This seems to be an extremely naive answer, because everything we once thought was a microscale component turned out to really be a macrosystem made up of smaller things, all the way down to configurations of quantum amplitudes. This answer is exactly the thing I’m trying to address. If it wasn’t clear in my post, I totally understand what “reductionism is”—I’m more interested in how to explain our state of the art understanding of giving a reductionist account of actual physics, which seems to terminate at questions about the ontological status of quantum amplitude.
I’m more interested in how to explain our state of the art understanding of giving a reductionist account of actual physics, which seems to terminate at questions about the ontological status of quantum amplitude.
The next step below quantum amplitude, if there is one, is Tegmarkian multiverses, which are a reduction fixpoint (they reduce to themselves). (There might be one intermediate in between—I have a strong suspicion that quantum amplitudes are a continuous approximation of something discrete). However, there is pretty good reason to believe that we cannot gather evidence about them, even in principle.
Let me amend that slightly. I understand that if you’re given observations which indicate that X is composed of something more basic called Y, then reductionism suggests you should believe that X only exists by virtue of being made up of Y. But my questions is, what about the claim “Everything that exists only exists by virtue of being made up of something else that’s more basic.” Why would this overstep reductionism? How does this claim mesh up with what we theorize or know about quantum configurations?
Your claim: “Everything that exists only exists by virtue of being made up of something else that’s more basic” is inadequate.
A better formulation would be: Everything except the most fundamental components, whatever they ultimately turn out to be, exists only by virtue of being made up of something else that’s more basic.
Right, but I’m specifically talking about those most fundamental components, whatever they happen to be. It seems that we cannot give an account of what quantum amplitude is made up of, pending some highly speculative theories. And, in fact, large swaths of physicists and philosophers suggest there is good reason to think that quantum amplitude may indeed be that fundamental concept.
I use the term “ontologically basic” to refer to what you call the “most fundamental concept.” Basically, an eigenvector of the “decompose into smaller parts” operation, with eigenvalue 1. I am curious whether inside of physics we can have reason to think we have found such an ontologically basic concept (quantum amplitude).
Is it falsifiable to claim that X is ontologically basic yet really does exist, for some X? If X = the Christian God, for example, we say that with high probability the answer is no and we can ignore it. And because any anticipated experience yielded by this ontologically basic God doesn’t constrain experience, we can have a real evidence-based way to reject that X exists. But what if X=quantum amplitude?
This seems to be an extremely naive answer, because everything we once thought was a microscale component turned out to really be a macrosystem made up of smaller things, all the way down to configurations of quantum amplitudes. This answer is exactly the thing I’m trying to address. If it wasn’t clear in my post, I totally understand what “reductionism is”—I’m more interested in how to explain our state of the art understanding of giving a reductionist account of actual physics, which seems to terminate at questions about the ontological status of quantum amplitude.
The next step below quantum amplitude, if there is one, is Tegmarkian multiverses, which are a reduction fixpoint (they reduce to themselves). (There might be one intermediate in between—I have a strong suspicion that quantum amplitudes are a continuous approximation of something discrete). However, there is pretty good reason to believe that we cannot gather evidence about them, even in principle.
I understand the concept of Tegmarkian multiverses, but could you explain how they “reduce to themselves”?
Let me amend that slightly. I understand that if you’re given observations which indicate that X is composed of something more basic called Y, then reductionism suggests you should believe that X only exists by virtue of being made up of Y. But my questions is, what about the claim “Everything that exists only exists by virtue of being made up of something else that’s more basic.” Why would this overstep reductionism? How does this claim mesh up with what we theorize or know about quantum configurations?
Your claim: “Everything that exists only exists by virtue of being made up of something else that’s more basic” is inadequate.
A better formulation would be: Everything except the most fundamental components, whatever they ultimately turn out to be, exists only by virtue of being made up of something else that’s more basic.
Right, but I’m specifically talking about those most fundamental components, whatever they happen to be. It seems that we cannot give an account of what quantum amplitude is made up of, pending some highly speculative theories. And, in fact, large swaths of physicists and philosophers suggest there is good reason to think that quantum amplitude may indeed be that fundamental concept.
I use the term “ontologically basic” to refer to what you call the “most fundamental concept.” Basically, an eigenvector of the “decompose into smaller parts” operation, with eigenvalue 1. I am curious whether inside of physics we can have reason to think we have found such an ontologically basic concept (quantum amplitude).
Is it falsifiable to claim that X is ontologically basic yet really does exist, for some X? If X = the Christian God, for example, we say that with high probability the answer is no and we can ignore it. And because any anticipated experience yielded by this ontologically basic God doesn’t constrain experience, we can have a real evidence-based way to reject that X exists. But what if X=quantum amplitude?