You say you see colors and have other subjective experiences and you call those qualia and I can accept that, but when I ask why solutions to the Easy Problem wouldn’t be sufficient you say it’s because you have subjective experiences,
No it’s because the Easy Problem is , by definition ,everything except subjective experience. Its [consciousness-experience] explained [however], not [consciousness] explained [physically]. It happens to be the case that easy problems can be explained physically, but its not built into the definition.
Can you explain to me how exactly you come to this conclusion? Having subjective experience does not in itself imply that it’s not physical.
Because I’ve read the passages where Chalmers defines the Easy/ Hard distinction.
“What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? (1995, 202, emphasis in original).”
See? It’s not defined in terms of physicality!
Have you even read that passage before?
but that’s circular reasoning. You haven’t said why exactly solutions to the Easy Problem don’t satisfy you, which is why I keep asking what kind of explanation would satisfy you.
...an EP explanation isn’t it even trying to be an explanation of X for X=qualia.
It doesn’t have to be scientific.
If we are talking about scientific explanation: a scientific explanation of X succeeds if it is able to predict X’s, particularly novel ones, and it doesn’t mispredict X’s.
But it’s not clear to me how you would judge that any explanation, scientific or not, does these things for qualia, because it seems to me that solutions to the Easy Problem do exactly this;
Only by lowering the bar.
I can already predict what kind of qualia you experience, even novel ones.
Of course not …you can’t even express them.
If I show you a piece of red paper, you will experience the qualia of red.
I’m a colour blind super scientist , what is this Red?
If I give you a drink or a drug you haven’t had before I can predict that you will have a new experience. I may not be able to predict quite exactly what those experiences will be
Unfortunately , that’s what “predict novel experiences” means. CF other areas of science: you don’t get Nobels for saying “I predict some novel effect I cant describe or quantify”.
in a given situation because I don’t have complete information, but that’s true for virtually any explanation, even when using quantum mechanics.
The problem isnt that you don’t have infinite information, it’s that you are not reaching the base line of every other scientific theory, because “novel qualia , don’t ask me what” isn’t a meaningful prediction.
I suspect you may now object again and say, “but that doesn’t explain subjective experience”. Then I will object again and say, “what explanation would satisfy you?”, to which you will again say, “if it predicts qualia”, to which I will say, “but we can already predict what qualia you will have in a given situation”.
Not in a good enough way, you can’t.
Then you will again object and say, “but that doesn’t explain subjective experience”. And so on.
It looks to me like you’re holding out for something you don’t know how to recognize. True, maybe an explanation is impossible, but you don’t know that either. When some great genius finally does explain it all, how will you know he’s right? You wouldn’t want to miss out, right?
They don’t explain subjective experience.
The fact that qualia are physically mysterious can’t be predicted from physics
I’m genuinely curious what you mean by this. Can you expand on this?
I explained in the next clause, which you snipped:-
if physicalism is true, they [qualia] should as explicable as the Easy problem stuff.
The core issue is that there’s an inference gap between having subjective experience and the claim that it is non-physical. One doesn’t follow from the other. You can define subjective experience as non-physical, as Chalmer’s definition of the Hard Problem does, but that’s not justified. I can just as legitimately define subjective experience as physical.
I can understand why Chalmers finds subjective experience mysterious, but it’s not more mysterious than the existence of something physical such as gravity or the universe in general. Why is General Relativity enough for you to explain gravity, even though the reason for the existence of gravity is mysterious?
he core issue is that there’s an inference gap between having subjective experience and the claim that it is non-physical.
Of course there is. There is no reason there should not be. Who told you otherwise? Chalmers takes hundreds of pages to set out his argument.
Physical reductionism is compatible with the idea that the stuff at the bottom of the stack is irreducible, but consciousness appears to be a high level phenomenon.
Chalmers takes hundreds of pages to set out his argument.
His argument does not bridge that gap. He, like you, does not provide objective criteria for a satisfying explanation, which means by definition you do not know what the thing is that requires explanation, no matter how many words are used trying to describe it.
