some universal statements about all theories are very probable, and that
some of our theories are more probable than any particular data.
I’m not seeing why either of these facts are in tension with my previous comment. Would you elaborate?
The claims I made are true of certain priors. I’m not trying to argue you into using such a prior. Right now I only want to make the points that (1) a Bayesian can coherently use a prior satisfying the properties I described, and that (2) falsificationism is true, in a weakened but precise sense, under such a prior.
I agree that
some universal statements about all theories are very probable, and that
some of our theories are more probable than any particular data.
I’m not seeing why either of these facts are in tension with my previous comment. Would you elaborate?
The claims I made are true of certain priors. I’m not trying to argue you into using such a prior. Right now I only want to make the points that (1) a Bayesian can coherently use a prior satisfying the properties I described, and that (2) falsificationism is true, in a weakened but precise sense, under such a prior.