But it’s not unreasonable for me to treat the beliefs of people who actually pay attention to what I do as a different set from the beliefs of people who don’t, and to devote different levels of effort to attempting to manipulate the former and the latter.
For example, I might decide that the beliefs of people who won’t pay attention to what I actually do before deciding that I’m behaving badly simply aren’t worth considering at all.
This might not be wise—that is, I might not like the consequences of that decision—but it’s perfectly coherent, and entirely on-topic.
Sure.
But it’s not unreasonable for me to treat the beliefs of people who actually pay attention to what I do as a different set from the beliefs of people who don’t, and to devote different levels of effort to attempting to manipulate the former and the latter.
For example, I might decide that the beliefs of people who won’t pay attention to what I actually do before deciding that I’m behaving badly simply aren’t worth considering at all.
This might not be wise—that is, I might not like the consequences of that decision—but it’s perfectly coherent, and entirely on-topic.