No parent would prefer to send a child to Disney World over preventing even a single one of his or her children from contracting a life threatening illness!
This kind of criticism seems inappropriate to me. It is so utterly obvious that foreign lives could be saved for less money than a trip to Disney World, that it should be an automatic conclusion that people who donate to Make-A-Wish are deliberately purchasing fuzzies, not attempting to purchase utilons. In other words, I highly doubt that people who donate to Make-a-Wish are doing so because they think saving a foreign infant’s life would be more expensive; rather, they’re most likely doing so because they actually want a domestic sick child to go to Disney World.
Your argument is not an argument against donating to Make-a-Wish; it’s an argument against going to Disney World.
This is why I tend to be impatient with discussions of optimal philanthropy; most of it seems to consist of attempts to get people to feel bad about doing things that make them feel good. Of course I realize that this post, despite appearing on LW, isn’t actually targeted at a LW audience, so maybe it will have some effect just in terms of getting people to think about utilons when they might not have otherwise. But for me at least, the case is pretty much closed at once: when you’re actually trying to be efficient with your money, as measured by utility, you should spend your marginal dollars (or whatever currency) on existential-risk-reduction/long-term-species-improvement. The utilities (positive and negative) involved in these domains are so large that, until you actually think existing institutions are having a satisfactory impact on these problems, nothing else even comes close.
Hence I don’t myself see a lot of need for arguments about whether saving lives in third-world countries is “better” than going to Disney World—or sending a sick child there.
It is so utterly obvious that foreign lives could be saved for less money than a trip to Disney World, that it should be an automatic conclusion that people who donate to Make-A-Wish are deliberately purchasing fuzzies, not attempting to purchase utilons.
I doubt that most people even ask the question whether they want to purchase fuzzies or utilons, so it doesn’t make sense to conclude that they are deliberately choosing one over the other. It also is not clear that people consider and discard the option of donating to life saving charities, rather than just not thinking about the possibility. Getting people to actually deliberately consider these options is valuable.
But for me at least, the case is pretty much closed: when you’re actually trying to be efficient with your money, as measured by utility, you should spend your marginal dollars (or whatever currency) on existential-risk-reduction/long-term-species-improvement.
I agree, but if you are targeting people who not familiar with concepts of optimizing charity and x-risk/transhumanism, there are large inferential distances, and this is a good start in breaking of a manageable piece of it. To get to promoting x-risks, additional prerequisites include problems with time discounting, and expected utility optimizing under large uncertainty.
I understand and agree. I think I would just prefer not to have it framed as “Make-A-Wish is less efficient than VillageReach”. Their goals are different. I do think getting people to consider VillageReach as a source of fuzzies is all well and good.
I agree with JGWeissman’s comment here. The key point is that the article is written for donors who have not thought about who not familiar with concepts of optimizing charity and x-risk/transhumanism.
I would suggest comparing the cost of saving a life with the cost of something more mundane and dispensable, like movie tickets, rather than the sorts of activities that are likely to be seen as integral to one’s identity and values (like bringing happiness or other help to people in bad situations).
I see. I suspect that your objection arises from you having thought more about effective philanthropy than the intended audience but I may be wrong. If people in the intended audience have a similar objection I’ll consider revising the article.
Basically, I feel that “effective philanthropy” is a “wrong topic”. The topic should be effective use of money. VillageReach vs. Make-A-Wish is a false choice. If we are going to channel more money into VillageReach, I feel that that there are much better places to take it out of than something like Make-A-Wish.
Think about it: imagine you’re a regular Make-A-Wish donor who has suddenly found out about VillageReach, and would like to offer support. Why should your Disney-World-trips-for-cancer-patients fund be the first jar you raid?
Think about it: imagine you’re a regular Make-A-Wish donor who has suddenly found out about VillageReach, and would like to offer support. Why should your Disney-World-trips-for-cancer-patients fund be the first jar you raid?
