Pascal’s wager is pascal’s wager, no matter what box you put it in. You could try to rescue it by directly making the argument that we should expect a greater measure of “entities with resources that they are willing to acausally trade for things like humanity continuing to exist” compared to entities with the opposite preferences, and though I haven’t seen a rigorous case for that it seems possible, but that’s not sufficient; you need the expected measure of entities that have that preference to be large enough that dealing with the transaction costs/uncertainy of acausally trading at all to make sense. And that seems like a much harder case to make.
Pascal’s wager is pascal’s wager, no matter what box you put it in. You could try to rescue it by directly making the argument that we should expect a greater measure of “entities with resources that they are willing to acausally trade for things like humanity continuing to exist” compared to entities with the opposite preferences, and though I haven’t seen a rigorous case for that it seems possible, but that’s not sufficient; you need the expected measure of entities that have that preference to be large enough that dealing with the transaction costs/uncertainy of acausally trading at all to make sense. And that seems like a much harder case to make.