So, first I think Kant is wrong about noumena. They don’t exist. There are no things in themselves, there are only phenomena
Kant says that noumena don’t exist. Kant also says that the thing in itself does exist. From these statements, we can infer that (despite what many people think) “thing in itself” is not a synonym for “noumenon”.
A noumenon is something external to the mind that is knowable in a purely intellectual, non sensory, way. (Eg. a Platonic form).
A thing itself is the assumed source or cause of a phenomenon (or intuition on Kant’s vocabulary). But there is nothing in the concept of the thing in itself that requires it be knowable noumenally in addition to its phenomenal effects.
The famous statement that the thing in itself is not knowable is another way if saying it is not a noumenon...if it were a noumenon, it would be knowable intellectually. Phenomenonal appearances also do not reveal the thing in itself , because they are only ever in relation to an observing subject … so not “in itself”. Nonetheless, entirely general considerations suggest that appearances must be appearances of something, ie. have external causes
Kant says that noumena don’t exist. Kant also says that the thing in itself does exist. From these statements, we can infer that (despite what many people think) “thing in itself” is not a synonym for “noumenon”.
A noumenon is something external to the mind that is knowable in a purely intellectual, non sensory, way. (Eg. a Platonic form).
A thing itself is the assumed source or cause of a phenomenon (or intuition on Kant’s vocabulary). But there is nothing in the concept of the thing in itself that requires it be knowable noumenally in addition to its phenomenal effects.
The famous statement that the thing in itself is not knowable is another way if saying it is not a noumenon...if it were a noumenon, it would be knowable intellectually. Phenomenonal appearances also do not reveal the thing in itself , because they are only ever in relation to an observing subject … so not “in itself”. Nonetheless, entirely general considerations suggest that appearances must be appearances of something, ie. have external causes