I don’t see a good alternative to not believing in modus ponens. Not believing that my moral values are also objective truths works just fine: and does so without the absurd free-floating beliefs and other metaphysical baggage.
But as it happens, I think the arguments we do have, for Bayesian epistemology, Occam-like priors, and induction are already much stronger than the arguments we have that anyone’s moral beliefs are objective truths.
I think the arguments we do have, for Bayesian epistemology, Occam-like priors, and induction are already much stronger than the arguments we have that anyone’s moral beliefs are objective truths.
Really? I’d love to see them. I suspect you’re so used to using these things that you’ve forgotten how weak the arguments for them actually are.
Not believing that my moral values are also objective truths works just fine:
Works at what?
That depends how hard you test it: Albert thinks Charlie has committed a heinous sin and should be severely punished, Brenda thinks Charlie has engaged in a harmless pecadillo and should be let go. What should happen to Charlie?
The same way morality works for everyone else. I’m not biting any bullets.
That depends how hard you test it: Albert thinks Charlie has committed a heinous sin and should be severely punished, Brenda thinks Charlie has engaged in a harmless pecadillo and should be let go. What should happen to Charlie?
Objectively; there is no fact of the matter. Subjectively; you haven’t given me any details about what Charlie did.
The same way morality works for everyone else. I’m not biting any bullets.
One of the things it works for is assigning concrete, objective punishments and rewards. if there is no objective fact of the matter about moral claim, there is none about who gets punished or rewarded, yet these things still happen. And happen unjustifiably on your view. You view doesn’t work to rationally justify and explain actual practices.
Objectively; there is no fact of the matter. Subjectively; you haven’t given me any details about what Charlie did.
Why would that help? You would have one opinion, someone else has another. But Charlie can’t be in a a quantum superposition of jailed and free.
You would have one opinion, someone else has another. But Charlie can’t be in a a quantum superposition of jailed and free.
If whether Charlie is punished or not is entirely up to me then if I think he deserves to be punished I will do so; if I don’t I will not do so. If I have to persuade someone else to punish him, then I will try. If the legal system is doing the punishing then I will advocate for laws that agree with my morals. And so on.
if there is no objective fact of the matter about moral claim, there is none about who gets punished or rewarded
No. There is no objective fact about who ought to get punished or rewarded. Obviously people do get punished and rewarded: and this happens according to the moral values of the people around them and the society they live in. In lots of societies there is near-universal acceptance of many moral judgments and these get codified into norms and laws and so on.
If whether Charlie is punished or not is entirely up to me then if I think he deserves to be punished I will do so; if I don’t I will not do so. If I have to persuade someone else to punish him, then I will try. If the legal system is doing the punishing then I will advocate for laws that agree with my morals. And so on.
And do you alone get a say (after all, you belive that what you think is right, is right) or does anybody else?
There is no objective fact about who ought to get punished or rewarded.
Exactly. My view “works” int that it can rationally justify punishment and reward.
I don’t see a good alternative to not believing in modus ponens. Not believing that my moral values are also objective truths works just fine: and does so without the absurd free-floating beliefs and other metaphysical baggage.
But as it happens, I think the arguments we do have, for Bayesian epistemology, Occam-like priors, and induction are already much stronger than the arguments we have that anyone’s moral beliefs are objective truths.
Really? I’d love to see them. I suspect you’re so used to using these things that you’ve forgotten how weak the arguments for them actually are.
Works at what?
That depends how hard you test it: Albert thinks Charlie has committed a heinous sin and should be severely punished, Brenda thinks Charlie has engaged in a harmless pecadillo and should be let go. What should happen to Charlie?
The same way morality works for everyone else. I’m not biting any bullets.
Objectively; there is no fact of the matter. Subjectively; you haven’t given me any details about what Charlie did.
One of the things it works for is assigning concrete, objective punishments and rewards. if there is no objective fact of the matter about moral claim, there is none about who gets punished or rewarded, yet these things still happen. And happen unjustifiably on your view. You view doesn’t work to rationally justify and explain actual practices.
Why would that help? You would have one opinion, someone else has another. But Charlie can’t be in a a quantum superposition of jailed and free.
If whether Charlie is punished or not is entirely up to me then if I think he deserves to be punished I will do so; if I don’t I will not do so. If I have to persuade someone else to punish him, then I will try. If the legal system is doing the punishing then I will advocate for laws that agree with my morals. And so on.
No. There is no objective fact about who ought to get punished or rewarded. Obviously people do get punished and rewarded: and this happens according to the moral values of the people around them and the society they live in. In lots of societies there is near-universal acceptance of many moral judgments and these get codified into norms and laws and so on.
And do you alone get a say (after all, you belive that what you think is right, is right) or does anybody else?
Exactly. My view “works” int that it can rationally justify punishment and reward.