Good epistemics says: If X, I desire to believe X. If not-X, I desire to believe not-X.
This holds even when X is “Y person did Z thing” and Z is norm-violating.
If you don’t try to explicitly believe “Y person did Z thing” in worlds where in fact Y person did Z thing, you aren’t trying to have good epistemics. If you don’t say so where it’s relevant (and give a bogus explanation instead), you’re demonstrating bad epistemics. (This includes cases of saying a mistake theory where a conflict theory is correct)
It’s important to distinguish good epistemics (having beliefs correlated with reality) with the aesthetic that claims credit for good epistemics (e.g. the polite academic style).
Don’t conflate politeness with epistemology. They’re actually opposed in many cases!
Good epistemics says: If X, I desire to believe X. If not-X, I desire to believe not-X.
This holds even when X is “Y person did Z thing” and Z is norm-violating.
If you don’t try to explicitly believe “Y person did Z thing” in worlds where in fact Y person did Z thing, you aren’t trying to have good epistemics. If you don’t say so where it’s relevant (and give a bogus explanation instead), you’re demonstrating bad epistemics. (This includes cases of saying a mistake theory where a conflict theory is correct)
It’s important to distinguish good epistemics (having beliefs correlated with reality) with the aesthetic that claims credit for good epistemics (e.g. the polite academic style).
Don’t conflate politeness with epistemology. They’re actually opposed in many cases!