Not a technical book about the Apollo program by any means. The author goes around finding and interviewing all the surviving moonwalkers as of the time he was writing it (9) about the effect the event had on their lives. Some report massive changes in perspective about the Earth. Some feel massively betrayed by NASA, having taken part in something they felt was the first step in a direction and which was then not followed up on (be the reasons for that good or bad). There’s pretty much as many reactions as there are moonwalkers.
But then, most fascinating to me was the difference between living the history and watching the history. Armstrong and Aldrin on Apollo 11 didn’t really appreciate how much importance was projected on their mission and how much mythologization of the event was going on back home, with half a billion people watching them live (and indeed it was the first huge live media event of this type). They were just doing their jobs—and then the president gets on the line with them on the surface of the moon and they scramble to not make asses of themselves talking extemporaneously while lugging around hundreds of kg of equipment on their backs. And when they get back and are in isolation (as all the first moonwalkers were in case of living microbes on the moon) and are dealing with a constant parade of dignitaries outside their little window, eventually they gather the gravitas that the event had for the world at large. Aldrin turns to Armstrong and says “Neil, we missed it!”
Currently reading Christopher Clark’s “The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914” so far the book has two upshots: nationalism makes people really irrational. No, you think you already know that, but you don’t realize how far it can go. No, more irrational than that. Second, it is really easy for things to spiral out of control. Reading it has made me strongly update to the probability that there will be a large-scale war in the next few years, and in general that war might be a major aspect of the Great Filter. A relevant, somewhat critical review of the book is here.
Essentially that large-scale, complicated alliances can result in small scale wars unexpectedly spiraling out of control. In the case of WWI there were multiple small conflagrations in the Balkans before WWI but it then took just the right one to set it off. In a similar vein, one wouldn’t be surprised if one the similar small conflagrations around Russia like are currently happening leads to a Russia v. NATO war with little warning. Similarly, one could expect a similar situation in the Pacific given the many border conflicts there.
I think Putin wants to rebuild the Soviet Empire and is going to keep taking more territory until he encounters serious resistance, and this resistance could easily turn into a war in which nuclear weapons are used. Putin might rationally calculate that if he tried to conquer Finland (which used to be part of the Czarist Empire) there is only a 10% chance that the U.S. would put up serious resistance, and this was a gamble he would be willing to take. But if the U.S. did decide to fight it would easily beat back Russia if the war stayed conventional, and this might cause Putin to use atomic weapons.
Putin probably calculates that Obama is much less likely to use military force against him than the next U.S. President will be, so we might be entering a period of great danger.
You should note that while having more territory usually does help a country to be more powerful, it is not the only way to be a powerful country. While trying to conquer as much land as possible made sense when agriculture was the primary source of wealth, nowadays it is somewhat more complicated because industry and service sector of annexed territory are often destroyed by the war and has to be rebuilt so why not build in the territory you already own. That leaves natural resources such as oil and coal, but it is sometimes possible to profit from them even without having direct control over them, for example, by owning (directly or indirectly) companies that extract those resources from the ground and having enough influence over the government of that country to prevent them from meddling with those companies. Having higher population seems to be useful in some cases, but wars tend to create a lot refugees and creating an economic union that you dominate is perhaps a good enough substitute. Therefore, it sometimes might not make sense to try to conquer as much territory as possible, especially when that territory does not have a lot of natural resources. I don’t think that NATO and EU are the only things that stop Russia from trying to conquer Baltic States or Finland, they also lack the necessity to do so. Because military force is not the only way to gain a lot of influence over the country’s actions.
In my country (and I would guess in Finland as well), what many people fear is not Russian tanks, it is Russia gaining a lot of influence by making backroom deals, promoting and financially supporting certain political parties and individual politicians whose ideas are useful to them, buying up shares in energy companies, either directly or by proxy individuals (who do not have to be Russians themselves, there are a lot of people who got rich due to having the right connections and they often want to preserve those connections) and gaining cultural influence. Finlandization is often a good enough substitute for the actual conquest. I am not an expert in geopolitics or international relations, but it is my impression that while Crimea does have strategic importance to Russia due its warm deepwater ports, it is harder to make such case for Donbas/Donbass or South Ossetia (or Abkhazia, or Transistria). It is my impression that in these cases it is not necessarily just the territory itself that is important to Russia, but the fact that having disputed territories may make it significantly more difficult for those countries to join NATO and EU, and, that by waging these small scale wars Russia demonstrates ability and willingness to protect their interests, thus sending a signal to many people that Russia is a powerful country and therefore siding with their interests in a domestic politics of their respective countries and trying to establish connections with them is potentially useful. For example, by negotiating with each country individually, Russia is able to extract higher prices for its natural gas than they would be able if EU countries coordinated with each other and negotiated as one bloc. In addition to that, because of these large profit margins, Russia is able to selectively make discounts for some countries in exchange for various things that they want, for example, naval facilities. Thus it is in Russia’s interest to try to weaken the EU, therefore they support various anti-EU parties, politicians (both rightwing and (probably) leftwing) and people who are influential in politics without themselves being politicians in various ways. However, I predict that it would be much more difficult to attract such allies if Russia would give in to Western demands and remove their troops from regions such as Donbas, because it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness, therefore Russia would not be thought of as worth siding with. Even though these anti-EU parties would probably still be anti-EU, they would no longer necessarily be against, e.g. sanctions against Russia. Perhaps even more importantly, there are a lot of influential people in Eastern Europe and Central Asia who find it useful to join whichever side is more powerful and a sign of Russia’s weakness would make the option of seeking closer relations with the West more attractive, thus reducing Russia’s influence even further.
