In the underlying computer which executes the actions which are represented by this interface, there is nothing that resembles a pointer
Course’ there are: probably 64 bits in memory (for more degree of detail: 64 places of persistent electric charge with two stable states), which change iff pointer moves, and each bit restricts the places pointer can appear at. That resemblance exists certainly; I also agree there’s no resemblance like “small pointer-like thing/charge pattern in RAM module”.
In other words, one has to taboo “resemblance” but it’s not clear if that can be done.
We taboo resemblance all the time for things that refer to other things: Words, for example. The word “mouse” does not resemble a mouse, but we can usefully use the word as a reference. Words that resemble their references are a peculiar and remarkable tiny category (onomatopoeia) that are the exception to the rule.
If you thought your computer interface were an accurate picture of what is going on inside the computer, you might indeed go looking for a microscopic pointer somewhere in the wires. It’s because you don’t think this that you know to look for correspondences and representations instead. Hoffman’s point is that we don’t tend to do this with things like space, time, matter, etc.: we think those things in our interface-with-reality correspond to the same sorts of things in reality-under-the-hood (space, time, matter, etc.). He believes we’re mistaken.
Ok, fair, I agree they do not resemble one another in this kind of way. That isn’t how I was interpreting “resemblence.” I was thinking of it as “correspondence.”
Minor off topic aside: While they are a small minority, I suspect onomatopoeia-like words are probably more common than we usually think. A lot of words resemble, to me, aspects of their referent, even if only in a synesthetic way, or only if you look at older forms of the word. Add that to things like the bouba/kiki effect, and I start to wonder how much we coin new words using some kind of felt, metaphorical sense of meanings corresponding to how sounds feel.
Course’ there are: probably 64 bits in memory (for more degree of detail: 64 places of persistent electric charge with two stable states), which change iff pointer moves, and each bit restricts the places pointer can appear at. That resemblance exists certainly; I also agree there’s no resemblance like “small pointer-like thing/charge pattern in RAM module”.
In other words, one has to taboo “resemblance” but it’s not clear if that can be done.
We taboo resemblance all the time for things that refer to other things: Words, for example. The word “mouse” does not resemble a mouse, but we can usefully use the word as a reference. Words that resemble their references are a peculiar and remarkable tiny category (onomatopoeia) that are the exception to the rule.
If you thought your computer interface were an accurate picture of what is going on inside the computer, you might indeed go looking for a microscopic pointer somewhere in the wires. It’s because you don’t think this that you know to look for correspondences and representations instead. Hoffman’s point is that we don’t tend to do this with things like space, time, matter, etc.: we think those things in our interface-with-reality correspond to the same sorts of things in reality-under-the-hood (space, time, matter, etc.). He believes we’re mistaken.
Ok, fair, I agree they do not resemble one another in this kind of way. That isn’t how I was interpreting “resemblence.” I was thinking of it as “correspondence.”
Minor off topic aside: While they are a small minority, I suspect onomatopoeia-like words are probably more common than we usually think. A lot of words resemble, to me, aspects of their referent, even if only in a synesthetic way, or only if you look at older forms of the word. Add that to things like the bouba/kiki effect, and I start to wonder how much we coin new words using some kind of felt, metaphorical sense of meanings corresponding to how sounds feel.