That is not a fact, and you have done nothing to argue it, saying instead that you don;t want to talk about morality
Yes, I said it’s not a fact, and I don’t want to talk about morality because it’s a huge tangent. Do you feel that morality is relevant to our general discussion?
and also don;’t want to talk about consciousness.
What?
A theory should be as simple as possible while still explaining the facts. There are prima facie facts facts about conscious sensations,that are not addressed by talk of brain states and preferences.
What facts am I failing to explain? That “pain hurts”? Give concrete examples.
I’ll need “defined” defined
In this case, “definition” of a category is text that can be used to tell which objects belong to that category and which don’t. No, I don’t see how silly this is.
You are happy to use 99% of the words in English, and you only complain about the ones that don’t fit your apriori ontology.
I only complain about the words when your definition is obviously different from mine. It’s actually perfectly fine not to have a word well defined. It’s only a problem if you then assume that the word identifies some natural category.
You used the word , surely you meant something by it.
Not really, in many cases it could be omitted or replaced and I just use it because it sounds appropriate. That’s how language works. You first asked about definitions after I used the phrase “other poorly defined concepts”. Here “concept” could mean “category”.
Proper as in proper scotsman?
Proper as not circular. I assume that, if you actually offered definitions, you’d define consciousness in terms of having experiences, and then define experiences in terms of being conscious.
Yes, I said it’s not a fact, and I don’t want to talk about morality because it’s a huge tangent. Do you feel that morality is relevant to our general discussion?
Yes: it’s relevant because “tortruing robots is wrong” is a test case of whether your definitons are solving the problem or changing the subject.
and also don;’t want to talk about consciousness.
What?
You keep saying it s a broken concept.
A theory should be as simple as possible while still explaining the facts. There are prima facie facts facts about conscious sensations,that are not addressed by talk of brain states and preferences.
What facts am I failing to explain?
That anything should feel like anything,
Proper as in proper scotsman?
Proper as not circular.
Circular as in
“Everything is made of matter.
matter is what everything is made of.” ?
Yes. I consider that “talking about consciousness”. What else is there to say about it?
That anything should feel like anything,
If “like” refers to similarity of some experiences, a physicalist model is fine for explaining that. If it refers to something else, then I’ll need you to paraphrase.
Circular as in
“Everything is made of matter. matter is what everything is made of.” ?
Yes, if I had actually said that. By the way, matter exists in you universe too.
Yes: it’s relevant because “tortruing robots is wrong” is a test case of whether your definitons are solving the problem or changing the subject.
Well, if we must. It should be obvious that my problem with morality is going to be pretty much the same as with consciousness. You can say “torture is wrong”, but that has no implications about the physical world. What happens if I torture someone?
If “like” refers to similarity of some experiences, a physicalist model is fine for explaining that
We can’t compare experiences qua experiences using a physicalist model, because we don’t have a model that tells us which subset or aspect of neurological functioning corresponds to which experience.
If it refers to something else, then I’ll need you to paraphrase.
If you want to know what “pain” means, sit on a thumbtack.
You can say “torture is wrong”, but that has no implications about the physical world
That is completely irrelevant. Even if it is an irrational personal pecadillo of someone to not deliberately cause pain , they still need to know about robot pain. Justifying morality form the ground up is not relevant.
We can’t compare experiences qua experiences using a physicalist model, because we don’t have a model that tells us which subset or aspect of neurological functioning corresponds to which experience.
We can derive that model by looking at brain states and asking the brains which states are similar to which.
Even if it is an irrational personal pecadillo of someone to not deliberately cause pain , they still need to know about robot pain.
They only need to know about robot pain if “robot pain” is a phrase that describes something. They could also care a lot about the bitterness of colors, but that doesn’t make it a real thing or an interesting philosophical question.
It’s interesting that you didn’t reply directly about morality. I was already mentally prepared to drop the whole consciousness topic and switch to objective morality, which has many of the same problems as consciousness, and is even less defensible.
We can derive that model by looking at brain states and asking the brains which states are similar to which.
That is a start, but we can’t gather data from entities that cannot speak , and we don’t know how to arrive at general rules that apply accross different classes of conscious entity.
They only need to know about robot pain if “robot pain” is a phrase that describes something.
