You can ensure zero mutual information by building a sufficiently thick lead wall. By convention in engineering, any number is understood as a range, based on the number of significant digits relevant to the calculation. So “zero” is best understood as “zero within some tolerance”. So long as we are not facing an intelligent and resourceful adversary, there will probably be a human-achievable amount of lead which cancels the signal sufficiently.
This serves to illustrate the point that sometimes we can find ways to bound an error to within desirable tolerances, even if we do not yet know how to do such a thing in the face of the immense optimization pressure which superhuman AGI would bring to bear on a problem.
We need plans to have achievable tolerances. For example, we need to assume a realistic amount of hardware failure. We can’t treat the hardware as blackboxes; we know how it operates, and we have to make use of that knowledge. But we can’t pretend perfect mathematical knowledge of it, either; we have error tolerances.
So your blackbox/whitebox dichotomy doesn’t fit the situation very well.
But do you really buy the whole analogy with mutual information, IE buy the claim that we can judge the viability of escaping goodhart from this one example, and only object that the judgement with respect to this example was incorrect?
Perhaps we should really look at a range of examples, not just one? And judge John’s point as reasonable if and only if we can find some cases where effectively perfect proxies were found?
Ah, but perhaps your objection is that the difficulty of the AI alignment problem suggests that we do in fact need the analog of perfect zero correlation in order to succeed. So John’s plan sounds doomed to failure, because it relies on finding an actually-perfect proxy, when all realistic proxies are imprecise at least in their physical tolerances.
In which case, I would reply that the idea is not to try ang contain a malign AGI which is already not on our side. The plan, to the extent that there is one, is to create systems that are on our side, and apply their optimization pressure to the task of keeping the plan on-course. So there is hope that we will not end up in a situation where every tiny flaw is exploited. What we are looking for is plans which robustly get us to that point.
Ah, but perhaps your objection is that the difficulty of the AI alignment problem suggests that we do in fact need the analog of perfect zero correlation in order to succeed.
My objection is actually mostly to the example itself.
As you mention:
the idea is not to try ang contain a malign AGI which is already not on our side. The plan, to the extent that there is one, is to create systems that are on our side, and apply their optimization pressure to the task of keeping the plan on-course.
Compare with the example:
Suppose we’re designing some secure electronic equipment, and we’re concerned about the system leaking information to adversaries via a radio side-channel.
[...]
But what if we instead design the system so that the leaked radio signal has zero mutual information with whatever signals are passed around inside the system? Then it doesn’t matter how much optimization pressure an adversary applies, they’re not going to figure out anything about those internal signals via leaked radio.
This is analogous to the case of… trying to contain a malign AI which is already not on our side.
Fair enough! I admit that John did not actually provide an argument for why alignment might be achievable by “guessing true names”. I think the approach makes sense, but my argument for why this is the case does differ from John’s arguments here.
You can ensure zero mutual information by building a sufficiently thick lead wall. By convention in engineering, any number is understood as a range, based on the number of significant digits relevant to the calculation. So “zero” is best understood as “zero within some tolerance”. So long as we are not facing an intelligent and resourceful adversary, there will probably be a human-achievable amount of lead which cancels the signal sufficiently.
This serves to illustrate the point that sometimes we can find ways to bound an error to within desirable tolerances, even if we do not yet know how to do such a thing in the face of the immense optimization pressure which superhuman AGI would bring to bear on a problem.
We need plans to have achievable tolerances. For example, we need to assume a realistic amount of hardware failure. We can’t treat the hardware as blackboxes; we know how it operates, and we have to make use of that knowledge. But we can’t pretend perfect mathematical knowledge of it, either; we have error tolerances.
So your blackbox/whitebox dichotomy doesn’t fit the situation very well.
But do you really buy the whole analogy with mutual information, IE buy the claim that we can judge the viability of escaping goodhart from this one example, and only object that the judgement with respect to this example was incorrect?
Perhaps we should really look at a range of examples, not just one? And judge John’s point as reasonable if and only if we can find some cases where effectively perfect proxies were found?
Ah, but perhaps your objection is that the difficulty of the AI alignment problem suggests that we do in fact need the analog of perfect zero correlation in order to succeed. So John’s plan sounds doomed to failure, because it relies on finding an actually-perfect proxy, when all realistic proxies are imprecise at least in their physical tolerances.
In which case, I would reply that the idea is not to try ang contain a malign AGI which is already not on our side. The plan, to the extent that there is one, is to create systems that are on our side, and apply their optimization pressure to the task of keeping the plan on-course. So there is hope that we will not end up in a situation where every tiny flaw is exploited. What we are looking for is plans which robustly get us to that point.
My objection is actually mostly to the example itself.
As you mention:
Compare with the example:
This is analogous to the case of… trying to contain a malign AI which is already not on our side.
Fair enough! I admit that John did not actually provide an argument for why alignment might be achievable by “guessing true names”. I think the approach makes sense, but my argument for why this is the case does differ from John’s arguments here.