Ah, I thought you were limiting yourself to humans, given your example.
If you’re asserting that for every pair of cognitive systems X,Y (including animals, aliens, sufficiently sophisticated software, etc.) if X thinks thought T then Y is capable of thinking T, then we just disagree.
Yes, transmission of thoughts between sufficiently different minds breaks down, so we recover the possibility of thoughts that can be thought but not by us. But that’s a sufficiently different reason from why there are sensations we can’t perceive to show that the analogy is very shallow.
Ah, I thought you were limiting yourself to humans, given your example.
If you’re asserting that for every pair of cognitive systems X,Y (including animals, aliens, sufficiently sophisticated software, etc.) if X thinks thought T then Y is capable of thinking T, then we just disagree.
Yes, transmission of thoughts between sufficiently different minds breaks down, so we recover the possibility of thoughts that can be thought but not by us. But that’s a sufficiently different reason from why there are sensations we can’t perceive to show that the analogy is very shallow.