To sum up, in my layman’s view, I do not think that Russia is hungry for more territory, but it is probably hungry for more power and influence over decision making in other countries (because it is a useful thing to have), which can be acquired by other means than conquest. I conjecture that the present situation in Donbas is probably not because Russia desires to annex the Donets Basin, but perhaps because giving in would send a signal that Russia is not strong enough and/or not willing to protect its own interests (let alone interests of their allies), therefore not worth siding with.
The rationale for claiming the parts of Ukraine was much stronger than for Finland. Russians account for 17% of the population of Ukraine, while Russians account for 1.1% of residents of Finland. The Finns won independence from Russia via war and have not been in the same country as Russia for almost a century, while Ukraine’s territory gained from Russia was by the stroke of Kruschev’s pen as a bureacratic transfer of low significance as long as both Russia and Ukraine were parts of the Soviet Union. Also, Ukraine is culturally very close to Russia, even having a common language-base, which Finland does not. Russia has only been not in the same country as Crimea since the fall of the Soviet Union. So, the general causes are much weaker.
Ukraine was extremely unstable before Russia moved in, with a strong geographical split between areas with protests in favor of closer ties to the west and Russia. This seems unlikely to recur in FInland. Without the underlying weakness, the proximate excuse is gone.
You are right in terms of moral rationale, but what I think will matter to Putin are the costs and benefits to him of an invasion. Finding a proximate excuse will be easy, especially for a former KGB agent.
The costs will be higher and the benefits lower based on the (lack of) rationale. Forcing the Finns into Russia will be very bad for everyone involved even if successful, and failure is obviously worse for him.
Before it was an ordinary (somewhat poor) country. 17% of an ethnicity does not a casus belli make. Similar culture does not a casus belli make. This is kind of crazy reasoning, imagine applying it to Western Europe.
Do any you have any evidence for your claim regarding a strong geographical split between areas and protests in favor in closer ties with Russia (that are independent of Russian special forces operating on Ukranian soil)? Where have you read this? There is an ongoing information war, please be very careful about sources.
Also, the protests in favor of sticking with Europeanization were in the west and the counter-protests were in the east. Russia definitely had a political ground game going, but it’s no accident that they could only get it going in certain provinces. If they could have gotten it going in the capital, they would have.
ALSO also, I wasn’t saying that Russian actions were actually legitimate.
Agreeing with your main point, i’ll just point out that there were incipient protests in favor of the EU in the East, but 1) it’s really easy to quench a local action unsupported by the body of the protest, after which sane people would either shut up or join the main force, 2) the capital, built upon the Dnieper River, is hardly in the west, 3) there were anti-EU protests in Kyiv, which is partly why there was street-fighting (I mean, beside the Berkut).
And polarization had been present before December ’14, but it skyrocketed after.
I agree the odds are well under 50%. If you provide your real identity, I would bet $20 based on a 20% chance that Russia will invade a country (other than the Ukraine) by the end of the Obama presidency, so you would have to give me $100 if Russia did invade. I will bet more if your real identity causes me to assign a high probability of you paying if you lose. This is me.
So you claim a 20% chance that Russia will invade a country other than Ukraine by January 20, 2017? That is not really specific to your prediction that Putin is likely to try to steal territory by the end of the Obama administration. For example, the US has invaded many countries in the last 15 years but hasn’t been trying to take territory. In addition, the Russian invasion would have to be aggressive (i.e. the other country did not attack first.) Something like the 2008 Georgia war would not count.
Edit: If you can agree to those terms, I will accept the 20:100 odds you offer.
It’s Ukraine, not the Ukraine, since the latter version already implies, through history of language, that the territory is a (border) part of Russia (okraina).
The EU far outdoes Russia in population, military spending, wealth, and technology. They don’t need the United States to win a conventional war against Russia. The Russian advantage lies in unity and a European aversion to force. It may be advantageous for Putin to assert dominance over some of the former Soviet states. But an outright invasion of the EU? If anything would create a united front against Russia, that would be it. I don’t know if Putin as after territory so much as maintaining a buffer zone against Western influence (and scoring the occasional political victory over the US).
Putin might rationally calculate that if he tried to conquer Finland (which used to be part of the Czarist Empire) there is only a 10% chance that the U.S. would put up serious resistance, and this was a gamble he would be willing to take.
Finland is an EU country. Even if the US doesn’t care about defending EU territory the EU does.
Military is not commanded via the EU commission but by individual member states. There nothing to veto. Finish citizens have free movement via the EU. That means average people know more Finish people than Ukranians and actually care about defending Finland.
Ukraine is for political purposes like a third world country. People far away that nobody deeply cares about.
It’s worth looking at innerpolitical issures. I don’t think German or France politicians would get away in their own countries with not defending Finland. On the other hand Germans who already don’t want to pay for the Greece bailout, don’t want to bailout the Ukraine and have substantial resources spent over there.
From Putins perspective the Ukraine conflict made him popular at home, I don’t think starting an additional conflict in Finland would help Putin inside of Russian politics.
Russia invades Finland. Germany announces it’s going to send lots of troops to Finland to fight against the Russians. Putin announces that if Germany does this he will drop an atomic bomb on Berlin. Germany then backs down.
