That which can be destroyed by abstract truths might also be abstractly true.
Only when you are dealing with claims which represent fully formalized intuitions does it apply that ‘that which can be destroyed by the truth (is false and therefore) should be.’
Abstract imperatives like “don’t be a dick” and “be cool to each other” are important to remember even if you have a very good formalization, because you basically never know if you’ve really formalized the full set of intuitions, or if you’ve only formalized some parts of the set of intuitions which e.g. “don’t be a dick” and “be cool to each other” capture.
On the other hand, I am curious as to what would happen if we formalized intuitions about levels of abstraction in general.
That which can be destroyed by abstract truths might also be abstractly true.
Only when you are dealing with claims which represent fully formalized intuitions does it apply that ‘that which can be destroyed by the truth (is false and therefore) should be.’
Abstract imperatives like “don’t be a dick” and “be cool to each other” are important to remember even if you have a very good formalization, because you basically never know if you’ve really formalized the full set of intuitions, or if you’ve only formalized some parts of the set of intuitions which e.g. “don’t be a dick” and “be cool to each other” capture.
On the other hand, I am curious as to what would happen if we formalized intuitions about levels of abstraction in general.