This seems substantially different from UDT, which does not really have or use a notion of “past version of yourself”.
My terminology here was sloppy, apologies. When I say “past versions of yourself” I am also including (as Nesov phrases it below) “the idealized past agent (which doesn’t physically exist)”. E.g. in the Counterfactual Mugging case you describe, I am thinking about precommitments that the hypothetical past version of yourself from before the coin was flipped would have committed to.
I find it a more intuitive way to think about UDT, though I realize it’s a somewhat different framing from yours. Do you still think this is substantially different?
My terminology here was sloppy, apologies. When I say “past versions of yourself” I am also including (as Nesov phrases it below) “the idealized past agent (which doesn’t physically exist)”. E.g. in the Counterfactual Mugging case you describe, I am thinking about precommitments that the hypothetical past version of yourself from before the coin was flipped would have committed to.
I find it a more intuitive way to think about UDT, though I realize it’s a somewhat different framing from yours. Do you still think this is substantially different?