Since Germany doesn’t have atomic weapons, it can’t credibly threaten Russia absent Russia invading Germany.
Russia doesn’t even invade the East-Ukraine as far as Russian media is concerned. It’s done by plausible deniable locals supported by Russian citizens on vacation.
Military action can be done without announcing it and a tanks that move into NATO or EU territory will likely produce an immediate military response within less than an hour.
NATO doesn’t send tanks to clear cities in East Ukraine that are under the control of separatists, but
Since Germany doesn’t have atomic weapons, it can’t credibly threaten Russia absent Russia invading Germany.
Germany doesn’t but France does. The UK does as well.
US innerpolitics even forces the US president to increase North Korea sanctions after the recent cyberattack when he knows that the thing that actually good to do is to increase interaction between North Korea and the outside world.
Ignoring threads of nuclear attack is likely not very popular in the US.
Putin announces that if Germany does this he will drop an atomic bomb on Berlin.
That’s a very risky thing to do. It might trigger nuclear first strike protocols on the US side.
It might trigger nuclear first strike protocols on the US side.
I doubt it. The U.S. didn’t initiate a first strike against North Korea when it threatened us with nuclear weapons, and unlike with Russia, the U.S. almost certainly could eliminate all North Korean nuclear weapons without any significant U.S. losses.
North Korea didn’t threaten in a way that the US military considered to be highly probable to start a war. It’s more seen as posturing. It would need a plausible thread to achieve military objectives.
North Korea can complete destroy most of Seoul. It’s in artillery range.
Russia invades Finland. Germany announces it’s going to send lots of troops to Finland to fight against the Russians. Putin announces that if Germany does this he will drop an atomic bomb on Berlin. Germany then backs down.
I think the scenario will be a wee bit different:
Russia invades Finland. Germany announces it’s going to send lots of troops to Finland to fight against the Russians. Putin announces that if Germany does this he will drop an atomic bomb on Berlin. Terrified Russian elites remove Putin from power.
Even in Russia I don’t think there is any political faction which thinks that a nuclear exchange is a good idea.
Even in Russia I don’t think there is any political faction which thinks that a nuclear exchange is a good idea.
Unfortunately, the idea of limited nuclear exchanges or making credible or close to credible threats of such exchanges is is depressingly popular in Russian military and political discussion. See e.g. here. More generally, this is actually an old idea that of the “tactical nuclear exchange” with a few nukes being perhaps exchanged in Eastern Europe without a full-scale war. During much of the Cold War this was actually more common as a NATO idea whereas the USSR accepted that limiting nuclear exchanges was not viable and that there was no clear line between tactical and strategic exchange of nuclear weapons.
More generally, this is actually an old idea that of the “tactical nuclear exchange” with a few nukes being perhaps exchanged in Eastern Europe without a full-scale war.
Yes, and I seen nothing particularly wrong about this idea—it’s a possibility. However I don’t think the current Russian elite (with bank accounts in Switzerland, houses in the Cyprus, sending their kids to English private schools, etc. etc.) would be willing to contemplate high risk of even a limited nuclear exchange.
More generally, this is actually an old idea that of the “tactical nuclear exchange” with a few nukes being perhaps exchanged in Eastern Europe without a full-scale war.
Yes, and I seen nothing particularly wrong about this idea—it’s a possibility.
The wrong aspect about this is that it seems very unlikely to actually stay that restricted. And it may not at all be easy for a country to tell that another launched only a few nukes and isn’t intending to use more. The standard way this sort of thing goes wrong is where the exchanges get pushed farther East and West until they are close to Moscow and Paris and then all hell more or less breaks loose.
However I don’t think the current Russian elite (with bank accounts in Switzerland, houses in the Cyprus, sending their kids to English private schools, etc. etc.) would be willing to contemplate high risk of even a limited nuclear exchange.
That seems likely to be true, but how much influence do they have? And note that even with Putin’s repeated mentions of nukes they haven’t taken any steps to curtail the situation. A nuclear exchange if it started could start well before they had a chance to do much about it.
it seems very unlikely to actually stay that restricted
I don’t know—my level of uncertainty about what’s going to be “likely” or “unlikely” in the event of a limited nuclear exchange is very high :-/
how much influence do they have?
The question at this point will be not “influence” but “capability”—will they be able to remove Putin and those personally loyal to him at any cost from power? I think it’s “likely” but see the previous paragraph :-)
Headlines are written to attract eyeballs and clicks. Would you like to know one weird trick which will enhance and supercharge your understanding of European politics? X-D
And NATO pushing up to the borders of Russia isn’t considered an aggressive move on the part of the USA, because … ?
I’m not trying to defend his annexation of the Crimea but “trying to rebuild the Soviet Empire” isn’t what I think his motivations are when I can look at a map like this, and recall the Georgian conflict was itself sparked in part by aspirations of that country to join NATO. Americans would feel threatened if say, Mexico joined the Warsaw Pact, no?
And NATO pushing up to the borders of Russia isn’t considered an aggressive move on the part of the USA, because … ?
Because it wasn’t NATO that “pushed up to the borders of Russia” it was the Eastern European countries that fled from Russia into NATO. Not a single NATO tank had to streamroll into those Eastern European countries for them to join . You’ll note that none of those nations that joined NATO needed to be invaded and military occupied by NATO—unlike what Russia is doing now, and unlike what Warsaw Pact did in the past.