Because people are the way they are. They have intuitive budgets for different classes of expenditure and trying to take money from their shoes budget instead of their charity budget just would not work.
Was it not clear that I was attacking the notion that there ought to be a “charity budget”?
This is the inferential gap that we ought to be trying to bridge. Famine relief and Make-A-Wish shouldn’t be in the same budget!
trying to take money from their shoes budget instead of their charity budget just would not work.
How do you know this? In fact I beg to differ. People aren’t born with a charity budget; they have to take it out of somewhere when they start giving in the first place.
Was it not clear that I was attacking the notion that there ought to be a “charity budget”?
I am attacking the notion that effecive philanthropy is a ‘wrong topic’ just because in a perfect world people would be different to they are now. Effective philanthropy is an important topic because people do care about their shoes. A lot.
How do you know this? In fact I beg to differ. People aren’t born with a charity budget; they have to take it out of somewhere when they start giving in the first place.
I disagree on the fundamentals. People do allocate their resources and attention according to inbuilt instincts. People do have an impulse to balance signalling conspicuous consumption and signalling altruism. People do not act as perfect utility maximisers who will be persuaded to redirect their resources so fluidly. We know that these individuals are not rational because they are donating to the flipping Make A Wish Foundation!
For what it’s worth, I upvoted the last 4 posts in this exchange. Both the problems of excessive compartmentalization and of inadequate attention to charitable effectiveness are worth attacking. But, despite possible aggravation of the former issue, not necessarily at the same time.
Both the problems of excessive compartmentalization and of inadequate attention to charitable effectiveness are worth attacking. But, despite possible aggravation of the former issue, not necessarily at the same time.
Interesting thought. I’ll have to think about this. Again, the ultimate question is how the intended audience responds. Neither you nor I are representative of the intended audience. It would be good to have some data on people’s subjective reactions to the article. A couple of points:
It’s plausible to me that Make-A-Wish donors could get more fuzzies out of donating to VillageReach than they do now (after initial discomfort coming from a readjustment of worldview).
See the GiveWell blog entry titled Denying the choice.
I would suggest that the author of that entry see the grandparent comment. No one denies that there must ultimately be some tradeoff. That doesn’t mean that a particular proposed tradeoff is necessarily optimal.
It’s plausible to me that Make-A-Wish donors could get more fuzzies out of donating to VillageReach than they do now
It sounds like you’re once again assuming the very thing I’m disputing, which is that donating to VillageReach implies “switching” from being a “Make-A-Wish donor”. Either that, or you’ve perhaps forgotten what I wrote earlier:
I do think getting people to consider VillageReach as a source of fuzzies is all well and good.
I feel like we’re engaged in a semantic dispute and/or hairsplitting which has proceeded beyond the point of diminishing returns at least for me personally. Though I’ve read everything you’ve said, I don’t have a clear intuitive sense for where you’re coming from and why this topic is important to you. If you feel that you have a substantive point to make on this subject maybe you can make a discussion board post detailing your position.
Though I’ve read everything you’ve said, I don’t have a clear intuitive sense for where you’re coming from and why this topic is important to you.
I don’t want to see the human species stop doing things like e.g. Make-A-Wish does. I feel that the kind of urge that motivates people to do such things is a large part of why humanity is worth protecting in the first place. Although I agree that saving lives is typically more important than a particular other cause, and that it’s usually what you should do if you have to choose, I think we should if at all possible avoid compromising high-level values—such as by discouraging other forms of altruism—in order to do so.
To put this in a broader context, I have a strong aversion to the mentality expressed in the second paragraph of this post. I fear that if we don’t allocate some of our caring to particular humans in their individual capacities, people will come to be seen as dispensable—and then, one day, I might be discarded, too. Since I greatly value my existence on good days and my autonomy even on the worst days, this is a nightmare scenario. I’m afraid of someone being tortured for 50 years to save 3^^^3 people the inconvenience of a dust speck. Yes, it may be the better option, if those are the only two choices, but that doesn’t make it good.
