Even if there is no baton, I care about future versions of myself (idk why, humans are weird I guess). Is your proposal that I only care about future versions of myself when I’m awake?
”there is no baton” is fundamental to the question. If there was a baton, we could empirically observe a rule like “the baton is only passed to states that are spatiotemporally nearby”. But if there is no baton, the induction:
present waking me --(cares about)--> future dreaming me ==(is identical to)== a waking person who has the same conscious experience as dreaming me
is locally valid.
Though I suppose I could add some kind of global rule that I refuse to care about such locally valid chains.
Even if there is no baton, I care about future versions of myself (idk why, humans are weird I guess). Is your proposal that I only care about future versions of myself when I’m awake?
”there is no baton” is fundamental to the question. If there was a baton, we could empirically observe a rule like “the baton is only passed to states that are spatiotemporally nearby”. But if there is no baton, the induction:
present waking me --(cares about)--> future dreaming me ==(is identical to)== a waking person who has the same conscious experience as dreaming me
is locally valid.
Though I suppose I could add some kind of global rule that I refuse to care about such locally valid chains.
You can care about what you want. For me, I do rate the continuations that preserve my awake self as more me.