Because if any of those countries ask to leave NATO, NATO will leave. However Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova are asking Russia to leave, and Russia isn’t leaving.
Because the sovereign and independent Eastern European nations wanted to become part of NATO, and NATO tanks didn’t need to force itself on a single nation, it was invited( a single country, nor change the borders, unlike Russia’s military occupation of portions of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.
Because a NATO country like Poland isn’t the one attempting to annex the western portions of Ukraine or Belarus or Russia.
Because when Greece has been recently openly allying itself with Russia, I don’t see NATO troops from Italy or Albania or Bulgaria attempting to break apart portions of Greece.
Yay, for simple answers to simple questions.
Americans would feel threatened if say, Mexico joined the Warsaw Pact, no?
Yes, America also often used military imperialism in its attempt to stop Latin American countries from allying themselves with the Soviet Union, (e.g. the invasion at the Bay of Pigs).
You are looking at this from a moral viewpoint. The fact that many of Russia’s neighbors would rather militarily associate with the U.S. than Russia is a cause of great insecurity for Russia and probably a big part of the reason Putin would like to gain military control of more territory. Putin would have less to worry about if the eastern European nations in NATO joined because they were forced to because then these countries would be weaker U.S. allies.
Clearly Aris has moral sentiments about the matter (who would not?), but he is presenting observable facts, such as who is sending men and materiel and who is not.
Putin would have less to worry about if the eastern European nations in NATO joined because they were forced to because then these countries would be weaker U.S. allies.
If they were forced to, that would imply a US more able and willing to force them, which cancels that out.
Putin clearly intends to exert all the pressure and take all the opportunities that he can to expand Russia’s sphere of influence indefinitely, as did the former USSR. All else is tactics. As you said:
I think Putin wants to rebuild the Soviet Empire and is going to keep taking more territory until he encounters serious resistance
Because the sovereign and independent Eastern European nations wanted to become part of NATO, and NATO tanks didn’t need to force itself on a single nation, it was invited( a single country, nor change the borders, unlike Russia’s military occupation of portions of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.
I’m not sure your average Serb would agree …
Because when Greece has been recently openly allying itself with Russia, I don’t see NATO troops from Italy or Albania or Bulgaria attempting to break apart portions of Greece.
No, they just get the Troika to do it by proxy.
I’ll restate what I said before—I’m not defending Putin’s regime as such. It’s tyrannical and corrupt and no sane person would die defending that hill. Just that Russia’s actions are perfectly understandable as defensive and reactive in nature. Yes, the Eastern Euro countries (mostly) joined NATO of their own free will (more accurately, they had little alternative either way with Russia being dead in the water through the 90s). What of it? The fact remains there’s an explicitly anti-Russian coalition on Russia’s doorstep, and allied groups like the EU pushing into historically-Russian territories. They’re understandably afraid of the Germans pushing east of the Vistula—after all, it didn’t end well the last two times.
“Rebuilding the Soviet Empire” is exactly the kind of propagandistic slogan that contributes to crises in the first place—viewing your enemy as some kind of inscrutable, uncompromisingly aggressive monster rather than a country concerned for its survival and who possesses few natural defenses.
I opposed NATO’s action in Kosovo as an imperialist action in support of Albanian imperialism—but this has nothing to do with NATO’s expansion eastwards any more than its intervention against Afghanistan does. NATO’s expansion eastwards was an action of the Eastern European countries fleeing westwards, being rightfully afraid of Russian imperialism.
Italy or Albania or Bulgaria attempting to break apart portions of Greece.
No, they just get the Troika to do it by proxy
Know what? I can’t remain civil in this discussion, if you’re comparing Greece being loaned money with extremely low interests as being the same thing as Ukraine being militarily conquered by Russia and many thousands of its people getting killed.
So I’m tapping out. Enjoy your “understanding” of the so called defensive attitude of Russia as one by one it conquers nations that never once threatened anyone. On my part I’ll keep denouncing Russia neoHitleric imperialism, and its vile policies.
One of the reasons to join NATO was that Russia (Soviet Union) had a history of reverting political changes in Eastern Europe; see Prague Spring. Given this history, a political change from communism to democracy seemed half-assed without also joining NATO, because it seemed like a question of time until someone in Russia decides “okay guys, your political regime will now change to this” and send tanks to enforce the decision.
It felt like without NATO, the future of Eastern Europe would be decided in two steps. 1) Russia will decide what political regime it wants, which may take a few years, but when the decision is made, then 2) the tanks will come and enforce the same regime in other countries. So, unless you agree that this is how the political regime in your country should be decided, the only safe alternative is to join NATO.
I don’t think the desire to maintain a little Balkan empire counts here.
Just that Russia’s actions are perfectly understandable as defensive and reactive in nature.
I don’t think so. Do tell, what Russia is defending against? And is the threat to Russia or to Mr.Putin’s thoroughly corrupt state?
an explicitly anti-Russian coalition on Russia’s doorstep
Show me that coalition and show me how is it “anti-Russian”.
a country concerned for its survival and who possesses few natural defenses
I am sorry, this passed into the realm of unadulterated bullshit. So, right now, in the XXI century Russia is “concerned for its survival”? A country of “few natural defenses” that was last conquered by Genghis Khan?
Part of the reason Putin wants a bigger empire is undoubtedly to gain some protection against future aggression. I totally agree with you that the U.S. has acted to weaken Russia.