Given that this is how I feel even when we’re talking about existential risk—saving the whole human species and its future—I hope you can understand why similar-sounding arguments against small-scale fuzzy personal altruism in favor of anything less than existential risk reduction leave an especially bad taste in my mouth.
I’m the type of person who highly values fuzzies, to such an extent that I value others’ valuing of fuzzies, and I don’t want to push the culture in a direction toward hostility to valuing fuzzies. I think it’s great if we can learn to be more rational in the pursuit of our goals, but anyone whose goals include trips to Disneyland for cancer patients doesn’t have anything more to be ashamed of than someone whose goals include a new pair of shoes.
I don’t want to push the culture in a direction toward hostility to valuing fuzzies. I think it’s great if we can learn to be more rational in the pursuit of our goals, but anyone whose goals include trips to Disneyland for cancer patients doesn’t have anything more to be ashamed of than someone whose goals include a new pair of shoes.
Several points here:
I agree with Holden’s posting Nothing wrong with selfish giving—just don’t call it philanthropy (though I find the negative connotation of ‘selfish’ attached to the phrase ‘selfish giving’ unfortunate). I think that people who are interested in making the world a better place should allocate some of their resources with an eye toward maximizing their positive impact.
As I’ve said elsewhere, I think that there’s a fair amount to the points that Yvain makes in his Doing Your Good Deed For the Day and do think that it sometimes happens that people’s willingness to help others is diminished by their existing charitable activities.
I think that people who are interested in making the world a better place should allocate some of their resources with an eye toward maximizing their positive impact.
Agreed, of course.
As I’ve said elsewhere, I think that there’s a fair amount to the points that Yvain makes in his Doing Your Good Deed For the Day and do think that it sometimes happens that people’s willingness to help others is diminished by their existing charitable activities.
Yes, I regard this as definitely a bug and not a feature.
I’m all for people feeling more fuzzies.
Glad to hear it. :-)
I’ll take some time to reflect on the nature and extent of our apparent disagreement.
You are making the perfect (people donating to x-risks charities instead of buying personal luxuries) the enemy of the good (people donating to save lives instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland).
If you know how to convince people (not LW regulars) to contribute to x-risk reduction, instead of buying shoes, then please do so. If not, it doesn’t make sense to complain about efforts that can convince people to make immediate positive changes in their behavior while planting the seeds towards convincing them to more generally maximize expected utility.
You are making the perfect (people donating to x-risks charities instead of buying personal luxuries) the enemy of the good (people donating to save lives instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland).
My preference ordering is:
(people donating to x-risks charities instead of buying personal luxuries) > (people donating to save lives instead of buying personal luxuries)>(people donating to to provide trips to Disneyland instead of buying personal luxuries)>(people donating to x-risks charities instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland)>(people donating to save lives instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland).
EDIT: No, this is wrong; see below. Attention should be focused on the grandparent.
(people donating to to provide trips to Disneyland instead of buying personal luxuries)
This has incredibly marginal utility. It is effectively trading your luxury for the fuzzy feeling of providing luxury to another.
(people donating to x-risks charities instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland)
This has more utility. In fact, it bears a strong resemblance to
(people donating to x-risks charities instead of buying personal luxuries)
given that “providing trips to Disneyland” looks more like a luxury than charity.
I don’t understand how you can prefer A>C but C>A*, unless you think that “preventing the purchase of personal luxuries” is worth more utility than preventing existential risk (A, A*) or saving lives (B, B*).
You’re right. The penultimate item is too low; it should in fact be second.
All I really wanted to point out was the abundance of items between the first and the last, and the fact that (people donating to save lives instead of buying personal luxuries) is higher than (people donating to save lives instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland).
Though I’ve read everything you’ve said, I don’t have a clear intuitive sense for where you’re coming from and why this topic is important to you.
Search ‘Amanda Knox’ on the site. Not necessarily just the top level posts on the subject by Kompo but the other times ‘rational charity’ subjects have come up.
