Okay, what I’m picking up here is that you feel that the natural abstractions hypothesis is quite trivial and that it seems like it is naively trying to say something about how cognition works similar to how physics work. Yet this is obviously not true since development in humans and other animals clearly happen in different ways, why would their mental representations converge? (Do correct me if I misunderstood)
Firstly, there’s something called the good regulator theorem in cybernetics and our boy that you’re talking about, Mr Wentworth, has a post on making it better that might be useful for you to understand some of the foundations of what he’s thinking about.
Okay, why is this useful preamble? Well, if there’s convergence in useful ways of describing a system then there’s likely some degree of internal convergence in the mind of the agent observing the problem. Essentially this is what the regulator theorem is about (imo)
So when it comes to the theory, the heavy lifting here is actually not really done by the Natural Abstractions Hypothesis part that is the convergence part but rather the Redundant Information Hypothesis.
It is proving things about the distribution of environments as well as power laws in reality that makes the foundation of the theory compared to just stating that “minds will converge”.
This is at least my understanding of NAH, does that make sense or what do you think about that?
Thanks for taking the time to explain this to me! I would like to read your links before responding to the meat of your comment, but I wanted to note something before going forward because there is a pattern I’ve noticed in both my verbal conversations on this subject and the comments so far.
I say something like ‘lots of systems don’t seem to converge on the same abstractions’ and then someone else says ‘yeah, I agree obviously’ and then starts talking about another feature of the NAH while not taking this as evidence against the NAH.
But most posts on the NAH explicitly mention something like the claim that many systems will converge on similar abstractions [1]. I find this really confusing!
Going forward it might be useful to taboo the phrase ‘the Natural Abstraction Hypothesis’ (?) and just discuss what we think is true about the world.
Your comment that its a claim about ‘proving things about the distribution of environments’ is helpful. To help me understand what people mean by the NAH could you tell me what would (in your view) constitute strong evidence against the NAH? (If the fact that we can point to systems which haven’t converged on using the same abstractions doesn’t count)
The Natural Abstraction Hypothesis: Implications and Evidence ’there exist abstractions (relatively low-dimensional summaries which capture information relevant for prediction) which are “natural” in the sense that we should expect a wide variety of cognitive systems to converge on using them.
But, to help me understand what people mean by the NAH could you tell me what would (in your view) constitute strong evidence against the NAH? (If the fact that we can point to systems which haven’t converged on using the same abstractions doesn’t count)
Yes sir!
So for me it is about looking at a specific type of systems or a specific type of system dynamics that encode the axioms required for the NAH to be true.
So, it is more the claim that “there are specific set of mathematical axioms that can be used in order to get convergence towards similar ontologies and these are applicable in AI systems.”
For example, if one takes the Active Inference lens on looking at concepts in the world, we generally define the boundaries between concepts as markov blankets. Suprisingly or not, markov blankets are pretty great for describing not only biological systems but also AI and some economic systems. The key underlying invariant is that these are all optimisation systems.
p(NAH|Optimisation System).
So if we for example, with the perspective of markov blankets or the “natural latents” (which are functionals that work like markov blankets) don’t see convergence in how different AI systems represent reality then I would say that the NAH has been disproven or that it is evidence against it.
I do however think that this exists on a spectrum and that it isn’t fully true or false, it is true for a restricted set of assumptions, the question being how restricted that is.
I see it more as a useful frame of viewing agent cognition processes rather than something I’m willing to bet my life on. I do think it is pointing towards a core problem similar to what ARC Theory are working on but in a different way, understanding cognition of AI systems.
Okay, what I’m picking up here is that you feel that the natural abstractions hypothesis is quite trivial and that it seems like it is naively trying to say something about how cognition works similar to how physics work. Yet this is obviously not true since development in humans and other animals clearly happen in different ways, why would their mental representations converge? (Do correct me if I misunderstood)
Firstly, there’s something called the good regulator theorem in cybernetics and our boy that you’re talking about, Mr Wentworth, has a post on making it better that might be useful for you to understand some of the foundations of what he’s thinking about.
Okay, why is this useful preamble? Well, if there’s convergence in useful ways of describing a system then there’s likely some degree of internal convergence in the mind of the agent observing the problem. Essentially this is what the regulator theorem is about (imo)
So when it comes to the theory, the heavy lifting here is actually not really done by the Natural Abstractions Hypothesis part that is the convergence part but rather the Redundant Information Hypothesis.
It is proving things about the distribution of environments as well as power laws in reality that makes the foundation of the theory compared to just stating that “minds will converge”.
This is at least my understanding of NAH, does that make sense or what do you think about that?
Thanks for taking the time to explain this to me! I would like to read your links before responding to the meat of your comment, but I wanted to note something before going forward because there is a pattern I’ve noticed in both my verbal conversations on this subject and the comments so far.
I say something like ‘lots of systems don’t seem to converge on the same abstractions’ and then someone else says ‘yeah, I agree obviously’ and then starts talking about another feature of the NAH while not taking this as evidence against the NAH.
But most posts on the NAH explicitly mention something like the claim that many systems will converge on similar abstractions [1]. I find this really confusing!
Going forward it might be useful to taboo the phrase ‘the Natural Abstraction Hypothesis’ (?) and just discuss what we think is true about the world.
Your comment that its a claim about ‘proving things about the distribution of environments’ is helpful. To help me understand what people mean by the NAH could you tell me what would (in your view) constitute strong evidence against the NAH? (If the fact that we can point to systems which haven’t converged on using the same abstractions doesn’t count)
Natural Abstractions: Key Claims, Theorems and Critiques: ‘many cognitive systems learn similar abstractions’,
Testing the Natural Abstraction Hypothesis: Project Intro ‘a wide variety of cognitive architectures will learn to use approximately the same high-level abstract objects/concepts to reason about the world’
The Natural Abstraction Hypothesis: Implications and Evidence ’there exist abstractions (relatively low-dimensional summaries which capture information relevant for prediction) which are “natural” in the sense that we should expect a wide variety of cognitive systems to converge on using them.
′
Yes sir!
So for me it is about looking at a specific type of systems or a specific type of system dynamics that encode the axioms required for the NAH to be true.
So, it is more the claim that “there are specific set of mathematical axioms that can be used in order to get convergence towards similar ontologies and these are applicable in AI systems.”
For example, if one takes the Active Inference lens on looking at concepts in the world, we generally define the boundaries between concepts as markov blankets. Suprisingly or not, markov blankets are pretty great for describing not only biological systems but also AI and some economic systems. The key underlying invariant is that these are all optimisation systems.
p(NAH|Optimisation System).
So if we for example, with the perspective of markov blankets or the “natural latents” (which are functionals that work like markov blankets) don’t see convergence in how different AI systems represent reality then I would say that the NAH has been disproven or that it is evidence against it.
I do however think that this exists on a spectrum and that it isn’t fully true or false, it is true for a restricted set of assumptions, the question being how restricted that is.
I see it more as a useful frame of viewing agent cognition processes rather than something I’m willing to bet my life on. I do think it is pointing towards a core problem similar to what ARC Theory are working on but in a different way, understanding cognition of AI systems.