Putin might rationally calculate that if he tried to conquer Finland (which used to be part of the Czarist Empire) there is only a 10% chance that the U.S. would put up serious resistance
Well, first the Finns are likely to put up serious resistance. There a reason why Finland was an independent country post-WW2 and not the 16th Soviet republic.
The “logical” next targets for Putin are the Baltics.
Whether US and Europe are more likely to go to war with Russia over Finland or over the Baltics is an interesting question, but there doesn’t appear to be any way of deciding it :-)
Nonfiction Books Thread
Moondust: In Search of the Men who Fell to Earth
Not a technical book about the Apollo program by any means. The author goes around finding and interviewing all the surviving moonwalkers as of the time he was writing it (9) about the effect the event had on their lives. Some report massive changes in perspective about the Earth. Some feel massively betrayed by NASA, having taken part in something they felt was the first step in a direction and which was then not followed up on (be the reasons for that good or bad). There’s pretty much as many reactions as there are moonwalkers.
But then, most fascinating to me was the difference between living the history and watching the history. Armstrong and Aldrin on Apollo 11 didn’t really appreciate how much importance was projected on their mission and how much mythologization of the event was going on back home, with half a billion people watching them live (and indeed it was the first huge live media event of this type). They were just doing their jobs—and then the president gets on the line with them on the surface of the moon and they scramble to not make asses of themselves talking extemporaneously while lugging around hundreds of kg of equipment on their backs. And when they get back and are in isolation (as all the first moonwalkers were in case of living microbes on the moon) and are dealing with a constant parade of dignitaries outside their little window, eventually they gather the gravitas that the event had for the world at large. Aldrin turns to Armstrong and says “Neil, we missed it!”
Currently reading Christopher Clark’s “The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914” so far the book has two upshots: nationalism makes people really irrational. No, you think you already know that, but you don’t realize how far it can go. No, more irrational than that. Second, it is really easy for things to spiral out of control. Reading it has made me strongly update to the probability that there will be a large-scale war in the next few years, and in general that war might be a major aspect of the Great Filter. A relevant, somewhat critical review of the book is here.
Studying WWI has done the same for me.
Could you two go into some specifics of what you’re expecting and why?
Essentially that large-scale, complicated alliances can result in small scale wars unexpectedly spiraling out of control. In the case of WWI there were multiple small conflagrations in the Balkans before WWI but it then took just the right one to set it off. In a similar vein, one wouldn’t be surprised if one the similar small conflagrations around Russia like are currently happening leads to a Russia v. NATO war with little warning. Similarly, one could expect a similar situation in the Pacific given the many border conflicts there.
I think Putin wants to rebuild the Soviet Empire and is going to keep taking more territory until he encounters serious resistance, and this resistance could easily turn into a war in which nuclear weapons are used. Putin might rationally calculate that if he tried to conquer Finland (which used to be part of the Czarist Empire) there is only a 10% chance that the U.S. would put up serious resistance, and this was a gamble he would be willing to take. But if the U.S. did decide to fight it would easily beat back Russia if the war stayed conventional, and this might cause Putin to use atomic weapons.
Putin probably calculates that Obama is much less likely to use military force against him than the next U.S. President will be, so we might be entering a period of great danger.
You should note that while having more territory usually does help a country to be more powerful, it is not the only way to be a powerful country. While trying to conquer as much land as possible made sense when agriculture was the primary source of wealth, nowadays it is somewhat more complicated because industry and service sector of annexed territory are often destroyed by the war and has to be rebuilt so why not build in the territory you already own. That leaves natural resources such as oil and coal, but it is sometimes possible to profit from them even without having direct control over them, for example, by owning (directly or indirectly) companies that extract those resources from the ground and having enough influence over the government of that country to prevent them from meddling with those companies. Having higher population seems to be useful in some cases, but wars tend to create a lot refugees and creating an economic union that you dominate is perhaps a good enough substitute. Therefore, it sometimes might not make sense to try to conquer as much territory as possible, especially when that territory does not have a lot of natural resources. I don’t think that NATO and EU are the only things that stop Russia from trying to conquer Baltic States or Finland, they also lack the necessity to do so. Because military force is not the only way to gain a lot of influence over the country’s actions.
In my country (and I would guess in Finland as well), what many people fear is not Russian tanks, it is Russia gaining a lot of influence by making backroom deals, promoting and financially supporting certain political parties and individual politicians whose ideas are useful to them, buying up shares in energy companies, either directly or by proxy individuals (who do not have to be Russians themselves, there are a lot of people who got rich due to having the right connections and they often want to preserve those connections) and gaining cultural influence. Finlandization is often a good enough substitute for the actual conquest. I am not an expert in geopolitics or international relations, but it is my impression that while Crimea does have strategic importance to Russia due its warm deepwater ports, it is harder to make such case for Donbas/Donbass or South Ossetia (or Abkhazia, or Transistria). It is my impression that in these cases it is not necessarily just the territory itself that is important to Russia, but the fact that having disputed territories may make it significantly more difficult for those countries to join NATO and EU, and, that by waging these small scale wars Russia demonstrates ability and willingness to protect their interests, thus sending a signal to many people that Russia is a powerful country and therefore siding with their interests in a domestic politics of their respective countries and trying to establish connections with them is potentially useful. For example, by negotiating with each country individually, Russia is able to extract higher prices for its natural gas than they would be able if EU countries coordinated with each other and negotiated as one bloc. In addition to that, because of these large profit margins, Russia is able to selectively make discounts for some countries in exchange for various things that they want, for example, naval facilities. Thus it is in Russia’s interest to try to weaken the EU, therefore they support various anti-EU parties, politicians (both right wing and (probably) left wing) and people who are influential in politics without themselves being politicians in various ways. However, I predict that it would be much more difficult to attract such allies if Russia would give in to Western demands and remove their troops from regions such as Donbas, because it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness, therefore Russia would not be thought of as worth siding with. Even though these anti-EU parties would probably still be anti-EU, they would no longer necessarily be against, e.g. sanctions against Russia. Perhaps even more importantly, there are a lot of influential people in Eastern Europe and Central Asia who find it useful to join whichever side is more powerful and a sign of Russia’s weakness would make the option of seeking closer relations with the West more attractive, thus reducing Russia’s influence even further.
