I don’t think ideal Bayesian’s use burden of proof either. Who has the burden of proof in demonstrating that burden of proof is required in a particular instance?
In which case there’s some specific amount of distinguishing evidence that promotes the hypothesis over the less complicated one, in which case, I suppose, the other would acquire this “burden of proof” of which you speak?
Not sure that I understand (I’m not being insolent, I just haven’t had my coffee this morning). Claiming that “humans are likely to over-estimate the chance of a hard-takeoff singularity in the next 50 years and should therefore discount inside view arguments on this topic” requires evidence, and I’m not convinced that the standard optimism bias literature applies here. In the absence of such evidence one should accept all arguments on their merits and just do Bayesian updating.
I don’t think ideal Bayesian’s use burden of proof either. Who has the burden of proof in demonstrating that burden of proof is required in a particular instance?
Occams razor: the more complicated hypothesis acquires a burden of proof
In which case there’s some specific amount of distinguishing evidence that promotes the hypothesis over the less complicated one, in which case, I suppose, the other would acquire this “burden of proof” of which you speak?
Not sure that I understand (I’m not being insolent, I just haven’t had my coffee this morning). Claiming that “humans are likely to over-estimate the chance of a hard-takeoff singularity in the next 50 years and should therefore discount inside view arguments on this topic” requires evidence, and I’m not convinced that the standard optimism bias literature applies here. In the absence of such evidence one should accept all arguments on their merits and just do Bayesian updating.