As i have previously pointed out, you cannot assume meaninglessness as a default.
morality, which has many of the same problems as consciousness, and is even less defensible.
Morality or objective morality? They are different.
Actions directly affect the physical world. Morality guides action, so it indirectly affects the physical world.
That is a start, but we can’t gather data from entities that cannot speak
If you have a mind that cannot communicate, figuring out what it feels is not your biggest problem. Saying anything about such a mind is a challenge. Although I’m confident much can be said, even if I can’t explain the algorithm how exactly that would work.
On the other hand, if the mind is so primitive that it cannot form the thought “X feels a like Y”, then does X actually feel like Y to it? And of course, the mind has to have feelings in the first place. Note, my previous answer (to ask the mind which feelings are similar) was only meant to work for human minds. I can vaguely understand what similarity of feelings is in a human mind, but I don’t necessarily understand what it would mean for a different kind of mind.
and we don’t know how to arrive at general rules that apply accross different classes of conscious entity.
Are there classes of conscious entity?
Morality or objective morality? They are different.
You cut off the word “objective” from my sentence yourself. Yes, I mean “objective morality”. If “morality” means a set of rules, then it is perfectly well defined and clearly many of them exist (although I could nitpick). However if you’re not talking about “objective morality”, you can no longer be confident that those rules make any sense. You can’t say that we need to talk about robot pain, just because maybe robot pain is mentioned in some moral system. The moral system might just be broken.
If you have a mind that cannot communicate, figuring out what it feels is not your biggest problem. Saying anything about such a mind is a challenge. Although I’m confident much can be said, even if I can’t explain the algorithm how exactly that would work.
It seems you are no longer ruling out a science of other minds, Are you still insisting that robots don’t feel pain?
but I don’t necessarily understand what it would mean for a different kind of mind.
I’ve already told you what it would mean, but you have a self-imposed problem of tying meaning to proof.
Consider a scenario where two people are discussing something of dubious detectability.
Unbeknownst to them, halfway through the conversation a scientist on the other side of the world invents a unicorn detector, tachyone detector, etc.
Is the first half of the conversation meaningful and the second half meaningless? What kind of influence travels from the scientists lab?
It seems you are no longer ruling out a science of other minds
No, by “mind” I just mean any sort of information processing machine. I would have said “brain”, but you used a more general “entity”, so I went with “mind”. The question of what is and isn’t a mind is not very interesting to me.
I’ve already told you what it would mean
Where exactly?
Is the first half of the conversation meaningful and the second half meaningless?
First of all, the meaningfulness of words depends on the observer. “Robot pain” is perfectly meaningful to people with precise definitions of “pain”. So, in the worst case, the “thing” remains meaningless to the people discussing it, and it remains meaningful to the scientist (because you can’t make a detector if you don’t already know what exactly you’re trying to detect). We could then simply say that that the people and the scientist are using the same word for different things.
It’s also possible that the “thing” was meaningful to everyone to begin with. I don’t know what “dubious detectability” is. My bar for meaningfulness isn’t as high as you may think, though. “Robot pain” has to fail very hard so as not to pass it.
The idea that with models of physics, it might sometimes be hard to tell which features are detectable and which are just mathematical machinery, is in general a good one. Problem is that it requires good understanding of the model, which neither of us has. And I don’t expect this sort of poking to cause problems that I couldn’t patch, even in the worst case.
Yes, I said it’s not a fact, and I don’t want to talk about morality because it’s a huge tangent. Do you feel that morality is relevant to our general discussion?
What?
What facts am I failing to explain? That “pain hurts”? Give concrete examples.
In this case, “definition” of a category is text that can be used to tell which objects belong to that category and which don’t. No, I don’t see how silly this is.
I only complain about the words when your definition is obviously different from mine. It’s actually perfectly fine not to have a word well defined. It’s only a problem if you then assume that the word identifies some natural category.
Not really, in many cases it could be omitted or replaced and I just use it because it sounds appropriate. That’s how language works. You first asked about definitions after I used the phrase “other poorly defined concepts”. Here “concept” could mean “category”.
Proper as not circular. I assume that, if you actually offered definitions, you’d define consciousness in terms of having experiences, and then define experiences in terms of being conscious.
Yes: it’s relevant because “tortruing robots is wrong” is a test case of whether your definitons are solving the problem or changing the subject.