To sum up, in my layman’s view, I do not think that Russia is hungry for more territory, but it is probably hungry for more power and influence over decision making in other countries (because it is a useful thing to have), which can be acquired by other means than conquest. I conjecture that the present situation in Donbas is probably not because Russia desires to annex the Donets Basin, but perhaps because giving in would send a signal that Russia is not strong enough and/or not willing to protect its own interests (let alone interests of their allies), therefore not worth siding with.
The rationale for claiming the parts of Ukraine was much stronger than for Finland. Russians account for 17% of the population of Ukraine, while Russians account for 1.1% of residents of Finland. The Finns won independence from Russia via war and have not been in the same country as Russia for almost a century, while Ukraine’s territory gained from Russia was by the stroke of Kruschev’s pen as a bureacratic transfer of low significance as long as both Russia and Ukraine were parts of the Soviet Union. Also, Ukraine is culturally very close to Russia, even having a common language-base, which Finland does not. Russia has only been not in the same country as Crimea since the fall of the Soviet Union. So, the general causes are much weaker.
Ukraine was extremely unstable before Russia moved in, with a strong geographical split between areas with protests in favor of closer ties to the west and Russia. This seems unlikely to recur in FInland. Without the underlying weakness, the proximate excuse is gone.
You are right in terms of moral rationale, but what I think will matter to Putin are the costs and benefits to him of an invasion. Finding a proximate excuse will be easy, especially for a former KGB agent.
The costs will be higher and the benefits lower based on the (lack of) rationale. Forcing the Finns into Russia will be very bad for everyone involved even if successful, and failure is obviously worse for him.
???
Moved in with troops, yes. Russia had done political maneuvering so as to destabilize it, I grant.
They have much less traction to pull the same sorts of political maneuvers in Finland.
I am just trying to understand what timeline you had in mind. Did you mean before Yanukovich scuttled EU integration?
After. Before then, well, it wasn’t rock solid, but it wasn’t, so far as I know, abnormally unstable. Yes, Putin brought that about.
Before it was an ordinary (somewhat poor) country. 17% of an ethnicity does not a casus belli make. Similar culture does not a casus belli make. This is kind of crazy reasoning, imagine applying it to Western Europe.
Do any you have any evidence for your claim regarding a strong geographical split between areas and protests in favor in closer ties with Russia (that are independent of Russian special forces operating on Ukranian soil)? Where have you read this? There is an ongoing information war, please be very careful about sources.
This seems to be relevant evidence...
Also, the protests in favor of sticking with Europeanization were in the west and the counter-protests were in the east. Russia definitely had a political ground game going, but it’s no accident that they could only get it going in certain provinces. If they could have gotten it going in the capital, they would have.
ALSO also, I wasn’t saying that Russian actions were actually legitimate.
Agreeing with your main point, i’ll just point out that there were incipient protests in favor of the EU in the East, but 1) it’s really easy to quench a local action unsupported by the body of the protest, after which sane people would either shut up or join the main force, 2) the capital, built upon the Dnieper River, is hardly in the west, 3) there were anti-EU protests in Kyiv, which is partly why there was street-fighting (I mean, beside the Berkut).
And polarization had been present before December ’14, but it skyrocketed after.
So, where have you read about these protests?
This is just neocon blather. I’ll bet you $2000 Russia does not invade Finland by the end of the Obama presidency.
I agree the odds are well under 50%. If you provide your real identity, I would bet $20 based on a 20% chance that Russia will invade a country (other than the Ukraine) by the end of the Obama presidency, so you would have to give me $100 if Russia did invade. I will bet more if your real identity causes me to assign a high probability of you paying if you lose. This is me.
So you claim a 20% chance that Russia will invade a country other than Ukraine by January 20, 2017? That is not really specific to your prediction that Putin is likely to try to steal territory by the end of the Obama administration. For example, the US has invaded many countries in the last 15 years but hasn’t been trying to take territory. In addition, the Russian invasion would have to be aggressive (i.e. the other country did not attack first.) Something like the 2008 Georgia war would not count.
Edit: If you can agree to those terms, I will accept the 20:100 odds you offer.
It’s Ukraine, not the Ukraine, since the latter version already implies, through history of language, that the territory is a (border) part of Russia (okraina).
I’m concerned about what happens after the end of the Obama presidency as well as before.
