frequentist correspondence is the only type that has any hope of being truly objective
I’d counter this.
If I have enough information about an event and enough computation power, I get only objectively true and false statements. There are limits to my knowledge of the laws of the universe, the event in question (e.g. due to measurement limits) and limits to my computational power. The situation is further complicated by being embedded in the universe and epistemic concerns (e.g. do I trust my eyes and cognition?).
The need for a concept “probability” comes from all these limits. There is nothing objective about it.
I’d counter this.
If I have enough information about an event and enough computation power, I get only objectively true and false statements. There are limits to my knowledge of the laws of the universe, the event in question (e.g. due to measurement limits) and limits to my computational power. The situation is further complicated by being embedded in the universe and epistemic concerns (e.g. do I trust my eyes and cognition?).
The need for a concept “probability” comes from all these limits. There is nothing objective about it.