I don’t think your position is anything to be ashamed of, or to defend. Multi wasn’t sure where you were coming from and those are places where you have expressed your position. It isn’t offensive unless what you have said previously regarding charity is something to be ashamed of.
So, then, by the way, was I wrong here after all? Do you simply not approve of fuzzy-seeking, despite what you said in that thread?
I don’t know where those questions came from. But no to both.
I don’t think your position is anything to be ashamed of, or to defend...those are places where you have expressed your position
Well, thanks for that clarification. I hope I can be forgiven for interpreting your comment as an apparent repetition of the rather unpleasant-sounding accusation expressed in the last paragraph here, combined with a suggestion that I wasn’t being transparent about what was motivating my remarks here.
I don’t know where those questions came from
I had intended to ask them in the other sub-thread, where you expressed contempt for Make-A-Wish donors, but was too lazy to dig up the old discussion (not easily found by the keywords you suggest, incidentally) until provoked here.
This kind of criticism seems inappropriate to me. It is so utterly obvious that foreign lives could be saved for less money than a trip to Disney World, that it should be an automatic conclusion that people who donate to Make-A-Wish are deliberately purchasing fuzzies, not attempting to purchase utilons. In other words, I highly doubt that people who donate to Make-a-Wish are doing so because they think saving a foreign infant’s life would be more expensive; rather, they’re most likely doing so because they actually want a domestic sick child to go to Disney World.
Your argument is not an argument against donating to Make-a-Wish; it’s an argument against going to Disney World.
This is why I tend to be impatient with discussions of optimal philanthropy; most of it seems to consist of attempts to get people to feel bad about doing things that make them feel good. Of course I realize that this post, despite appearing on LW, isn’t actually targeted at a LW audience, so maybe it will have some effect just in terms of getting people to think about utilons when they might not have otherwise. But for me at least, the case is pretty much closed at once: when you’re actually trying to be efficient with your money, as measured by utility, you should spend your marginal dollars (or whatever currency) on existential-risk-reduction/long-term-species-improvement. The utilities (positive and negative) involved in these domains are so large that, until you actually think existing institutions are having a satisfactory impact on these problems, nothing else even comes close.
Hence I don’t myself see a lot of need for arguments about whether saving lives in third-world countries is “better” than going to Disney World—or sending a sick child there.
I doubt that most people even ask the question whether they want to purchase fuzzies or utilons, so it doesn’t make sense to conclude that they are deliberately choosing one over the other. It also is not clear that people consider and discard the option of donating to life saving charities, rather than just not thinking about the possibility. Getting people to actually deliberately consider these options is valuable.
I agree, but if you are targeting people who not familiar with concepts of optimizing charity and x-risk/transhumanism, there are large inferential distances, and this is a good start in breaking of a manageable piece of it. To get to promoting x-risks, additional prerequisites include problems with time discounting, and expected utility optimizing under large uncertainty.
I understand and agree. I think I would just prefer not to have it framed as “Make-A-Wish is less efficient than VillageReach”. Their goals are different. I do think getting people to consider VillageReach as a source of fuzzies is all well and good.
I agree with JGWeissman’s comment here. The key point is that the article is written for donors who have not thought about who not familiar with concepts of optimizing charity and x-risk/transhumanism.
I responded to JGWeissman here, acknowledging that but standing by my criticism of the framing.
What framing would you prefer?
I would suggest comparing the cost of saving a life with the cost of something more mundane and dispensable, like movie tickets, rather than the sorts of activities that are likely to be seen as integral to one’s identity and values (like bringing happiness or other help to people in bad situations).
I see. I suspect that your objection arises from you having thought more about effective philanthropy than the intended audience but I may be wrong. If people in the intended audience have a similar objection I’ll consider revising the article.
Basically, I feel that “effective philanthropy” is a “wrong topic”. The topic should be effective use of money. VillageReach vs. Make-A-Wish is a false choice. If we are going to channel more money into VillageReach, I feel that that there are much better places to take it out of than something like Make-A-Wish.
