Are you saying that we can’t be in a simulation because our descendants might go on to build a large number of simulations themselves, requiring too many resources in the base reality? But I don’t think that weakens the argument very much, because we aren’t currently in a position to run a large number of simulations. Whoever is simulating us can just turn off/reset the simulation before that happens.
Said argument applies if we cannot recursively self-simulate, regardless of reason (Margolus–Levitin theorem, parent turning the simulation off or resetting it before we could, etc).
In order for ‘almost all’ computation to be simulated, most simulations have to be recursively self-simulating. So either we can recursively self-simulate (which would be interesting), we’re rare (which would also be interesting), or we have a non-zero chance we’re in the ‘real’ universe.
The argument is not that generic computations are likely simulated, it’s about our specific situation—being a newly intelligent species arising in an empty universe. So simulationists would take the ‘rare’ branch of your trilemma.
If you’re stating that generic intelligence was not likely simulated, but generic intelligence in our situationwaslikely simulated...
Doesn’t that fall afoul of the mediocrity principle applied to generic intelligence overall?
(As an aside, this does somewhat conflate ‘intelligence’ and ‘computation’; I am assuming that intelligence requires at least some non-zero amount of computation. It’s good to make this assumption explicit I suppose.)
Doesn’t that fall afoul of the mediocrity principle applied to generic intelligence overall?
Sure. I just think we have enough evidence to overrule the principle, in the form of sensory experiences apparently belonging to a member of a newly-arisen intelligent species. Overruling mediocrity principles with evidence is common.
Are you saying that we can’t be in a simulation because our descendants might go on to build a large number of simulations themselves, requiring too many resources in the base reality? But I don’t think that weakens the argument very much, because we aren’t currently in a position to run a large number of simulations. Whoever is simulating us can just turn off/reset the simulation before that happens.
Said argument applies if we cannot recursively self-simulate, regardless of reason (Margolus–Levitin theorem, parent turning the simulation off or resetting it before we could, etc).
In order for ‘almost all’ computation to be simulated, most simulations have to be recursively self-simulating. So either we can recursively self-simulate (which would be interesting), we’re rare (which would also be interesting), or we have a non-zero chance we’re in the ‘real’ universe.
The argument is not that generic computations are likely simulated, it’s about our specific situation—being a newly intelligent species arising in an empty universe. So simulationists would take the ‘rare’ branch of your trilemma.
Interesting.
If you’re stating that generic intelligence was not likely simulated, but generic intelligence in our situation was likely simulated...
Doesn’t that fall afoul of the mediocrity principle applied to generic intelligence overall?
(As an aside, this does somewhat conflate ‘intelligence’ and ‘computation’; I am assuming that intelligence requires at least some non-zero amount of computation. It’s good to make this assumption explicit I suppose.)
Sure. I just think we have enough evidence to overrule the principle, in the form of sensory experiences apparently belonging to a member of a newly-arisen intelligent species. Overruling mediocrity principles with evidence is common.