Strelok comments on How would you respond to the Philpapers “What are your Philosophical Positions” Survey?

[Strelok]

• A priori knowledge: Yes

  To ground epistemic justification of logical systems, or beliefs about the nature of mathematical objects (that is, not simply their presence and implications), is impossible because empirical analysis is constrained against other possible worlds.

• Abstract objects: Platonism

  To say that universals are but conceptual utilities is to be lazy and uninteresting. Universals are necessary to evade the problem of cosmic coincidence, and a world where common properties between objects is merely an arbitrary evaluation seems implausible.

• Aesthetic value: Objective

  There are two senses that aesthetic judgements might be taken objective: (i) that judgements of intrinsic mental states (i.e. the private beholding of an aesthetic work) that are causally explained by external events cannot be called subjective, and are without error,, (ii) that aesthetic judgement should not be met with skepticism because it relies on the same internal mechanism that all non-aesthetic judgement relies on: the phenomenological force of appearances.

• Analytic-synthetic distinction: Yes

• Epistemic justification: Internalism

  To establish an externalist theory is to assume internalist justification, in that trusting their judgement assumes the justifying power of what is based on: propositional attitudes. These theories are usually motivated by a confusion between truth and justification.

• External world: Non-skeptical realism

• Free will: Libertarianism

  To imply that the propositional contents of our beliefs is determined by the contingent location of atoms is self-defeating.

• God: Atheism

  Theological realism requires alien and absurd metaphysical commitments, and the God concept is fundamentally dehumanizing.

• Knowledge: Rationalism

• Knowledge claims: Invariantism

• Laws of nature: Non-humean

• Logic: Classical

• Mental content: Internalism

• Meta-ethics: Moral realism

• Metaphilosophy: Non-naturalism

• Mind: Non-physicalism

• Moral judgment: Cognitivism

  Friege-Greige, introspection—enough said?

• Moral motivation: Internalism

• Newcomb’s problem: Two boxes

• Normative ethics: Deontology

• Perceptual experience: Non-disjunctive direct realism

• Personal identity: Further-fact view

• Politics: Libertarianism

• Proper names: Millian

• Science: Scientific realism

• Teletransporter (new matter): Death

• Time: A-theory

• Trolley problem: Don’t switch

• Truth: Correspondence

• Zombies: Conceivable, but not metaphysically possible

  Causal essentialism

• Which philosophers do you identify with: G.E. Moore, Aristotle