A priori knowledge: Yes (in the restricted case of prior probabilities only,
and knowledge about a statement has lesser status if it hasn’t been updated on
enough to minimize sensitivity to changes in prior.)
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? Reject both as confused
Aesthetic value: Subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? Insufficiently familiar with the issue (Too confused to determine whether this distinction maps onto a distinction that I actually draw)
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? The question is too unclear to answer
External world: Realism
Free will: The question is too unclear to answer (it depends on the definition of “free will”; but for most likely definitions Compatibilism works)
God: Atheism
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? Accept both (but for distinct subsets of the things that can be known)
Knowledge claims: Contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? Insufficiently familiar (Find Hume’s writing too
confusing to determine whether it maps to what I believe or not in broad terms)
Logic: Accept both
Mental content: internalism or externalism? The question is too unclear to answer
Meta-ethics: Anti-realism (IsMoral is a two-place predicate and there is a fact
of the matter; uncertain whether I got the mapping to philosophical terminology
right)
Metaphilosophy: Naturalism
Mind: Physicalism
Moral judgment: Cognitivism (with the caveat that most ethical sentences
express propositions that are underspecified in that they require an agent,
agent-pool or utility function to make them unambiguous).
Moral motivation: Reject all (both sides of this debate depend on broken theories of mind)
Newcomb’s problem: One box
Normative ethics: Reject all (I favor a combination of all three, with bounded
deontological and virtue-ethical terms, but consequentailist terms scaling without
bound)
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or
sense-datum theory? Reject all (these are all just approximations of behaviors
of the brain, and are useful as simplified models but occasionally wrong, and
not ontologically basic.)
Personal identity: There is no fact of the matter (reduces to a statement about
utility functions)
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? Reject all
(these positions all reduce to decision theoretic heurestics and no more)
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? Reject both (confused beyond repair)
Science: Scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): Survival, with caveats (subject to empirical test that has non-transferrable evidence)
Time: A-theory or B-theory? There is no fact of the matter (looks like an argument over the definition of the word “real”)
Trolley problem: Switch
Truth: Correspondence
Zombies: Inconceivable
And… which of the following philosophers do you identify with? None of the above.
A priori knowledge: Yes (in the restricted case of prior probabilities only, and knowledge about a statement has lesser status if it hasn’t been updated on enough to minimize sensitivity to changes in prior.)
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? Reject both as confused
Aesthetic value: Subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? Insufficiently familiar with the issue (Too confused to determine whether this distinction maps onto a distinction that I actually draw)
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? The question is too unclear to answer
External world: Realism
Free will: The question is too unclear to answer (it depends on the definition of “free will”; but for most likely definitions Compatibilism works)
God: Atheism
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? Accept both (but for distinct subsets of the things that can be known)
Knowledge claims: Contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? Insufficiently familiar (Find Hume’s writing too confusing to determine whether it maps to what I believe or not in broad terms)
Logic: Accept both
Mental content: internalism or externalism? The question is too unclear to answer
Meta-ethics: Anti-realism (IsMoral is a two-place predicate and there is a fact of the matter; uncertain whether I got the mapping to philosophical terminology right)
Metaphilosophy: Naturalism
Mind: Physicalism
Moral judgment: Cognitivism (with the caveat that most ethical sentences express propositions that are underspecified in that they require an agent, agent-pool or utility function to make them unambiguous).
Moral motivation: Reject all (both sides of this debate depend on broken theories of mind)
Newcomb’s problem: One box
Normative ethics: Reject all (I favor a combination of all three, with bounded deontological and virtue-ethical terms, but consequentailist terms scaling without bound)
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? Reject all (these are all just approximations of behaviors of the brain, and are useful as simplified models but occasionally wrong, and not ontologically basic.)
Personal identity: There is no fact of the matter (reduces to a statement about utility functions)
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? Reject all (these positions all reduce to decision theoretic heurestics and no more)
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? Reject both (confused beyond repair)
Science: Scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): Survival, with caveats (subject to empirical test that has non-transferrable evidence)
Time: A-theory or B-theory? There is no fact of the matter (looks like an argument over the definition of the word “real”)
Trolley problem: Switch
Truth: Correspondence
Zombies: Inconceivable
And… which of the following philosophers do you identify with? None of the above.