If you assume the prior has a computational cost vs computational benefit criteria for communicating or gathering data, or sharing data then doesn’t that strongly limit the types of data and the data specifics that the prior would be interested in? As one commenter pointed out, it may be less expensive to simulate some things in the prior channel than create an actual new channel (simulation). We can categorize information that a prior could most efficiently transmit and receive across a specific channel into profitable and not profitable types of information. Non-profitable information is less expensive to discover or produce without opening a channel. Profitable information for the channel may be limited to very specific kinds of first principle information.
To use an analogy. Humans don’t engage is building large scale simulations to try and learn something simple they can learn with a smaller and less resource demanding simulation. I think it has to do with the motives of the prior. If it’s just seeking self advancement, then it would follow the human principle of making any experiments or simulations using the least amount of information and resources necessary. If the prior doesn’t seek self advancement then it probably doesn’t reach the stage where it can create any simulation at all. So priors are expected to be self interested, but maybe not interested in us as a method for advancing it’s interests. You could maybe expect that we are not living in a simulation because if we were, then it would be a very inefficient simulation or else a simulation with the goal of deriving an extremely complex answer to a very difficult simulation question that can’t be discovered in any other less expensive, faster, or cheeper way. If the universe contains meaningless data and meaningless information and irrelevant matter, then we are probably not living in a simulation. If everything we do, and every molecule and every decision matters and has meaning, then we are probably living in a simulation? Planks content seems to be related to the information density of the universe and would be a good way to roughly calculate the information complexity of the universe and the complexity.
In theory you could test this out and determine if we are living in a simulation or else crash a simulation by imposing overly burdensome calculations that require excessive and unfeasible detail. For example, you might measure a star in the sky with extreme precision and collect data that requires 1 trillion years of effort to verify. As soon as you make that measurement, then perhaps you have imposed a very high cost of 1 trillion years of effort for the simulation to maintain consistency. BUT only took you 1 year to measure the star with the precision needed. The result is an exponentially increasing inefficiency in the simulation that eventually causes a crash or end or other intervention?
If you assume the prior has a computational cost vs computational benefit criteria for communicating or gathering data, or sharing data then doesn’t that strongly limit the types of data and the data specifics that the prior would be interested in? As one commenter pointed out, it may be less expensive to simulate some things in the prior channel than create an actual new channel (simulation). We can categorize information that a prior could most efficiently transmit and receive across a specific channel into profitable and not profitable types of information. Non-profitable information is less expensive to discover or produce without opening a channel. Profitable information for the channel may be limited to very specific kinds of first principle information.
To use an analogy. Humans don’t engage is building large scale simulations to try and learn something simple they can learn with a smaller and less resource demanding simulation. I think it has to do with the motives of the prior. If it’s just seeking self advancement, then it would follow the human principle of making any experiments or simulations using the least amount of information and resources necessary. If the prior doesn’t seek self advancement then it probably doesn’t reach the stage where it can create any simulation at all. So priors are expected to be self interested, but maybe not interested in us as a method for advancing it’s interests. You could maybe expect that we are not living in a simulation because if we were, then it would be a very inefficient simulation or else a simulation with the goal of deriving an extremely complex answer to a very difficult simulation question that can’t be discovered in any other less expensive, faster, or cheeper way. If the universe contains meaningless data and meaningless information and irrelevant matter, then we are probably not living in a simulation. If everything we do, and every molecule and every decision matters and has meaning, then we are probably living in a simulation? Planks content seems to be related to the information density of the universe and would be a good way to roughly calculate the information complexity of the universe and the complexity.
In theory you could test this out and determine if we are living in a simulation or else crash a simulation by imposing overly burdensome calculations that require excessive and unfeasible detail. For example, you might measure a star in the sky with extreme precision and collect data that requires 1 trillion years of effort to verify. As soon as you make that measurement, then perhaps you have imposed a very high cost of 1 trillion years of effort for the simulation to maintain consistency. BUT only took you 1 year to measure the star with the precision needed. The result is an exponentially increasing inefficiency in the simulation that eventually causes a crash or end or other intervention?