If determinism is true, then nondeterminist intuitions are mistaken.
If determinism is true and compatibilism is false.
You keep commenting on determinism but given your intuitions, you end up sounding a bit like “Nondeterminism, therefore X.”
I have pointed out what people worry they are going to lose under determinism. Yes, they only going to have those things under nondeterminism..that’s just another way of saying the same thing.
I have pointed out what people worry they are going to lose under determinism. Yes, they only going to have those things under nondeterminism.
You just said that nondeterminist intuitions are only mistaken if determinism is true and compatibilism is false. So what exactly is being lost if you subscribe to both determinism and compatibilism?
That’s the bone of contention. Compatiblists say nothing that’s “worth having”, their opponents say otherwise. It’s hard to dispute that the ability to choose between really possible alternatives goes missing.
If determinism is true and compatibilism is false.
Huh. Going by the wikipedia definition of compatibilism, it seems like a distinction without a difference. How does it help in your view?
I have pointed out what people worry they are going to lose under determinism.
This feels like worrying about losing the colors of the rainbow if optics is true. Maybe add that worry to the list of potentially mistaken intuitions.
Previously, you said that people need to give up their intuitions about free will.
Well, under full strength compatibilism, they don’t. That’s the difference.
This feels like worrying about losing the colors of the rainbow if optics is true.
Not giving up, updating. The whole point is that determinism (or timelessness for that matter) need not invalidate our notions of agency, consequence or morality. If it feels like it does, that’s a bug in the system.
Imagine someone giving you orders while holding a gun to your head. That situation feels distinctly unfree, even though you’re entirely free to disobey and take the bullet to the head.
Our intuitive sense of freedom may actually refer to a lack of externally imposed constraints on our decision process, as opposed to some inherent internal quality. The mistake would then be imagining determinism as an external imposition when it would in fact be a quality of the decision process itself.
Thats a standard argument for compatibilism. It isn’t considered a proof of compatibilism, because that would require assuaging all the worries that people have, and not just the subset compatibilist have ready answers for. I’ve already put forward another issue which is harder to answer from the compatibilist perspective: making a difference.
Are you sure that isn’t the same type of confusion? The way your decision process goes does make a difference to the outcomes of the universe. Again, being predictable-in-principle is a property of the process, not an external imposition.
If my decision making process could not be different , how does it make a difference? I have already covered the difference between logical counterfactuals and real countefactuals.
You consider a number of choices. You judge them according to your decision criteria and choose the one that seems best. What difference does it make if some hypothetical omniscient observer could tell in advance which choice you’ll make? You’ll still choose just one, and you want it to be the best one.
In what sense is the unchosen counterfactual a real one?
You consider a number of choices. You judge them according to your decision criteria and choose the one that seems best. What difference does it make if some hypothetical omniscient observer could tell in advance which choice you’ll make? You’ll still choose just one, and you want it to be the best one.
You are portraying decision making as always having a determinate outcome, and that isn’t even true if computational decision making.
In what sense is the unchosen counterfactual a real one.
As examined before the… in the sense that if my decision making was indeterminate, then I could have decided differently, meaning that counterfactual was real in the sense that it could have occurred.
Unless you want to postulate some sort of branching-future superposition, there will be one eventual outcome. How do we disambiguate between objective indeterminacy in a nondeterministic world and subjective indeterminacy in a deterministic one?
It now occurs to me to wonder how antideterminists feel about books and movies. Does it diminish their enjoyment to know that the plot has already been determined?
Unless you want to postulate some sort of branching-future superposition, there will be one eventual outcome.
That’s not the point. Under determinism, the one outcome had to happen, had prior probability 1.0. etc. Under indeterminism, it didn’t have to happen and the alternatives had non-zero probability. You can’t infer from the fact that something happened to the conclusion that it happened inevitably and necessarily.
How do we disambiguate between objective indeterminacy in a nondeterministic world and subjective indeterminacy in a deterministic one?
I’m asking because I expect the two to be subjectively indistinguishable and your answer should help shed light on the nature of our disagreement.
I don’t expect them to be be objectively indistinguishable for reasons I’ve already stated, to do with Bell’s theorem and so on. (And even if they are not distinguishable, they have very different implications).
The books and movies question seems like a disguised argument. People don’t like reading the same thing over and over, and don’t like spoilers, so there is a case that the subjective surprise if the ending is what matters even if it is determined. But that doesn’t generalise to subjective indeterminism being the only kind that matters. Because people don’t just passively consume books and movies, people also try to change objective states of affairs.
