It’s possible that the strategy of only judging those who break the anti-judgment norm is the optimal one. Kind of like how most people only condone violence against those who break the anti-violence norm.
A good example would be using violence to prevent or punish theft.
Some people solve this by stretching the meaning of “violence” to include theft… but if one follows this path, the word becomes increasingly unrelated to its original meaning.
Generally, it seems like a good heuristics to define a set of “forbidden behavior”, with the exception that some kinds of “forbidden behavior” are allowed as a response to someone else’s “forbidden behavior”. This can help reduce the amount of “forbidden behavior” in society.
The only problem is that the definition of the “forbidden behavior” is arbitrary. It reflects the values of some part of the society, but some people will disagree and suggest changes to the definition. The proponents of given definition will then come with rationalizations why their definition is correct and the other one is not.
I guess it’s the same with “judgement”. The proponents of non-judgement usually have a set of exceptions: behaviors so bad that it is allowed to judge them. (Being judgemental, that is judging things not belonging to this set of exceptions, is usually one of them.) They just don’t want to admit that this set is arbitrary, based on their values.
I was with you until you said the choice of forbidden behaviors was arbitrary.
No, it’s not arbitrary; indeed, it’s remarkably consistent across societies. Societies differ on their approaches to law, but in almost every society, randomly assaulting strangers is not allowed. Societies differ on their ideas on sex, but in almost every society, parents are forbidden from having sex with their children. Societies differ on their systems of property, in almost every society, it’s forbidden to grab food out of other people’s hands.
There are obviously a lot of biological and cultural reasons for the rules people choose, and rule systems do differ, so we have to decide which to use (is gay sex allowed? is abortion legal? etc.). But they’re clearly not arbitrary; even the most radically different societies agree on a lot of things.
I don’t have enough data about behaviors in different cultures, but I suspect they are rather different. (I wish I had better data, such as a big table with cultures in columns, behaviors in rows, and specific norms in the cells.)
Of course it depends on how many details do we specify about the behavior. The more generally we speak, the more similar results will we get. For example if I ask “is it OK to have sex with anyone anytime, or is it regulated by some rules?”, then yes, probably everywhere it is regulated. The more specific questions will show more disagreement, such as “is it OK for a woman to marry a man from a lower social class?” or “is it OK if a king marries his own sister?” or “if someone is dissatisfied with their sexual partner, is it OK to find another one?” (this question may have different answers for men and women).
Also it will depend on the behavior; some behaviors would have obvious disadvantages, such as anyone randomly attacking anyone… though it may be considered OK if a person from a higher class randomly attacks a person from a lower class, or if the attacked person is a member of a different tribe.
I guess there is a lot of mindkilling and disinformation involved in this topic, because if someone is a proponent of a given social norm, it benefits them to claim (truly or falsely) that all societies have the same norm; and if someone is an opponent, it benefits them to claim (truly or falsely) that some other societies have it differently. Even this strategy may be different in different cultures: some cultures may prefer to signal that they have universal values, other cultures may prefer to signal that they are different (read: better) than their neighbors.
And my point wasn’t to claim that there is no variation in moral values between societies; that’s obviously untrue.
My main objection was to the word arbitrary; no, they’re not arbitrary, they have causes in our culture and evolutionary history and some of these causes even rise to the level of justifications.
Who says that a society’s moral values don’t have causes? The issue is whether those causes are historically contingent (colloquailly, whether history could have happened in a way that different moral positions were adopted in a particular time and place).
Alternatively, can I suggest you taboo the word justification? The way I understand the term, saying moral positions are justified is contradicted by the proliferation of contradictory moral positions throughout time. (But I’m out of the mainstream in this community because I’m a moral anti-realist)
The way I understand the term, saying moral positions are justified is contradicted by the proliferation of contradictory moral positions throughout time.
Would you apply the same logic to physical propositions? Would you claim that, for example, saying that astronomical positions are justified is contradicted by the proliferation of contradictory astronomical positions throughout time?
