I think he means that people choose not to think about any map but their favorite one (“their way of looking at reality is the only sane way of viewing the world”), to the point where they can’t estimate the conditional probability P(E|a) of the evidence given not-A.
The link with Aristotle seems weak. But the problem obviously makes it harder to use “the logic of probability,” as Korzybski called it, and Wilson well knew that Korzybski contrasted probability with classical “Aristotelian” logic. (Note that K wrote before the Bayesian school of thought really took off, so we should expect some imprecision and even wrong turns from him.)
I think he means that people choose not to think about any map but their favorite one (“their way of looking at reality is the only sane way of viewing the world”), to the point where they can’t estimate the conditional probability P(E|a) of the evidence given not-A.
The link with Aristotle seems weak. But the problem obviously makes it harder to use “the logic of probability,” as Korzybski called it, and Wilson well knew that Korzybski contrasted probability with classical “Aristotelian” logic. (Note that K wrote before the Bayesian school of thought really took off, so we should expect some imprecision and even wrong turns from him.)