It is plausible that I can X.
There are no dire consequences for failure if I X.
That doesn’t seem appropiate for arbitrary X. It is the sort of thing you would have to use ordinary epistemic rationality to evaluate for a particular X.
I left out a bit of the implied procedure that goes with reciting this. You’re supposed to truth-check those two lines as you say them, and stop if they aren’t true, with the understanding that (as a prior probability) they usually will be.
That doesn’t seem appropiate for arbitrary X. It is the sort of thing you would have to use ordinary epistemic rationality to evaluate for a particular X.
I left out a bit of the implied procedure that goes with reciting this. You’re supposed to truth-check those two lines as you say them, and stop if they aren’t true, with the understanding that (as a prior probability) they usually will be.
What? Where did that prior probability come from?