocritus” theory. For examples, see every post on Overcoming Bias with a title of the form “X is not about Y”. This theory sees all communicative acts as signalling, that is to say, undertaken with the purpose of persuading someone that one possesses some desirable characteristic. To pass a mathematics test is just as much a signal of mathematical ability as to hang out with mathematicians and adopt their jargon.
There is something that distinguishes actual performance from other signals of ability: unforgeability. By doing something that only a mathematician could do, one sends a more effective signal—that is, one more likely to be believed—that one can do mathematics.
This is a radical re-understanding of communication. On this view, not one honest thing has ever been said, not one honest thing done, by anyone, ever. “Honesty” is not a part of how brains physically work. Whether we tell a truth or tell a lie, truth-telling is never part of our purpose, but no more than a means to the end of persuading people of our qualities. It is to be selected as a means only so far as it may happen to be more effective than the alternatives in a given situation. The concept of honesty as a virtue is merely part of such signalling.
The purpose of signalling desirable qualities is to acquire status, the universal currency of social interaction. Status is what determines your access to reproduction. Those who signal status best get to reproduce most. This is what our brains have evolved to do, for as long as they been able to do this at all. Every creature bigger than an earthworm does it.
Furthermore, all acts are communicative acts, and therefore all acts are signalling. Everything we do in front of someone else is signalling. Even in solitude we are signalling to ourselves, for we can more effectively utter false signals if we believe them. Every thought that goes through your head is self-signalling, including whatever thoughts you have while reading this. It’s all signalling.
Such, at least, is the theory.
...which means that describing an act as “signalling” is basically meaningless, insofar as it fails to ascribe to that act a property that distinguishes it from other acts. It’s like describing my lunch as “material”. True, yes, but uninteresting except as a launching point to distinguish among expensive and cheap signals, forgeable and unforgeable signals, purely external signals and self-signalling, etc.
That said, in most contexts when a behavior is described as “signalling” without further qualification I generally understand the speaker to be referring more specifically to cheap signalling which is reliably treated as though it were a more expensive signal. Hanging out with mathematicians and adopting their jargon without really understanding it usually falls in this category; completing a PhD program in mathematics usually doesn’t (though I could construct contrived exceptions in both cases).
That a proposition has the form “every X is a Y” does not make it uninteresting. For example: All matter is made of atoms. All humans are descended from apes. God made everything. Every prime number is a sum of three squares. Everyone requires oxygen to live. True or false, these are all meaningful, interesting statements. “All acts are acts of signalling” is similarly so.
Yes, this subtext is present whenever the concept of signalling is introduced (another example of an “all X is Y” which is nevertheless a meaningful observation).
Not really comparable to matter being made of atoms, though, as “signalling” only establishes a tautology (like all communication is communication).
“Signalling”, in this context, means “acts undertaken primarily for the purpose of gaining status by persuading others of one’s status-worthy qualities”. As such, “All communication is signalling” is not a tautology, but an empirical claim.
Many of those acts can be undertaken without having any such qualities, though.
I think Hanson’s ideas are far more applicable to Hanson’s own personal behaviour than to the world in general.
In particular, what he’s trying to do with his “Signalling theory” is not to tell us anything about human behaviour, but instead to try to imply that he is neglecting necessity for actual training, which would be consistent with him having some immense innate abilities but not trying hard.
Meanwhile out there in the real world, if you specifically want to get a job that requires you to speak Chinese, you are going to have to attend a course in Chinese, to actually learn Chinese. Unless you are actually native Chinese in which case you won’t have to attend that course. Which applies to most disciplines, with perhaps other disciplines for which the skill may not even exist monkey style imitating the rest.
Though depending on the situation I might still find that it’s useful to attend the course, so I can get certification as having gone through the course, which in the real world might be of more value than speaking Chinese without that certification.
And these sorts of certification-based (as opposed to skill-based) considerations apply to most disciplines as well.
And, of course, the fact that I’m applying for this job, which requires Chinese, is itself a choice I’m making, and we can ask why I’m making that choice, and to what extent my motives are status-seeking vs. truth-seeking vs. improvements-in-the-world-seeking vs. something else.
Conversely, if I am entirely uninterested in certification and I really am solely interested in learning Chinese for the intrinsic value of learning Chinese, I might find it’s more useful not to attend a course, but instead study Chinese on my own (e.g. via online materials and spending my afternoons playing Mahjong in Chinatown).
