1.6.2 Are explanations-of-self-reports a first step towards understanding the “true nature” of consciousness, free will, etc.?
Fwiw I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about the relationship between Step 1 and Step 2, and I strongly believe that step 1 is sufficient or almost sufficient for step 2, i.e., that it’s impossible to give an adequate account of human phenomenology without figuring out most of the computational aspects of consciousness. So at least in principle, I think philosophy is superfluous. But I also find all discussions I’ve read about it (such as the stuff from Dennett, but also everything I’ve found on LessWrong) to be far too shallow/high-level to get anywhere interesting. People who take the hard problem seriously seem to prefer talking about the philosophical stuff, and people who don’t seem content with vague analogies or appeals to future work, and so no one—that I’ve seen, anyway—actually addresses what I’d consider to be the difficult aspects of phenomenology.
Will definitely read any serious attempt to engage with step 1. And I’ll try not be biased by the fact that I know your set of conclusions isn’t compatible with mine.
I strongly believe that step 1 is sufficient or almost sufficient for step 2, i.e., that it’s impossible to give an adequate account of human phenomenology without figuring out most of the computational aspects of consciousness.
Apologies for nitpicking, but your strong belief that step 1 is (almost) sufficient for step 2 would be more faithfully re-phrased as: it will (probably) be possible/easy to give an adequate account of human phenomenology by figuring out most of the computational aspects of consciousness. The way you phrased it (viz., “impossible...without”) is equivalent to saying that step 1 is necessary for step 2, an importantly different claim (on this phrasing, something besides the computational aspects may be required). Of course, you may think it is both necessary and sufficient, I’m just pointing out the distinction.
Mhh, I think “it’s not possible to solve (1) without also solving (2)” is equivalent to “every solution to (1) also solves (2)”, which is equivalent to “(1) is sufficient for (2)”. I did take some liberty in rephrasing step (2) from “figure out what consciousness is” to “figure out its computational implementation”.
Fwiw I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about the relationship between Step 1 and Step 2, and I strongly believe that step 1 is sufficient or almost sufficient for step 2, i.e., that it’s impossible to give an adequate account of human phenomenology without figuring out most of the computational aspects of consciousness. So at least in principle, I think philosophy is superfluous. But I also find all discussions I’ve read about it (such as the stuff from Dennett, but also everything I’ve found on LessWrong) to be far too shallow/high-level to get anywhere interesting. People who take the hard problem seriously seem to prefer talking about the philosophical stuff, and people who don’t seem content with vague analogies or appeals to future work, and so no one—that I’ve seen, anyway—actually addresses what I’d consider to be the difficult aspects of phenomenology.
Will definitely read any serious attempt to engage with step 1. And I’ll try not be biased by the fact that I know your set of conclusions isn’t compatible with mine.
Apologies for nitpicking, but your strong belief that step 1 is (almost) sufficient for step 2 would be more faithfully re-phrased as: it will (probably) be possible/easy to give an adequate account of human phenomenology by figuring out most of the computational aspects of consciousness. The way you phrased it (viz., “impossible...without”) is equivalent to saying that step 1 is necessary for step 2, an importantly different claim (on this phrasing, something besides the computational aspects may be required). Of course, you may think it is both necessary and sufficient, I’m just pointing out the distinction.
Mhh, I think “it’s not possible to solve (1) without also solving (2)” is equivalent to “every solution to (1) also solves (2)”, which is equivalent to “(1) is sufficient for (2)”. I did take some liberty in rephrasing step (2) from “figure out what consciousness is” to “figure out its computational implementation”.