The EU far outdoes Russia in population, military spending, wealth, and technology. They don’t need the United States to win a conventional war against Russia. The Russian advantage lies in unity and a European aversion to force. It may be advantageous for Putin to assert dominance over some of the former Soviet states. But an outright invasion of the EU? If anything would create a united front against Russia, that would be it. I don’t know if Putin as after territory so much as maintaining a buffer zone against Western influence (and scoring the occasional political victory over the US).
Finland is an EU country. Even if the US doesn’t care about defending EU territory the EU does.
Military power of EU was not enough to stop or seriously inconvenience Milosevic.
What? Did he invade an EU country?
But would the EU do anything, especially if the Greeks decide to veto everything if they are not given a bailout?
Military is not commanded via the EU commission but by individual member states. There nothing to veto. Finish citizens have free movement via the EU. That means average people know more Finish people than Ukranians and actually care about defending Finland.
Ukraine is for political purposes like a third world country. People far away that nobody deeply cares about.
It’s worth looking at innerpolitical issures. I don’t think German or France politicians would get away in their own countries with not defending Finland. On the other hand Germans who already don’t want to pay for the Greece bailout, don’t want to bailout the Ukraine and have substantial resources spent over there.
From Putins perspective the Ukraine conflict made him popular at home, I don’t think starting an additional conflict in Finland would help Putin inside of Russian politics.
Russia invades Finland. Germany announces it’s going to send lots of troops to Finland to fight against the Russians. Putin announces that if Germany does this he will drop an atomic bomb on Berlin. Germany then backs down.
Since Germany doesn’t have atomic weapons, it can’t credibly threaten Russia absent Russia invading Germany.
Russia doesn’t even invade the East-Ukraine as far as Russian media is concerned. It’s done by plausible deniable locals supported by Russian citizens on vacation.
Military action can be done without announcing it and a tanks that move into NATO or EU territory will likely produce an immediate military response within less than an hour.
NATO doesn’t send tanks to clear cities in East Ukraine that are under the control of separatists, but
Germany doesn’t but France does. The UK does as well.
US innerpolitics even forces the US president to increase North Korea sanctions after the recent cyberattack when he knows that the thing that actually good to do is to increase interaction between North Korea and the outside world. Ignoring threads of nuclear attack is likely not very popular in the US.
That’s a very risky thing to do. It might trigger nuclear first strike protocols on the US side.
I doubt it. The U.S. didn’t initiate a first strike against North Korea when it threatened us with nuclear weapons, and unlike with Russia, the U.S. almost certainly could eliminate all North Korean nuclear weapons without any significant U.S. losses.
North Korea didn’t threaten in a way that the US military considered to be highly probable to start a war. It’s more seen as posturing. It would need a plausible thread to achieve military objectives.
North Korea can complete destroy most of Seoul. It’s in artillery range.
I think the scenario will be a wee bit different:
Russia invades Finland. Germany announces it’s going to send lots of troops to Finland to fight against the Russians. Putin announces that if Germany does this he will drop an atomic bomb on Berlin. Terrified Russian elites remove Putin from power.
Even in Russia I don’t think there is any political faction which thinks that a nuclear exchange is a good idea.
Unfortunately, the idea of limited nuclear exchanges or making credible or close to credible threats of such exchanges is is depressingly popular in Russian military and political discussion. See e.g. here. More generally, this is actually an old idea that of the “tactical nuclear exchange” with a few nukes being perhaps exchanged in Eastern Europe without a full-scale war. During much of the Cold War this was actually more common as a NATO idea whereas the USSR accepted that limiting nuclear exchanges was not viable and that there was no clear line between tactical and strategic exchange of nuclear weapons.
Yes, and I seen nothing particularly wrong about this idea—it’s a possibility. However I don’t think the current Russian elite (with bank accounts in Switzerland, houses in the Cyprus, sending their kids to English private schools, etc. etc.) would be willing to contemplate high risk of even a limited nuclear exchange.
The wrong aspect about this is that it seems very unlikely to actually stay that restricted. And it may not at all be easy for a country to tell that another launched only a few nukes and isn’t intending to use more. The standard way this sort of thing goes wrong is where the exchanges get pushed farther East and West until they are close to Moscow and Paris and then all hell more or less breaks loose.
That seems likely to be true, but how much influence do they have? And note that even with Putin’s repeated mentions of nukes they haven’t taken any steps to curtail the situation. A nuclear exchange if it started could start well before they had a chance to do much about it.
I don’t know—my level of uncertainty about what’s going to be “likely” or “unlikely” in the event of a limited nuclear exchange is very high :-/
The question at this point will be not “influence” but “capability”—will they be able to remove Putin and those personally loyal to him at any cost from power? I think it’s “likely” but see the previous paragraph :-)
Title of a Daily Beast article “Putin Threatens Nuclear War Over Ukraine”
Headlines are written to attract eyeballs and clicks. Would you like to know one weird trick which will enhance and supercharge your understanding of European politics? X-D
And NATO pushing up to the borders of Russia isn’t considered an aggressive move on the part of the USA, because … ?
I’m not trying to defend his annexation of the Crimea but “trying to rebuild the Soviet Empire” isn’t what I think his motivations are when I can look at a map like this, and recall the Georgian conflict was itself sparked in part by aspirations of that country to join NATO. Americans would feel threatened if say, Mexico joined the Warsaw Pact, no?
Because it wasn’t NATO that “pushed up to the borders of Russia” it was the Eastern European countries that fled from Russia into NATO. Not a single NATO tank had to streamroll into those Eastern European countries for them to join . You’ll note that none of those nations that joined NATO needed to be invaded and military occupied by NATO—unlike what Russia is doing now, and unlike what Warsaw Pact did in the past.