Because people don’t just passively consume books and movies, people also try to change objective states of affairs.
Deterministic or not, we are the process by which change happens. I now wonder what kind of agency would satisfy your objection. Must our choices be uncaused causes? If not, what kind of causal influence is permitted?
Naturalistic libertarians usually appeal to mixtures of determinism and indeterminism, occurring in different parts of the brain or at different stages in the decision making process.
If determinism is true and compatibilism is false.
I have pointed out what people worry they are going to lose under determinism. Yes, they only going to have those things under nondeterminism..that’s just another way of saying the same thing.
You just said that nondeterminist intuitions are only mistaken if determinism is true and compatibilism is false. So what exactly is being lost if you subscribe to both determinism and compatibilism?
That’s the bone of contention. Compatiblists say nothing that’s “worth having”, their opponents say otherwise. It’s hard to dispute that the ability to choose between really possible alternatives goes missing.
Huh. Going by the wikipedia definition of compatibilism, it seems like a distinction without a difference. How does it help in your view?
This feels like worrying about losing the colors of the rainbow if optics is true. Maybe add that worry to the list of potentially mistaken intuitions.
Previously, you said that people need to give up their intuitions about free will. Well, under full strength compatibilism, they don’t. That’s the difference.
Care to turn that feeling into an argument?
Not giving up, updating. The whole point is that determinism (or timelessness for that matter) need not invalidate our notions of agency, consequence or morality. If it feels like it does, that’s a bug in the system.
Care to turn that assertion into an argument?
Okay, let me try to put it this way.
Imagine someone giving you orders while holding a gun to your head. That situation feels distinctly unfree, even though you’re entirely free to disobey and take the bullet to the head.
Our intuitive sense of freedom may actually refer to a lack of externally imposed constraints on our decision process, as opposed to some inherent internal quality. The mistake would then be imagining determinism as an external imposition when it would in fact be a quality of the decision process itself.
Does that help?
Thats a standard argument for compatibilism. It isn’t considered a proof of compatibilism, because that would require assuaging all the worries that people have, and not just the subset compatibilist have ready answers for. I’ve already put forward another issue which is harder to answer from the compatibilist perspective: making a difference.
Are you sure that isn’t the same type of confusion? The way your decision process goes does make a difference to the outcomes of the universe. Again, being predictable-in-principle is a property of the process, not an external imposition.
If my decision making process could not be different , how does it make a difference? I have already covered the difference between logical counterfactuals and real countefactuals.
You consider a number of choices. You judge them according to your decision criteria and choose the one that seems best. What difference does it make if some hypothetical omniscient observer could tell in advance which choice you’ll make? You’ll still choose just one, and you want it to be the best one.
In what sense is the unchosen counterfactual a real one?
You are portraying decision making as always having a determinate outcome, and that isn’t even true if computational decision making.
As examined before the… in the sense that if my decision making was indeterminate, then I could have decided differently, meaning that counterfactual was real in the sense that it could have occurred.
Unless you want to postulate some sort of branching-future superposition, there will be one eventual outcome. How do we disambiguate between objective indeterminacy in a nondeterministic world and subjective indeterminacy in a deterministic one?
It now occurs to me to wonder how antideterminists feel about books and movies. Does it diminish their enjoyment to know that the plot has already been determined?
That’s not the point. Under determinism, the one outcome had to happen, had prior probability 1.0. etc. Under indeterminism, it didn’t have to happen and the alternatives had non-zero probability. You can’t infer from the fact that something happened to the conclusion that it happened inevitably and necessarily.
I agree and didn’t intend that to be the main thrust of my reply. Let me repeat:
I’m asking because I expect the two to be subjectively indistinguishable and your answer should help shed light on the nature of our disagreement.
I’d also like to hear your take on the books-and-movies question.
I don’t expect them to be be objectively indistinguishable for reasons I’ve already stated, to do with Bell’s theorem and so on. (And even if they are not distinguishable, they have very different implications).
The books and movies question seems like a disguised argument. People don’t like reading the same thing over and over, and don’t like spoilers, so there is a case that the subjective surprise if the ending is what matters even if it is determined. But that doesn’t generalise to subjective indeterminism being the only kind that matters. Because people don’t just passively consume books and movies, people also try to change objective states of affairs.
Deterministic or not, we are the process by which change happens. I now wonder what kind of agency would satisfy your objection. Must our choices be uncaused causes? If not, what kind of causal influence is permitted?
Naturalistic libertarians usually appeal to mixtures of determinism and indeterminism, occurring in different parts of the brain or at different stages in the decision making process.