Sorry for not being more precise. I was actually asking what a given person’s Q_P is, put in terms that we have already defined. You give a partial example of such a question, but it is not enough for me to tell what metaethical theory you are expressing. For example, suppose Mary currently values her own pleasure and nothing else, but that were she exposed to certain arguments she would come to value everyone’s pleasure (in particular, the sum of everyone’s pleasure) and that no other arguments would ever lead her to value anything else. This is obviously unrealistic, but I’m trying to determine what you mean via a simple example. Would Q_Mary be ‘What maximizes Mary’s pleasure?’ or ‘What maximizes the sum of pleasure?’ or would it be something else? On my attempted summary, Q_Mary would be the second of these questions as that is what she would want if she knew all relevant arguments. Also, does it matter whether we suppose that Mary is open to change to her original values or if she is strongly opposed to change to her original values?
(Items marked in bold have to be morally evaluated.)
I don’t think so. For example, when I said ‘incorrect’ I meant ‘made a judgement which was false’. When I said ‘best’ arguments, I didn’t mean the morally superior arguments, just the ones that are most convincing (just as the ‘best available scientific theory’ is not a moral claim). Feel free to replace that with something like ‘if she had access to all relevant arguments’, or ‘if there exists an argument which would convince her’ or the like. There are many ways this could be made precise, but it is not my task to do so: I want you to do so, so that I can better see and reply to your position.
Regarding the comment about assessing future Q_Ps from the standpoint of old ones, I still don’t see a precise answer here. For example, if Q_P,T1 approves of Q_P,T2 which approves of Q_P,T3 but Q_P,T1 doesn’t approve of Q_P,T3, then what are we to say? Did two good changes make a bad change?
Eliezer,
Sorry for not being more precise. I was actually asking what a given person’s Q_P is, put in terms that we have already defined. You give a partial example of such a question, but it is not enough for me to tell what metaethical theory you are expressing. For example, suppose Mary currently values her own pleasure and nothing else, but that were she exposed to certain arguments she would come to value everyone’s pleasure (in particular, the sum of everyone’s pleasure) and that no other arguments would ever lead her to value anything else. This is obviously unrealistic, but I’m trying to determine what you mean via a simple example. Would Q_Mary be ‘What maximizes Mary’s pleasure?’ or ‘What maximizes the sum of pleasure?’ or would it be something else? On my attempted summary, Q_Mary would be the second of these questions as that is what she would want if she knew all relevant arguments. Also, does it matter whether we suppose that Mary is open to change to her original values or if she is strongly opposed to change to her original values?
(Items marked in bold have to be morally evaluated.)
I don’t think so. For example, when I said ‘incorrect’ I meant ‘made a judgement which was false’. When I said ‘best’ arguments, I didn’t mean the morally superior arguments, just the ones that are most convincing (just as the ‘best available scientific theory’ is not a moral claim). Feel free to replace that with something like ‘if she had access to all relevant arguments’, or ‘if there exists an argument which would convince her’ or the like. There are many ways this could be made precise, but it is not my task to do so: I want you to do so, so that I can better see and reply to your position.
Regarding the comment about assessing future Q_Ps from the standpoint of old ones, I still don’t see a precise answer here. For example, if Q_P,T1 approves of Q_P,T2 which approves of Q_P,T3 but Q_P,T1 doesn’t approve of Q_P,T3, then what are we to say? Did two good changes make a bad change?