Tl:dr, read Are there other counterfactuals? and Causal claims that are explicit enough it is clear they don’t fit into this taxonomy.
Contents:
Are there other counterfactuals?
Errors?
Unobserved factors (even factors we have no way of observing)
The difficulty of a full specification
Causal claims that are explicit enough it is clear they don’t fit into this taxonomy
Are there other counterfactuals?
1. Does quantum physics allow for ‘possibilities which do not happen’? (I recognize this is a partially circular question.)
2. Are there other types of counterfactuals (than classical, quantum, model)?
Errors?
sexless oxygen atom
A what?
ounterfactuals do not merely reflect causal claims, but rather are an endless opportunity for new causal conjectures, most of which are nonsnece. If a counterfactual is about the world, then it must be circular with reference to predictions and observations.
emphasis is my own
nonsense
Unobserved factors (even factors we have no way of observing)
Could your prediction have gone right? Yes, but only if the predictions and observations of the agents had been different.
Predictions not made with full info might:
ignore unobserved factors*
guess their values/positions/existence (or not)
*Do you think the cancer cells in this Petri dish will survive? Yes. [Pulls out gun, shoots the petri dish.] Looks like you were wrong.**
**And here we arrive at claims not separate from the world that might be ‘always false’ - that result can be forced via action. By attaching the action to prediction things can be made ‘always right’ or ‘always wrong’ as desired. (Such an attempt can fail—the well treated cells in the Petri dish might still die. But if they probably don’t, then this move works.)
The difficulty of a full specification
Only that which happens is possible, the rest is inferential conjecture.
With a simple deterministic environment, then if you fully specified it (variable X has this value...), then if the environment actually takes those values, then the hypothesis is actually ‘tested’ (or observed) to be true or false.
However, environments aren’t simple. What values held such that a Viking empire didn’t get established? (Assuming it didn’t.)
Consider the Viking explorations of the America’s. Could the Vikings have established a medieval empire in the Americas? In all historical What If scenarios, the argument will rest on a presumed geometric similarity between the causal forces in the scenario that did and the one that didn’t occur.
Causal claims that are explicit enough it is clear they don’t fit into this taxonomy
The claims about counterfactuals, or causal claims, only allows for one predictions. ‘I flip a coin, it may come up heads or tails after ending up flat.’ Here I am a) making two causal claims and saying one is correct, or b) being explicit about my model not being complete, and leaving open the outcome as contingent upon unobserved, or not yet fixed, factors. (This may make more sense to do if you are flipping the coin.)
Tl:dr, read Are there other counterfactuals? and Causal claims that are explicit enough it is clear they don’t fit into this taxonomy.
Contents:
Are there other counterfactuals?
Errors?
Unobserved factors (even factors we have no way of observing)
The difficulty of a full specification
Causal claims that are explicit enough it is clear they don’t fit into this taxonomy
Are there other counterfactuals?
1. Does quantum physics allow for ‘possibilities which do not happen’? (I recognize this is a partially circular question.)
2. Are there other types of counterfactuals (than classical, quantum, model)?
Errors?
A what?
emphasis is my own
nonsense
Unobserved factors (even factors we have no way of observing)
Predictions not made with full info might:
ignore unobserved factors*
guess their values/positions/existence (or not)
*Do you think the cancer cells in this Petri dish will survive? Yes. [Pulls out gun, shoots the petri dish.] Looks like you were wrong.**
**And here we arrive at claims not separate from the world that might be ‘always false’ - that result can be forced via action. By attaching the action to prediction things can be made ‘always right’ or ‘always wrong’ as desired. (Such an attempt can fail—the well treated cells in the Petri dish might still die. But if they probably don’t, then this move works.)
The difficulty of a full specification
With a simple deterministic environment, then if you fully specified it (variable X has this value...), then if the environment actually takes those values, then the hypothesis is actually ‘tested’ (or observed) to be true or false.
However, environments aren’t simple. What values held such that a Viking empire didn’t get established? (Assuming it didn’t.)
Causal claims that are explicit enough it is clear they don’t fit into this taxonomy
The claims about counterfactuals, or causal claims, only allows for one predictions. ‘I flip a coin, it may come up heads or tails after ending up flat.’ Here I am a) making two causal claims and saying one is correct, or b) being explicit about my model not being complete, and leaving open the outcome as contingent upon unobserved, or not yet fixed, factors. (This may make more sense to do if you are flipping the coin.)