It’s possible that the strategy of only judging those who break the anti-judgment norm is the optimal one. Kind of like how most people only condone violence against those who break the anti-violence norm.
Most people condone violence for a lot more reasons than that.
A good example would be using violence to prevent or punish theft.
Some people solve this by stretching the meaning of “violence” to include theft… but if one follows this path, the word becomes increasingly unrelated to its original meaning.
Generally, it seems like a good heuristics to define a set of “forbidden behavior”, with the exception that some kinds of “forbidden behavior” are allowed as a response to someone else’s “forbidden behavior”. This can help reduce the amount of “forbidden behavior” in society.
The only problem is that the definition of the “forbidden behavior” is arbitrary. It reflects the values of some part of the society, but some people will disagree and suggest changes to the definition. The proponents of given definition will then come with rationalizations why their definition is correct and the other one is not.
I guess it’s the same with “judgement”. The proponents of non-judgement usually have a set of exceptions: behaviors so bad that it is allowed to judge them. (Being judgemental, that is judging things not belonging to this set of exceptions, is usually one of them.) They just don’t want to admit that this set is arbitrary, based on their values.
I was with you until you said the choice of forbidden behaviors was arbitrary.
No, it’s not arbitrary; indeed, it’s remarkably consistent across societies. Societies differ on their approaches to law, but in almost every society, randomly assaulting strangers is not allowed. Societies differ on their ideas on sex, but in almost every society, parents are forbidden from having sex with their children. Societies differ on their systems of property, in almost every society, it’s forbidden to grab food out of other people’s hands.
There are obviously a lot of biological and cultural reasons for the rules people choose, and rule systems do differ, so we have to decide which to use (is gay sex allowed? is abortion legal? etc.). But they’re clearly not arbitrary; even the most radically different societies agree on a lot of things.
I don’t have enough data about behaviors in different cultures, but I suspect they are rather different. (I wish I had better data, such as a big table with cultures in columns, behaviors in rows, and specific norms in the cells.)
Of course it depends on how many details do we specify about the behavior. The more generally we speak, the more similar results will we get. For example if I ask “is it OK to have sex with anyone anytime, or is it regulated by some rules?”, then yes, probably everywhere it is regulated. The more specific questions will show more disagreement, such as “is it OK for a woman to marry a man from a lower social class?” or “is it OK if a king marries his own sister?” or “if someone is dissatisfied with their sexual partner, is it OK to find another one?” (this question may have different answers for men and women).
Also it will depend on the behavior; some behaviors would have obvious disadvantages, such as anyone randomly attacking anyone… though it may be considered OK if a person from a higher class randomly attacks a person from a lower class, or if the attacked person is a member of a different tribe.
I guess there is a lot of mindkilling and disinformation involved in this topic, because if someone is a proponent of a given social norm, it benefits them to claim (truly or falsely) that all societies have the same norm; and if someone is an opponent, it benefits them to claim (truly or falsely) that some other societies have it differently. Even this strategy may be different in different cultures: some cultures may prefer to signal that they have universal values, other cultures may prefer to signal that they are different (read: better) than their neighbors.
I’m sure that’s right.
And my point wasn’t to claim that there is no variation in moral values between societies; that’s obviously untrue.
My main objection was to the word arbitrary; no, they’re not arbitrary, they have causes in our culture and evolutionary history and some of these causes even rise to the level of justifications.
Who says that a society’s moral values don’t have causes? The issue is whether those causes are historically contingent (colloquailly, whether history could have happened in a way that different moral positions were adopted in a particular time and place).
Alternatively, can I suggest you taboo the word justification? The way I understand the term, saying moral positions are justified is contradicted by the proliferation of contradictory moral positions throughout time. (But I’m out of the mainstream in this community because I’m a moral anti-realist)
Would you apply the same logic to physical propositions? Would you claim that, for example, saying that astronomical positions are justified is contradicted by the proliferation of contradictory astronomical positions throughout time?
No