If you already speak Chinese, you’d just need to pass an exam, no course attached, and if you are a native speaker, you’d be correctly presumed to speak it better than someone who spent many years on a course, lived in China, etc.
I agree. I’m not defending Hanson’s theory, just saying what it is. Perhaps in more starkly extreme terms than he might, but I have never seen him put any limits on the concept. This, I am suggesting, is the origin of the broad application of the concept on LessWrong.
Quite so. But you are thinking like an engineer—that is, you are thinking in terms of actually getting things done. This is the right way to think, but it is not the way of the Hansonian fundamentalist (an imaginary figure that appears in my head when I contemplate signalling theory, and should not be confused with Robin Hanson himself).
The Hansonian fundamentalist would respond that it’s still all signalling. The only thing that he aims at getting done is the acquisition of status for himself. All else is means. The role that the actual ability to speak Chinese plays is that of an unforgeable signal, a concept which replaces that of truth, as far as what goes on inside our heads is concerned. Tarski’s definition of truth stands, but the Litany of Tarski does not. It is replaced by, “If X is true, I desire whatever attitude to X will maximise my status; if X is false, I desire whatever attitude to X will maximise my status. Let me not become attached to anything but status.”
If the job really cannot be done without good spoken Chinese, then to keep that job, you will need that ability. But if in the particular situation you correctly judged that you could get by with English and the help of a Chinese secretary, busk your way through the training course, and pull strings to keep your job if you run into difficulties, then that would be Homo Hypocritus’ choice. Homo Hypocritus does whatever will work best to convince his boss of his worthy qualities, with what lawyers call reckless disregard for the truth. Truth is never a consideration, except as a contingent means to status.
ETA:
He does have tenure at a reputable American university, which I think is not a prize handed out cheaply. OTOH, I am reminded of a cartoon whose caption is “Mad? Of course I’m mad! But I have tenure!”
At that point we aren’t really talking about signalling innate qualities, we’re talking of forgeries and pretending. Those only work at all because there are people who are not pretending.
A fly that looks like a wasp is only scary because there are wasps with venom that actually works. And those wasps have venom so potent because they actually use it to defend the hives. They don’t merely have venom to be worthy of having bright colours. Venom works directly, not through the bright colour.
One could of course forge the signals and then convince themselves that they are honestly signalling the ability to forge signals… but at the end of the day, this fly that looks like a wasp, it is just a regular fly, and it only gets an advantage from us not being fully certain that it is a regular fly. And the flies that look like wasps are not even close to displacing the other flies - there’s an upper limit on those.
Well, tenure is an example of status… and in his current field there may not be as many equivalents of “venom actually working” as in other fields so it looks like it is all about colours.
Yup, that’s true.
You can say that whether it’s signaling is determined by the motivations of the person taking the course, or the motivations of the people offering the course, or the motivations of employers hiring graduates of the course. And you can define motivation as the conscious reasons people have in their minds, or as the answer to the question of whether the person would still have taken the course if it was otherwise identical but provided no signaling benefit. And there can be multiple motivations, so you can say that something is signaling if signaling is one of the motivations, or that it’s signaling only if signaling is the only motivation.
If you make the right selections from the previous, you can argue for almost anything that it’s not signaling, or that it is for that matter.
If I wanted to defend competitions from accusations of signaling like you defended education, I could easily come up with lots of arguments. Like people doing them to challenge themselves, experience teamwork, test their limits and meet like-minded people. And the fact that lots of people that participate in competitions even though they know they don’t have a serious chance of coming on top, etc.
(Sure, but I meant that only truck drivers would be accepted into the crane operator training in the first place, because they would be more likely to pass it and perform well afterward.)
Given the way the term is actuallly used, I wouldn’t call that “signalling” because “signalling” normally refers to demonstrating that you have some trait by doing something other than performing the trait itself (if it’s capable of being performed). You can signal your wealth by buying expensive jewels, but you can’t signal your ability to buy expensive jewels by buying expensive jewels. And taking a math test to let people know that you’re good at math is not signalling, but going to a mathematicians’ club to let people know that you’re good at math may be signalling.
This seem to be the meaning common on these boards, yes.
Going to mathematicians club (and the like) is something that you can do if you aren’t any good at math, though. And it only works as a “signal” of being good at math because most people go to that club for other reasons (that would be dependent on being good at math).
Signalling was supposed to be about credibly conveying information to another party whenever there is a motivation for you to lie.
It seems that instead signalling is used to refer to behaviours portrayed in “Flowers for Charlie” episode of “It’s always sunny in Philadelphia”.