You keep saying it s a broken concept.
That anything should feel like anything,
Circular as in
“Everything is made of matter. matter is what everything is made of.” ?
Yes. I consider that “talking about consciousness”. What else is there to say about it?
If “like” refers to similarity of some experiences, a physicalist model is fine for explaining that. If it refers to something else, then I’ll need you to paraphrase.
Yes, if I had actually said that. By the way, matter exists in you universe too.
Well, if we must. It should be obvious that my problem with morality is going to be pretty much the same as with consciousness. You can say “torture is wrong”, but that has no implications about the physical world. What happens if I torture someone?
We can’t compare experiences qua experiences using a physicalist model, because we don’t have a model that tells us which subset or aspect of neurological functioning corresponds to which experience.
If you want to know what “pain” means, sit on a thumbtack.
That is completely irrelevant. Even if it is an irrational personal pecadillo of someone to not deliberately cause pain , they still need to know about robot pain. Justifying morality form the ground up is not relevant.
We can derive that model by looking at brain states and asking the brains which states are similar to which.
They only need to know about robot pain if “robot pain” is a phrase that describes something. They could also care a lot about the bitterness of colors, but that doesn’t make it a real thing or an interesting philosophical question.
It’s interesting that you didn’t reply directly about morality. I was already mentally prepared to drop the whole consciousness topic and switch to objective morality, which has many of the same problems as consciousness, and is even less defensible.
That is a start, but we can’t gather data from entities that cannot speak , and we don’t know how to arrive at general rules that apply accross different classes of conscious entity.
As i have previously pointed out, you cannot assume meaninglessness as a default.
Morality or objective morality? They are different.
Actions directly affect the physical world. Morality guides action, so it indirectly affects the physical world.
If you have a mind that cannot communicate, figuring out what it feels is not your biggest problem. Saying anything about such a mind is a challenge. Although I’m confident much can be said, even if I can’t explain the algorithm how exactly that would work.
On the other hand, if the mind is so primitive that it cannot form the thought “X feels a like Y”, then does X actually feel like Y to it? And of course, the mind has to have feelings in the first place. Note, my previous answer (to ask the mind which feelings are similar) was only meant to work for human minds. I can vaguely understand what similarity of feelings is in a human mind, but I don’t necessarily understand what it would mean for a different kind of mind.
Are there classes of conscious entity?
You cut off the word “objective” from my sentence yourself. Yes, I mean “objective morality”. If “morality” means a set of rules, then it is perfectly well defined and clearly many of them exist (although I could nitpick). However if you’re not talking about “objective morality”, you can no longer be confident that those rules make any sense. You can’t say that we need to talk about robot pain, just because maybe robot pain is mentioned in some moral system. The moral system might just be broken.
It seems you are no longer ruling out a science of other minds, Are you still insisting that robots don’t feel pain?
I’ve already told you what it would mean, but you have a self-imposed problem of tying meaning to proof.
Consider a scenario where two people are discussing something of dubious detectability.
Unbeknownst to them, halfway through the conversation a scientist on the other side of the world invents a unicorn detector, tachyone detector, etc.
Is the first half of the conversation meaningful and the second half meaningless? What kind of influence travels from the scientists lab?
No, by “mind” I just mean any sort of information processing machine. I would have said “brain”, but you used a more general “entity”, so I went with “mind”. The question of what is and isn’t a mind is not very interesting to me.
Where exactly?
First of all, the meaningfulness of words depends on the observer. “Robot pain” is perfectly meaningful to people with precise definitions of “pain”. So, in the worst case, the “thing” remains meaningless to the people discussing it, and it remains meaningful to the scientist (because you can’t make a detector if you don’t already know what exactly you’re trying to detect). We could then simply say that that the people and the scientist are using the same word for different things.
It’s also possible that the “thing” was meaningful to everyone to begin with. I don’t know what “dubious detectability” is. My bar for meaningfulness isn’t as high as you may think, though. “Robot pain” has to fail very hard so as not to pass it.
The idea that with models of physics, it might sometimes be hard to tell which features are detectable and which are just mathematical machinery, is in general a good one. Problem is that it requires good understanding of the model, which neither of us has. And I don’t expect this sort of poking to cause problems that I couldn’t patch, even in the worst case.