@orthogonality thesis equates there’s no impact on intelligence of holding incoherent values
I’m not sure what you mean by “incoherent”. Intelligence tells you what to do, not what to want. Even complicated constructs of seemingly “objective” or “absolute” values in philosophy are really based on the basic needs we humans have, like being part of a social group or caring for our offspring. Some species of octopuses, for example, which are not social animals, might find the idea of caring for others and helping them when in need ridiculous if they could understand it.
That deserves a better background, but could we freeze this one just to let you think what the odds are that I can change your mind about octopuses with a few netflix movies? Please write your very first instinct. Then your evaluation after 5’, and a few hours later. Then I’ll spoil the titles I had in mind.
See the first post of this series of comments. In brief I’m hacking the comment space of my own publication, as a safer place (less exposed) to discuss hot topics that can generate feedback that would make me go away. The guest is Karl and you’re welcome to join if you’re ok with the courtesy policy written in the first comment. If not please send me a pm and I’m sure we can try to agree on some policy for your own subspace here.
[The quote is from me, as the parody I tend to perceive. Yes, I fully agree an agent with conflicted preference is the opposite of a paperclip maximiser. Would we also agree that a random set of preference is more likely self-contradictory and that would have obvious impact on any ASI trying to guess my password?]
@orthogonality thesis equates there’s no impact on intelligence of holding incoherent values
That deserves a better background, but could we freeze this one just to let you think what the odds are that I can change your mind about octopuses with a few netflix movies? Please write your very first instinct. Then your evaluation after 5’, and a few hours later. Then I’ll spoil the titles I had in mind.
I don’t know where the quote is a quote from.
Conflicted preferences are obviously impactful on effectiveness. An agent with conflicted preferences is the opposite of a paperclipper.
See the first post of this series of comments. In brief I’m hacking the comment space of my own publication, as a safer place (less exposed) to discuss hot topics that can generate feedback that would make me go away. The guest is Karl and you’re welcome to join if you’re ok with the courtesy policy written in the first comment. If not please send me a pm and I’m sure we can try to agree on some policy for your own subspace here.
[The quote is from me, as the parody I tend to perceive. Yes, I fully agree an agent with conflicted preference is the opposite of a paperclip maximiser. Would we also agree that a random set of preference is more likely self-contradictory and that would have obvious impact on any ASI trying to guess my password?]