Think about it: imagine you’re a regular Make-A-Wish donor who has suddenly found out about VillageReach, and would like to offer support. Why should your Disney-World-trips-for-cancer-patients fund be the first jar you raid?
Because people are the way they are. They have intuitive budgets for different classes of expenditure and trying to take money from their shoes budget instead of their charity budget just would not work.
Was it not clear that I was attacking the notion that there ought to be a “charity budget”?
This is the inferential gap that we ought to be trying to bridge. Famine relief and Make-A-Wish shouldn’t be in the same budget!
How do you know this? In fact I beg to differ. People aren’t born with a charity budget; they have to take it out of somewhere when they start giving in the first place.
I am attacking the notion that effecive philanthropy is a ‘wrong topic’ just because in a perfect world people would be different to they are now. Effective philanthropy is an important topic because people do care about their shoes. A lot.
I disagree on the fundamentals. People do allocate their resources and attention according to inbuilt instincts. People do have an impulse to balance signalling conspicuous consumption and signalling altruism. People do not act as perfect utility maximisers who will be persuaded to redirect their resources so fluidly. We know that these individuals are not rational because they are donating to the flipping Make A Wish Foundation!
Not a wrong topic.
For what it’s worth, I upvoted the last 4 posts in this exchange. Both the problems of excessive compartmentalization and of inadequate attention to charitable effectiveness are worth attacking. But, despite possible aggravation of the former issue, not necessarily at the same time.
I can’t argue with that! :)
Interesting thought. I’ll have to think about this. Again, the ultimate question is how the intended audience responds. Neither you nor I are representative of the intended audience. It would be good to have some data on people’s subjective reactions to the article. A couple of points:
See the GiveWell blog entry titled Denying the choice.
It’s plausible to me that Make-A-Wish donors could get more fuzzies out of donating to VillageReach than they do now (after initial discomfort coming from a readjustment of worldview).
I would suggest that the author of that entry see the grandparent comment. No one denies that there must ultimately be some tradeoff. That doesn’t mean that a particular proposed tradeoff is necessarily optimal.
It sounds like you’re once again assuming the very thing I’m disputing, which is that donating to VillageReach implies “switching” from being a “Make-A-Wish donor”. Either that, or you’ve perhaps forgotten what I wrote earlier:
I feel like we’re engaged in a semantic dispute and/or hairsplitting which has proceeded beyond the point of diminishing returns at least for me personally. Though I’ve read everything you’ve said, I don’t have a clear intuitive sense for where you’re coming from and why this topic is important to you. If you feel that you have a substantive point to make on this subject maybe you can make a discussion board post detailing your position.
I don’t want to see the human species stop doing things like e.g. Make-A-Wish does. I feel that the kind of urge that motivates people to do such things is a large part of why humanity is worth protecting in the first place. Although I agree that saving lives is typically more important than a particular other cause, and that it’s usually what you should do if you have to choose, I think we should if at all possible avoid compromising high-level values—such as by discouraging other forms of altruism—in order to do so.
To put this in a broader context, I have a strong aversion to the mentality expressed in the second paragraph of this post. I fear that if we don’t allocate some of our caring to particular humans in their individual capacities, people will come to be seen as dispensable—and then, one day, I might be discarded, too. Since I greatly value my existence on good days and my autonomy even on the worst days, this is a nightmare scenario. I’m afraid of someone being tortured for 50 years to save 3^^^3 people the inconvenience of a dust speck. Yes, it may be the better option, if those are the only two choices, but that doesn’t make it good.
Given that this is how I feel even when we’re talking about existential risk—saving the whole human species and its future—I hope you can understand why similar-sounding arguments against small-scale fuzzy personal altruism in favor of anything less than existential risk reduction leave an especially bad taste in my mouth.