I know. Like I said, neither Chalmers nor you or anyone else have shown it plausible that subjective experience is non-physical. Moreover, you repeatedly avoid giving an objective description what you’re looking for.
Until either of the above change, there is no reason to think there is a Hard Problem.
Also., the existence of a problem does not depend on the existence of a solution.
Agreed, but even if no possible solution can ultimately satisfy objective properties, until those properties are defined the problem itself remains undefined. Can you define these objective properties?
All I’m asking for is a way for other people to determine whether a given explanation will satisfy you. You haven’t given enough information to do that. Until that changes we can’t know that we even agree on the meaning of the Hard Problem.
The meaning of the Hard Problem doesn’t depend on satisfying me, since I didn’t invent it. If you want to find out what it is, you need to read Chalmers at some point.
No it’s because the Easy Problem is , by definition ,everything except subjective experience. Its [consciousness-experience] explained [however], not [consciousness] explained [physically]. It happens to be the case that easy problems can be explained physically, but its not built into the definition.
Because I’ve read the passages where Chalmers defines the Easy/ Hard distinction.
“What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? (1995, 202, emphasis in original).”
See? It’s not defined in terms of physicality!
Have you even read that passage before?
...an EP explanation isn’t it even trying to be an explanation of X for X=qualia.
Only by lowering the bar.
Of course not …you can’t even express them.
I’m a colour blind super scientist , what is this Red?
Unfortunately , that’s what “predict novel experiences” means. CF other areas of science: you don’t get Nobels for saying “I predict some novel effect I cant describe or quantify”.
The problem isnt that you don’t have infinite information, it’s that you are not reaching the base line of every other scientific theory, because “novel qualia , don’t ask me what” isn’t a meaningful prediction.
Not in a good enough way, you can’t.
Then you will again object and say, “but that doesn’t explain subjective experience”. And so on. It looks to me like you’re holding out for something you don’t know how to recognize. True, maybe an explanation is impossible, but you don’t know that either. When some great genius finally does explain it all, how will you know he’s right? You wouldn’t want to miss out, right? They don’t explain subjective experience.
I explained in the next clause, which you snipped:-
if physicalism is true, they [qualia] should as explicable as the Easy problem stuff.
The core issue is that there’s an inference gap between having subjective experience and the claim that it is non-physical. One doesn’t follow from the other. You can define subjective experience as non-physical, as Chalmer’s definition of the Hard Problem does, but that’s not justified. I can just as legitimately define subjective experience as physical.
I can understand why Chalmers finds subjective experience mysterious, but it’s not more mysterious than the existence of something physical such as gravity or the universe in general. Why is General Relativity enough for you to explain gravity, even though the reason for the existence of gravity is mysterious?
Of course there is. There is no reason there should not be. Who told you otherwise? Chalmers takes hundreds of pages to set out his argument.
Physical reductionism is compatible with the idea that the stuff at the bottom of the stack is irreducible, but consciousness appears to be a high level phenomenon.
His argument does not bridge that gap. He, like you, does not provide objective criteria for a satisfying explanation, which means by definition you do not know what the thing is that requires explanation, no matter how many words are used trying to describe it.
The discussion was about whether there is a Hard Problem , not whether Chalmers or I have solved it.
I know. Like I said, neither Chalmers nor you or anyone else have shown it plausible that subjective experience is non-physical. Moreover, you repeatedly avoid giving an objective description what you’re looking for.
Until either of the above change, there is no reason to think there is a Hard Problem.
Like.I said, I don’t have to justify non physicalism when that is not.what the discussion is about.
Also., the existence of a problem does not depend on the existence of a solution.
Agreed, but even if no possible solution can ultimately satisfy objective properties, until those properties are defined the problem itself remains undefined. Can you define these objective properties?
Weve been through this.
You don’t have a non circular argument that everything is objective
It can be an objective fact that subjectivity exists.
All I’m asking for is a way for other people to determine whether a given explanation will satisfy you. You haven’t given enough information to do that. Until that changes we can’t know that we even agree on the meaning of the Hard Problem.
The meaning of the Hard Problem doesn’t depend on satisfying me, since I didn’t invent it. If you want to find out what it is, you need to read Chalmers at some point.