A lot of voting problems are actually group-preference ambiguity. For a given population with static preferences and independent positions (that is, the selected body is just a list of the top N candidates, not a slate where less-preferred individuals become preferred as a group), I’d expect that cloning is ideal.
The populace would actually prefer N copies of the best candidate, rather than the N-1 not-as-good people.
In the case where the interaction of selected options matters, and for instance, all cooperative second-best party is preferred over a mixed-party of the best people, then this kind of vote fails to serve regardless.
A lot of voting problems are actually group-preference ambiguity. For a given population with static preferences and independent positions (that is, the selected body is just a list of the top N candidates, not a slate where less-preferred individuals become preferred as a group), I’d expect that cloning is ideal.
The populace would actually prefer N copies of the best candidate, rather than the N-1 not-as-good people.
In the case where the interaction of selected options matters, and for instance, all cooperative second-best party is preferred over a mixed-party of the best people, then this kind of vote fails to serve regardless.