Since counterfactuals are in the map, not in the territory, the only way to evaluate their accuracy is by explicitly constructing a probability distribution of possible outcomes in your model...
“The only way”, clearly not all counterfactuals rely on an explicit probability distribution. The probability distribution is usually non-existent in the mind. We rarely make them explicitly. Implicitly, they are probably not represented in the mind as probability distributions either. (Rule 4: neuroscience claims are false.) I agree that it is a neat approach in that may expose trivial or nonsensical counterfactuals. But that approach only works the consequent is trivial or nonsensical. If the antecedent is trivial or nonsensical, the approach requires a regress.
“If not for Thomas Schelling, there would be no book The Strategy of Conflict 1960.” What does it mean? How do you steelman it so it is not a trivial claim “Thomas Schelling wrote the book The Strategy of Conflict 1960″?
My point is that higher level categories are necessary, and yet have to come from somewhere. I am not taking the author-work relationship as self-evident.
Right, definitely not “the only way”. Still I think most counterfactuals are implicit, not explicit, probability distributions. Sort of like when you shoot a hoop, your mind solves rather complicated differential equations implicitly, not explicitly.
The probability distribution is usually non-existent in the mind.
I don’t know if they are represented in the mind somewhere implicitly, but my guess would be that yes, somewhere in your brain there is a collection of experiences that get converted into “priors”, for example. If 90% of your relevant experiences say that “this proposition is true” and 10% say that “this proposition is false”, you end up with a prior credence of 90% seemingly pulled out of thin air.
“The only way”, clearly not all counterfactuals rely on an explicit probability distribution. The probability distribution is usually non-existent in the mind. We rarely make them explicitly. Implicitly, they are probably not represented in the mind as probability distributions either. (Rule 4: neuroscience claims are false.) I agree that it is a neat approach in that may expose trivial or nonsensical counterfactuals. But that approach only works the consequent is trivial or nonsensical. If the antecedent is trivial or nonsensical, the approach requires a regress.
My point is that higher level categories are necessary, and yet have to come from somewhere. I am not taking the author-work relationship as self-evident.
Right, definitely not “the only way”. Still I think most counterfactuals are implicit, not explicit, probability distributions. Sort of like when you shoot a hoop, your mind solves rather complicated differential equations implicitly, not explicitly.
I don’t know if they are represented in the mind somewhere implicitly, but my guess would be that yes, somewhere in your brain there is a collection of experiences that get converted into “priors”, for example. If 90% of your relevant experiences say that “this proposition is true” and 10% say that “this proposition is false”, you end up with a prior credence of 90% seemingly pulled out of thin air.