Because if any of those countries ask to leave NATO, NATO will leave. However Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova are asking Russia to leave, and Russia isn’t leaving.
Because the sovereign and independent Eastern European nations wanted to become part of NATO, and NATO tanks didn’t need to force itself on a single nation, it was invited( a single country, nor change the borders, unlike Russia’s military occupation of portions of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.
Because a NATO country like Poland isn’t the one attempting to annex the western portions of Ukraine or Belarus or Russia.
Because when Greece has been recently openly allying itself with Russia, I don’t see NATO troops from Italy or Albania or Bulgaria attempting to break apart portions of Greece.
Yay, for simple answers to simple questions.
Yes, America also often used military imperialism in its attempt to stop Latin American countries from allying themselves with the Soviet Union, (e.g. the invasion at the Bay of Pigs).
So?
You are looking at this from a moral viewpoint. The fact that many of Russia’s neighbors would rather militarily associate with the U.S. than Russia is a cause of great insecurity for Russia and probably a big part of the reason Putin would like to gain military control of more territory. Putin would have less to worry about if the eastern European nations in NATO joined because they were forced to because then these countries would be weaker U.S. allies.
Clearly Aris has moral sentiments about the matter (who would not?), but he is presenting observable facts, such as who is sending men and materiel and who is not.
If they were forced to, that would imply a US more able and willing to force them, which cancels that out.
Putin clearly intends to exert all the pressure and take all the opportunities that he can to expand Russia’s sphere of influence indefinitely, as did the former USSR. All else is tactics. As you said:
I’m not sure your average Serb would agree …
No, they just get the Troika to do it by proxy.
I’ll restate what I said before—I’m not defending Putin’s regime as such. It’s tyrannical and corrupt and no sane person would die defending that hill. Just that Russia’s actions are perfectly understandable as defensive and reactive in nature. Yes, the Eastern Euro countries (mostly) joined NATO of their own free will (more accurately, they had little alternative either way with Russia being dead in the water through the 90s). What of it? The fact remains there’s an explicitly anti-Russian coalition on Russia’s doorstep, and allied groups like the EU pushing into historically-Russian territories. They’re understandably afraid of the Germans pushing east of the Vistula—after all, it didn’t end well the last two times.
“Rebuilding the Soviet Empire” is exactly the kind of propagandistic slogan that contributes to crises in the first place—viewing your enemy as some kind of inscrutable, uncompromisingly aggressive monster rather than a country concerned for its survival and who possesses few natural defenses.
I opposed NATO’s action in Kosovo as an imperialist action in support of Albanian imperialism—but this has nothing to do with NATO’s expansion eastwards any more than its intervention against Afghanistan does. NATO’s expansion eastwards was an action of the Eastern European countries fleeing westwards, being rightfully afraid of Russian imperialism.
Know what? I can’t remain civil in this discussion, if you’re comparing Greece being loaned money with extremely low interests as being the same thing as Ukraine being militarily conquered by Russia and many thousands of its people getting killed.
So I’m tapping out. Enjoy your “understanding” of the so called defensive attitude of Russia as one by one it conquers nations that never once threatened anyone. On my part I’ll keep denouncing Russia neoHitleric imperialism, and its vile policies.
One of the reasons to join NATO was that Russia (Soviet Union) had a history of reverting political changes in Eastern Europe; see Prague Spring. Given this history, a political change from communism to democracy seemed half-assed without also joining NATO, because it seemed like a question of time until someone in Russia decides “okay guys, your political regime will now change to this” and send tanks to enforce the decision.
It felt like without NATO, the future of Eastern Europe would be decided in two steps. 1) Russia will decide what political regime it wants, which may take a few years, but when the decision is made, then 2) the tanks will come and enforce the same regime in other countries. So, unless you agree that this is how the political regime in your country should be decided, the only safe alternative is to join NATO.
Everyone’s actions are perfectly understandable as defensive and reactive in nature. Perfectly, universally, and therefore uselessly.
An average Serb or an average Yugoslav..? :-P
I don’t think the desire to maintain a little Balkan empire counts here.
I don’t think so. Do tell, what Russia is defending against? And is the threat to Russia or to Mr.Putin’s thoroughly corrupt state?
Show me that coalition and show me how is it “anti-Russian”.
I am sorry, this passed into the realm of unadulterated bullshit. So, right now, in the XXI century Russia is “concerned for its survival”? A country of “few natural defenses” that was last conquered by Genghis Khan?
Part of the reason Putin wants a bigger empire is undoubtedly to gain some protection against future aggression. I totally agree with you that the U.S. has acted to weaken Russia.
Well, first the Finns are likely to put up serious resistance. There a reason why Finland was an independent country post-WW2 and not the 16th Soviet republic.
The “logical” next targets for Putin are the Baltics.
But the Baltic states are in NATO, and so the U.S. is more likely to defend them than it would Finland.
Whether US and Europe are more likely to go to war with Russia over Finland or over the Baltics is an interesting question, but there doesn’t appear to be any way of deciding it :-)
NATO is a point in favor of the U.S. being more likely to fight over the Baltics than Finland. Are there any factors going the other way?
Yes. The Baltics belonged to Russia much more recently than Finland and have a much larger Russian minority population.
Good point.
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