That’s assuming that “feeling” is a meaningful category. If you didn’t start from that assumption, and instead identified your experiences
Assuming “experience” is a meaningful category.
with brain states, you could go one step further and ask “are the states of the robot’s processor/memory similar to my brain states”, but then you hit the obvious classification problem.
You hit a classification problem, which is that you don’t know which similarities are relevant, and therefore what kind of group you are aiming at. If you don’t reject experience and feeling, you at least know that you are trying to group brains states that are experientially similar.
Yes, “feeling” and “experience”, are pretty much the same thing, I didn’t mean to imply otherwise in the text you quoted. Instead, the first sentence refers to your definition, and the second offers an alternative one.
You hit a classification problem, which is that you don’t know which similarities are relevant, and therefore what kind of group you are aiming at. If you don’t reject experience and feeling, you at least know that you are trying to group brains states that are experientially similar.
There is a classification problem with tables and chairs. Generally, I know what chairs and tables are supposed to be like, but there are objects similar both to chairs and to tables, and there isn’t any obvious way to choose which of those similarities are more important. At this point someone could suggest that, if we started with the assumption that each object has an associated “chairness”, then that is what we would want to compare. I’m sure you can see why that doesn’t solve anything. And yet this is exactly what you do with experiences, from my point of view.
Yes, “feeling” and “experience”, are pretty much the same thing,
So they are either both meaningful, or both meaningless. But you have used “experience” as though it is meaningful,
and you have implied that “feeling” is meaningless.
That was a predictable problem. Physical identity theory requires statements of the form ” is equivalent to ”. if you reject all vocabulary relating to mental sates, you cannot make that kind of statement, and so cannot express identity theory.
At this point someone could suggest that, if we started with the assumption that each object has an associated “chairness”, then that is what we would want to compare. I’m sure you can see why that doesn’t solve anything. And yet this is exactly what you do with experiences, from my point of view.
Whereas, from my point of view, 1st person experience was there all along.
But you have used “experience” as though it is meaningful, and you have implied that “feeling” is meaningless.
No, I used “experience” as a label. Let me rewrite that part:
That’s assuming that “experience”, as you use that word, is a meaningful category. If you didn’t start from that assumption, and instead defined experiences as brain states, you could …
Is that better? I understand that having two definitions and two similar but not identical concepts in one sentence is confusing. But still I expect you to figure it out. Was “identified” the problem?
Physical identity theory requires statements of the form ” is equivalent to ”. if you reject all vocabulary relating to mental sates <...>
What vocabulary relating to what mental states do I reject? Give examples.
Whereas, from my point of view, 1st person experience was there all along.
Wasn’t “chairness” there too? More importantly, can you actually offer an argument why “chairness” doesn’t exist, other than pointing out that I just made it up? Preferably an argument that I couldn’t make about consciousness just by swapping a few words?
That’s assuming that “experience”, as you use that word, is a meaningful category.
Does “meaningful” mean “meaningful” here , or is it being used as a misleading proxy for something like “immeasurable” or “unnecessary” or “tadasdatys doens’t like it”?
What vocabulary relating to what mental states do I reject?
You keep saying various words are meaningless. One would not want to use meaningless words, generally. OTOH, you have revealed elsewhere that you don’t use “meaningless” to mean “meaningless”. So who knows?
More importantly, can you actually offer an argument why “chairness” doesn’t exist, other than pointing out that I just made it up? Preferably an argument that I couldn’t make about consciousness just by swapping a few words?
Consciousness is in the dictiionary, chariness isn’t.
Consciousness is a concept used by science, chairness isn’t.
Consciousness is supported by empirical evidence, chairness isn’t.
It’s not that words are meaningless, it’s that you sometimes apply them in stupid ways. “Bitter” is a fine word, until you start discussing the “bitterness of purple”.
Consciousness is in the dictiionary, chariness isn’t.
Are dictionary writers the ultimate arbiters of what is real? “Unicorn” is also in the dictionary, by the way.
Consciousness is a concept used by science, chairness isn’t.
Physicalist, medical definition of consciousness is used by science. You accuse me of changing definitions when it suits me, and then proceed to do exactly that. I guess that’s what projection looks like.
Consciousness is supported by empirical evidence, chairness isn’t.
What evidence exactly? I have to assume my last paragraph applies here too.
If you can’t even come up with arguments why a silly concept I made up is flawed, maybe you shouldn’t be so certain in the meaningfulness of other concepts.
Assuming “experience” is a meaningful category.
You hit a classification problem, which is that you don’t know which similarities are relevant, and therefore what kind of group you are aiming at. If you don’t reject experience and feeling, you at least know that you are trying to group brains states that are experientially similar.
Yes, “feeling” and “experience”, are pretty much the same thing, I didn’t mean to imply otherwise in the text you quoted. Instead, the first sentence refers to your definition, and the second offers an alternative one.
There is a classification problem with tables and chairs. Generally, I know what chairs and tables are supposed to be like, but there are objects similar both to chairs and to tables, and there isn’t any obvious way to choose which of those similarities are more important. At this point someone could suggest that, if we started with the assumption that each object has an associated “chairness”, then that is what we would want to compare. I’m sure you can see why that doesn’t solve anything. And yet this is exactly what you do with experiences, from my point of view.
So they are either both meaningful, or both meaningless. But you have used “experience” as though it is meaningful, and you have implied that “feeling” is meaningless.
That was a predictable problem. Physical identity theory requires statements of the form ” is equivalent to ”. if you reject all vocabulary relating to mental sates, you cannot make that kind of statement, and so cannot express identity theory.
Whereas, from my point of view, 1st person experience was there all along.
No, I used “experience” as a label. Let me rewrite that part:
That’s assuming that “experience”, as you use that word, is a meaningful category. If you didn’t start from that assumption, and instead defined experiences as brain states, you could …
Is that better? I understand that having two definitions and two similar but not identical concepts in one sentence is confusing. But still I expect you to figure it out. Was “identified” the problem?
What vocabulary relating to what mental states do I reject? Give examples.
Wasn’t “chairness” there too? More importantly, can you actually offer an argument why “chairness” doesn’t exist, other than pointing out that I just made it up? Preferably an argument that I couldn’t make about consciousness just by swapping a few words?
As opposed to what?
Does “meaningful” mean “meaningful” here , or is it being used as a misleading proxy for something like “immeasurable” or “unnecessary” or “tadasdatys doens’t like it”?
You keep saying various words are meaningless. One would not want to use meaningless words, generally. OTOH, you have revealed elsewhere that you don’t use “meaningless” to mean “meaningless”. So who knows?
Consciousness is in the dictiionary, chariness isn’t.
Consciousness is a concept used by science, chairness isn’t.
Consciousness is supported by empirical evidence, chairness isn’t.
It’s not that words are meaningless, it’s that you sometimes apply them in stupid ways. “Bitter” is a fine word, until you start discussing the “bitterness of purple”.
Are dictionary writers the ultimate arbiters of what is real? “Unicorn” is also in the dictionary, by the way.
Physicalist, medical definition of consciousness is used by science. You accuse me of changing definitions when it suits me, and then proceed to do exactly that. I guess that’s what projection looks like.
What evidence exactly? I have to assume my last paragraph applies here too.
If you can’t even come up with arguments why a silly concept I made up is flawed, maybe you shouldn’t be so certain in the meaningfulness of other concepts.