I’m the type of person who highly values fuzzies, to such an extent that I value others’ valuing of fuzzies, and I don’t want to push the culture in a direction toward hostility to valuing fuzzies. I think it’s great if we can learn to be more rational in the pursuit of our goals, but anyone whose goals include trips to Disneyland for cancer patients doesn’t have anything more to be ashamed of than someone whose goals include a new pair of shoes.
Upvoted, thanks for clarifying. I agree with
Several points here:
I agree with Holden’s posting Nothing wrong with selfish giving—just don’t call it philanthropy (though I find the negative connotation of ‘selfish’ attached to the phrase ‘selfish giving’ unfortunate). I think that people who are interested in making the world a better place should allocate some of their resources with an eye toward maximizing their positive impact.
As I’ve said elsewhere, I think that there’s a fair amount to the points that Yvain makes in his Doing Your Good Deed For the Day and do think that it sometimes happens that people’s willingness to help others is diminished by their existing charitable activities.
I’m all for people feeling more fuzzies.
Agreed, of course.
Yes, I regard this as definitely a bug and not a feature.
Glad to hear it. :-)
I’ll take some time to reflect on the nature and extent of our apparent disagreement.
You are making the perfect (people donating to x-risks charities instead of buying personal luxuries) the enemy of the good (people donating to save lives instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland).
If you know how to convince people (not LW regulars) to contribute to x-risk reduction, instead of buying shoes, then please do so. If not, it doesn’t make sense to complain about efforts that can convince people to make immediate positive changes in their behavior while planting the seeds towards convincing them to more generally maximize expected utility.
My preference ordering is:
(people donating to x-risks charities instead of buying personal luxuries) > (people donating to save lives instead of buying personal luxuries)>(people donating to to provide trips to Disneyland instead of buying personal luxuries)>(people donating to x-risks charities instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland)>(people donating to save lives instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland).
EDIT: No, this is wrong; see below. Attention should be focused on the grandparent.
This has incredibly marginal utility. It is effectively trading your luxury for the fuzzy feeling of providing luxury to another.
This has more utility. In fact, it bears a strong resemblance to
given that “providing trips to Disneyland” looks more like a luxury than charity.
I don’t understand how you can prefer A>C but C>A*, unless you think that “preventing the purchase of personal luxuries” is worth more utility than preventing existential risk (A, A*) or saving lives (B, B*).
Yes, never mind—see my reply to JGWeissman.
Your ordering raises the possibility that your preferences are nontransitive! :-)
I don’t see the nontransitivity, but it does seem to imply:
which, while not inconsistent, seems to undervalue x-risk reduction relative to trips to Disneyland for cancer patients.
You’re right. The penultimate item is too low; it should in fact be second.
All I really wanted to point out was the abundance of items between the first and the last, and the fact that (people donating to save lives instead of buying personal luxuries) is higher than (people donating to save lives instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland).
Where does the status quo fit into your preference ordering?
Search ‘Amanda Knox’ on the site. Not necessarily just the top level posts on the subject by Kompo but the other times ‘rational charity’ subjects have come up.
What is that supposed to mean?
If you’re referring to the discussion I think you are, I’ll remind you once again that someone else made the first mention.
This strikes me as something of a cheap shot.
(So, then, by the way, was I wrong here after all? Do you simply not approve of fuzzy-seeking, despite what you said in that thread?)
I don’t think your position is anything to be ashamed of, or to defend. Multi wasn’t sure where you were coming from and those are places where you have expressed your position. It isn’t offensive unless what you have said previously regarding charity is something to be ashamed of.
I don’t know where those questions came from. But no to both.
Well, thanks for that clarification. I hope I can be forgiven for interpreting your comment as an apparent repetition of the rather unpleasant-sounding accusation expressed in the last paragraph here, combined with a suggestion that I wasn’t being transparent about what was motivating my remarks here.
I had intended to ask them in the other sub-thread, where you expressed contempt for Make-A-Wish donors, but was too lazy to dig up the old discussion (not easily found by the keywords you suggest, incidentally) until provoked here.