Maybe. But what implications does that have? What does it prove or disprove?
Edit:
We tend to think of things as evolving from a starting state, or “input”, according to a set of rules laws . Both need to be specified to determine the end state or output as much a it can be determined. When considering counterfactuals , we tend to imagine variations in the starting state, not the rules of evolution (physical laws). Since if you want to take it to a meta level, you could consider counterfactuals based on the laws being different.
But why?
I’m not a type-theory expert, but I was under the impression that adopting it as explanation for counterfactuals precommits one to a variety of other notions in the philosophy of mathematics?
I wasn’t referring to the type/token distinction in a specifically mathematical sense...it’s much broader than that.
Everyone’s commited to some sort of type/token distinction anyway. It’s not like you suddenly have to by into some weird occult idea that only a few people take seriously. In particular, it’s difficult to bring able to give an account of causal interaction s without physical laws …and it’s difficult to give an account of physical laws without a type/token distinction. (Nonetheless, rationalists don’t seem to have an account of physical laws).
Maybe. But what implications does that have? What does it prove or disprove?
Edit:
We tend to think of things as evolving from a starting state, or “input”, according to a set of rules laws . Both need to be specified to determine the end state or output as much a it can be determined. When considering counterfactuals , we tend to imagine variations in the starting state, not the rules of evolution (physical laws). Since if you want to take it to a meta level, you could consider counterfactuals based on the laws being different.
But why?
I wasn’t referring to the type/token distinction in a specifically mathematical sense...it’s much broader than that.
Everyone’s commited to some sort of type/token distinction anyway. It’s not like you suddenly have to by into some weird occult idea that only a few people take seriously. In particular, it’s difficult to bring able to give an account of causal interaction s without physical laws …and it’s difficult to give an account of physical laws without a type/token distinction. (Nonetheless, rationalists don’t seem to have an account of physical laws).